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Issues of Migration in the Region in the Context of the EU Enlargement: a 
Ukrainian Perspective 
I.Pidluska, President of the Europe XXI Foundation, Kyiv, Ukraine 
 
Introduction. The East-West European migration in the region: issues and contexts 
International migration is seen as one of the key challenges of the new globalizing world 
that needs in-depth study, thorough analysis and adequate policies to deal with. The 
migration pressures from the poor East and South to the wealthy West and North have 
added to the growing feelings of insecurity in the European Union member states and 
raised both justified and unjustified concerns among the populations and the governments. 
Those feelings and concerns, rational and irrational alike, have added to prejudice against 
and suspicion of “the others”  - not only (potential) immigrants, illegal “guest workers” 
and asylum seekers from outside Europe, but also eastern and southern Europeans, 
sometimes even including nationals of the states preparing for the accession to the EU. 
After the euphoria of the newly-achieved freedom of Central and Eastern Europe, brought 
by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the former Soviet block, began to 
fade, the migration policies of the EU member states, already strongly unwelcoming to 
international migration, began to move fast in the direction of stricter measures designed 
to limit immigration and regulate movement of people from outside the EU, which gave 
the way to claims that the Berlin Wall could be substituted shortly with a “Schengen Wall” 
that would keep out not only potential illegal immigrants but also discourage travel and 
hinder business and culture exchange within a wider Europe.  
 
As the EU enlargement process gains momentum and a number of countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe are preparing to join the EU and introduce the Schengen regime, it 
becomes increasingly obvious that neither the EU, not the candidate states are fully 
prepared for the new situation that will emerge in their relations with the rest of the 
European continent, i.e., the non-accession countries to the east and south of what will 
soon become the border of an enlarged European Union. Though readiness to start a 
meaningful dialogue on the issues of the movement of people from Eastern Europe to 
Western Europe has been declared by the European Union and individual member states, 
the issue remains largely underexplored and, therefore, surrounded by myths, assumptions 
and “guestimates”. The analysis – and much more so, the implementation – of 
immigration policies is made even more difficult by the fact that the EU, the accession 
countries’, as well as East European non-accession countries’ immigration policies 
themselves are undergoing thorough transformation, and the institutions responsible for 
their implementation are in flux.   
 
There are three dimensions of the migration dilemma in the region as seen in the context 
of the EU enlargement. First, while the EU enlargement is seen as an irreversible and 
generally supported process that may be beneficial to non-accession Eastern European 
countries as well, the current member states of the European Union are apprehensive of 
the influx of the mass of immigrants (seen primarily as cheap labour force for the informal 
sector) from the accession states. The decision to introduce restrictions on free movement 
of labour force from the would-be new EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe 
at least till 2011 has given rise to resentment and criticism of the “second-class 
membership” in the accession states. Second, both the current and the future member 
states of the EU are anxious about migration from further East, primarily from their  
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neighbour states – Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and the Russian Federation. Hence, the 
adoption of restrictive immigration and visa policies by the candidate states vis-à-vis their 
neighbour countries is seen by the official EU as demonstration of their commitment to 
adhere to the EU policies but perceived by many in the accession states as a move that 
may hinder their own interests in relations with their neighbour countries – particularly, 
when shared history and/or substantial economic interests are present. Third, the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe, those preparing for membership and those that are not 
alike, have been donors of migrants to Western Europe themselves and have been used as 
transit routes of transnational illegal migration and organised trafficking in human beings 
to Western Europe. Neither of those states is able to counter the challenge of illegal 
migration alone.  
 
The three countries in focus – Moldova, Romania and Ukraine - have common borders 
and a number of common challenges in the field of management of migration flows and 
borders controls that they need to respond to in a cooperative manner. The purpose of this 
article is to explore some of those challenges from a Ukrainian perspective and suggest 
solutions that may be useful for dealing with the issues in the context of the EU 
enlargement. As Ukraine has been seen as one of the key elements of the EU efforts to 
manage migration flows from and through Eastern Europe, and as the major transit 
migration route through Moldova and Romania goes through Ukraine, the focus of article 
is on the Ukrainian case. The article seeks to consider the trends and statistics of 
westbound migration from Ukraine and of international illegal migration through the 
Ukrainian territory, and to discuss possible responses to the new challenges that stem from 
the introduction of visas by the neighbouring applicant countries, tightening of border 
procedures and the struggle against illegal migration, as well as to formulate proposals for 
measures to be taken in order to make sure that new arrangements do not hinder cross-
border exchange, personal, tourist and business contacts between Ukraine, Moldova and 
Romania and between Ukraine, the region and the enlarged EU in general.  
 
 
Background: different situations, common problems 
 
The issue of migration in the area needs to be considered taking into account three 
different situations of the countries in focus: Moldova, Romania and Ukraine. Romania is 
preparing to joint the European Union and, therefore, its priority is to fulfill the 
membership requirements, the compliance with the Schengen acquis included. Though 
most of its resources, capacity and attention are devoted to fulfilling that goal, the country 
is experiencing substantial difficulties. While fewer Romanians leave the country to settle 
in Western Europe every year1, countering migration through the Romanian territory 
remains a major challenge. Although Romania concluded readmission agreements with 
Austria, Benelux, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, and continued negotiations 
with Portugal, Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Ukraine, Belarus, China, Bulgaria, Lithuania, 
Turkey, Latvia, Yugoslavia, Lebanon and Iran, although the Romanian authorities 
currently apply restrictive visa requirements to nationals of 85 states regarded as major 
donors of illegal migration2, and although an agreement with Moldova regulating mutual  
                                                          
1 In 1990, 96,919 Romanians permanently settled abroad, compared to 18,148 in 1994 and 21,635 in 1997, 
according to the European Parliament report, February 1999.  
2 According to Romanian Mission to the EU, Florin Saghi, Counsellor, August 1998, 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/workingpapers/libe/104/romania_en.htm 
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travel of citizens and tightening border controls was signed on June 29, 2001, Romania 
was the last among the CEE accession states to receive visa-free travel arrangements with 
the EU3. One of the major reasons for that was its slow progress in dealing with migration 
within and through its territory, and the lack of capacity to ensure proper border 
management in order to counter the deterioration of the region into an illegal migrants’ 
gateway to the EU and other accession states.   
 
At the end of 1990s, three major trafficking routes went through Romania to Hungary: 
from Moscow to Chisinãu to Hungary, from Moscow to Kyiv to Hungary, and the 
southern route through Bulgaria and Romania to Hungary.4 Romania was named by 
Hungarian experts as one of the major transit routes for trafficking illegal migrants to the 
West, and Romanians were perceived among major organisers of such criminal 
operations5. Although the Romanian authorities implemented a number of legislative and 
administrative measures to counter illegal migration and border controls were tightened 
and modernised within the framework of the PHARE programme, a European Parliament 
report concluded in February 1999 that “[i]n the field of border control, there seems to be 
no significant progress, though the problem of illegal immigration is growing” but “the 
lack of financial resources makes efficient border controls, and especially the expulsion 
of illegal immigrants to their country of origin, very difficult.” 6 “Particular attention 
should be paid to the borders with Moldova and Ukraine, and the port of Constanza”, the 
document specified. At some point the Czech Republic even announced it would 
temporarily suspend its 1991 bilateral agreement with Romania and introduce visa 
requirements for Romanian citizens as of October 1, 2001, following an increase in the 
number of Romanian asylum seekers and illegal immigrants in the Czech Republic7 to 
over 11% of all asylum seekers and growing at the rate of 30% to 40% a month. Trying to 
cope, the Romanian government announced emergency measures and introduced new 
rules for Romanian nationals who wish to travel abroad. They were required to produce 
proof of medical and car insurance (if travelling by car), a return ticket, and cash or credit 
cards enough to cover expenses abroad for at least five days. Moreover, the new rules 
envisaged punishments of up to 10 years in prison for Romanians who commit crimes 
while abroad and the possible confiscation of the offender's passport for up to five years8. 
A strict “Law on Foreigners” (1998) prohibited Romanians to house foreigners who do not 
have passports and valid visas and demanded that Romanians who provide housing to 
foreigners must inform the police of their presence within 48 hours (the term is limited to 
24 hours for hotels). The mechanism of presenting a written invitation from a Romanian 
citizen (or legal person) approved by the Ministry of Internal Affairs was introduced to 
control the entry of nationals of the countries believed to have “at risk” of supplying 
illegal immigrants. Romanians who invited such foreigners had to formally declare  
                                                          
3 A Regulation of the EU Council of Ministers (539/2001 of 15 March 2001) includes Romania among the 
countries whose nationals are exempted from the visa obligation when entering EU member states. However, the 
Regulation also stipulated that the exemption would not enter into force as regards Romania until the Council of 
Ministers has decided so at a later stage on the basis of a report from the Commission. On September 29, 2001, 
the European Commission adopted a report that recommended that Romanian citizens should be exempted from 
the visa obligation from 1 January 2002. 
4 Council of Europe, CDMG, 'Evolution récente des politiques relatives aux migrations et aux migrants', 
Provisional version, 28 August 1998, p.66 
5 Organized Crime, Drug-related Crime and Illegal Migration in the Central and East European Region. A 
special report by Gyorgy Csoti (Hungary), NATO International Secretariat, April 14, 1997,  
http://www.nato-pa.int/publications/comrep/1997/ap84cce.pdf. 
6 emphasized as in the original text 
7 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, August 30, 2001 
8 RFE/RL, September 5, 2001 
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responsibility for expenses during the foreigners' stay in Romania and provide proof of a 
bank guarantee. The same applied to tourist companies that arranged travel of those 
foreigners to Romania. The visa still could be denied if an applicant was unable to prove 
that he/she had enough money for the intended stay in Romania, or based on suspicion that 
he/she might intend to overstay in the country, or in cases of diseases seen as dangerous 
for public health, or in the case of criminal records. The measures were criticised as rather 
controversial from the perspective of respect for human rights, but they have contributed 
to convincing the EU of Romania’s desire to have the visa restrictions for its own citizens 
lifted. While the EU later decided to lift visa restrictions for Romanians, the Czech 
measures were not enforced, and the incentives for Romania’s nationals to emigrate in 
search for better living in wealthier countries of the EU have been reduced (though are still 
present), but the capacity to manage migration through Romania remains insufficient. 
Struggling to cope with the problem, since the end of 1998 Romania has established and 
improved information exchange and co-operation with border police units in Belgium, 
France, Germany, Greece, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Slovak Republic, 
Turkey, Ukraine and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and recently announced its 
commitment to serve as an anchor of stability in the region and a barrier to organised 
crime. 
 
While similar to Romania in a number of socio-economic aspects, Moldova and Ukraine 
are generally in a different situation as far as their political relations with the EU are 
concerned. Both of the countries have Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the 
European Union which involves the obligations to pursue reforms and approximation of 
legislation with that of the EU, and provides for co-operation with the EU in a number of 
areas, including the justice and home affairs but, unlike Romania’s association agreement, 
does not envisage the prospect of eventual accession to the EU. Both Moldova and 
Romania have officially voiced aspirations for joining the EU but their chances to be 
considered by the EU as candidate states in the foreseeable future are marginal. However, 
both still have high hopes for some sort of “de facto membership”9, particularly after being 
invited and having taken part in the European Conference in 2001 to address measures to 
combat terrorism. Both Ukraine and Moldova are experiencing severe economic and 
social problems of the half-way transition. Ukraine, due to its size and location, is very 
important for the security of the enlarging EU, particularly as far as different aspects of the 
movement of persons and goods through Europe are concerned, but the mixed signals sent 
by the country’s leadership and the slow transformation justify the EU’s cautious attitude 
to the country’s declared “strategic goal”10. While urging the EU to take into account 
possible negative consequences of the enlargement for Ukraine and to continue the visa 
dialogue to prevent “the emergence of new division lines” between Ukraine and the 
enlarged EU, the government lacks political will to pursue legal demarcation of Ukraine’s 
eastern border, thus making claims for an association status mainly theoretical ones. In 
Moldova, the Transniestria conflict displaced well over 100,000 people in 1992 and left 
about 200 kilometres of the eastern border of the country – common with Ukraine – 
controlled by separatist authorities of the self-proclaimed Transniestrian Republic. The 
situation creates a major security challenge for the country and the region in general. Both 
Ukraine and Moldova are seen as donors of sources of insecurity and major transit routes 
for illegal migration, transborder organised crime, trafficking in human beings, drugs, and  
                                                          
9 a definition by State Secretary for European Integration at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine 
Oleksandr Chaly, The Day, #31, November 5, 2001 
10 The Strategy of Integration of Ukraine to the European Union (1998) and the Program of Integration of 
Ukraine to the European Union (2000) proclaim achieving membership in the EU as Ukraine’s strategic goal  
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smuggling. Both have notoriously “porous” borders and lack adequate policies, material 
and technical capacity as well as integrity and skills of relevant personnel to respond to the 
migration and trafficking challenges properly. As the Ukrainian-Polish border becomes 
increasingly tight for illegal migrants to cross, the incentives to use the still “easier” 
southern route Ukraine-Moldova-Romania and further to the West and Southwest grow. 
But illegal migration through the countries’ territories is not the only problem. The three 
countries are constantly listed by the International Organisation for Migration and other 
agencies among the countries of origin of large numbers of victims of trafficking in human 
beings, as well as of traffickers. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior, in the 
past decade at least 400,000 Ukrainian women had been trafficked, although Ukrainian 
NGOs and researchers believe the number to be higher11. According to the International 
Organisation for Migration, Moldova, Romania and Ukraine are among the leaders in 
trafficking in human beings – though accurate figures are unavailable, it is believed that of 
about 120,000 women sold to sex slavery in Europe in 2000 a major share come from 
these countries. According to various estimates, up to 45% women trafficked to sex 
slavery in Europe are Moldovan, and 7-11% are Ukrainian. Ukrainians comprise 56% of 
women trafficked to Bulgaria, and the share of Moldovans is 36%. 57% of trafficked sex 
slaves in Albania and 48% in Bosnia and Herzegovina are Moldovans.12 
 
As the EU enlargement process takes momentum, both Moldova and Ukraine are trying to 
avoid negative consequences of adoption of the Schengen regime by their neighbours, but 
appeal more to “special relationships” (between Moldova and Romania, and between 
Ukraine and Poland, on the one hand, and Ukraine and Russia, on the other hand), 
transforming even technical issues of border management into highly politicised 
dilemmas. Romania seeks to find a balance between “privileged” and “pragmatic” 
approaches to its relations with Moldova. In April 2001, it announced a plan to introduce 
passport controls at the border crossing for Moldovan and Ukrainian citizens in an effort 
to secure its eastern borders and have its own visa requirements to the EU lifted13 and even 
agreed to provide half of the amount of $2.5 million to help Moldova issue new passports 
to avoid criticism of trying to limit Moldovan citizens' access to Romania. According to 
Romanian President Ion Iliescu, the passport restrictions were necessary to limit illegal 
immigration from Transdniester into Europe, and "[m]oldovans will be free to travel to 
and from Romania - but without access to [the] Schengen [agreement] space. This will be 
the case for both Moldova and Ukraine. But Moldova has a much more difficult situation 
on its border with the Transdniester zone. Transdniester has become a hub for arms and 
drugs trafficking, and for other things."14 In less then four months of 2001 alone, 
Romanian border police turned back some 10,000 illegal immigrants trying to reach 
Western Europe15. According to Alexandru Farcas, a state secretary in Romania's Interior 
Ministry, the country's border with Moldova has become a regular route for smuggling 
illegal immigrants into Western Europe: "Almost daily, Romanian border police are 
confronted with larger or smaller groups of people who attempt illegally to cross the 
Moldovan border into Romania, helped by professional guides. [They include] people 
from Afghanistan, Iran, even from some African countries."16  
                                                          
11 Trafficking in Migrants Quarterly Bulletin. Special Issue. International Organization for Migration, April 2001 
12 Washington Profile, February 22, 2002. http://www.washprofile.org/SUBJECTS/Bondmaids.html 
13 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, May 2, 2001 
14 ibid. 
15 RFE/RL, April 25, 2001 
16 ibid 
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On October 19, 2001, prime ministers of Ukraine and Moldova signed the Protocol on 
exchange of ratification instruments of the Ukrainian-Moldovan treaty on the state borders 
(signed in August 1999). A round of bilateral consultations on the issues was launched, 
including the bilateral talks on consular issues in Kyiv on November 29-30, 2001. At the 
end of 2001, Ukraine and Moldova agreed on a stricter border crossing regime and agreed 
to control the Ukrainian-Moldovan border jointly17 but the agreement did not meet support 
of the authorities of the breakaway Transniestria. The move was seen as very important for 
facilitating co-operation in border guarding and prevention of illegal migration. Yet, many 
more efforts, both political and technical, are required to effectively cut down the illegal 
migration flow along the Ukraine-Moldova-Romania “axis”. 
 
 
The framework: EU migration policies overview 
 
In order to understand why migration and border management are so high on the agenda of 
the three countries in focus, it is necessary to consider the attitudes and policies towards 
those issues in the European Union, relations with which are the top priorities for 
Moldova, Romania and Ukraine.  
 
The political thinking on costs and benefits of transitional migration in Europe and 
subsequently in the European Union, and involvement in the processes, evolved from 
practical non-intervention of the European governments (and, in fact, massive emigration 
of the population) before the World War I, through the perceptions of immigration as a 
vehicle of economic reconstruction and an expression of a fundamental right to leave the 
country  that does not offer conditions for one’s safe and secure living, to stricter then ever 
immigration controls and asylum policies that gave rise to criticism of the “Fortress 
Europe”. While after the World War II Western Europe needed the influx of migrant 
labour in order to rebuild its ruined economy and admitted about 10 million 
“guestworkers” from other countries and regions, following the oil crisis of 1973-1974 and 
related growth in unemployment rates Western European governments began to adopt and 
implement immigration policies that reflected their populations’ suspicion and fear of the 
“aliens”. The issue of migration to Western Europe was further complicated by the 
collapse of the Warsaw Pact and, subsequently, of the Soviet Union itself (1989-1991), 
followed with the opening of western borders of the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe and the former USSR, and then the break-up and bloodshed in the former 
Yugoslavia. Recently, the tragic events of September 11, 2001 and subsequent war on 
terrorism have brought a new dimension to the issue, and added to the feeling of growing 
insecurity, sometimes referred to as “the September 11 factor”. Although no documented 
evidence of direct correlation between international migration and terrorism is available, 
the implicit linkage has added to the xenophobic perceptions in Western Europe and 
stimulated the pursuit for collective and effective solutions.  
 
The tightening of immigration controls and perception of migration as a security threat has 
been based on the assumption that uncontrolled mass immigration may endanger social 
cohesion, put an additional burden on labour markets and social security systems of 
countries of the European Union, and challenge their national security. While the right to 
leave any country including one’s own was universally recognised, the possibility to enter 
another country was questioned and, in fact, deliberately limited. The European Union has 
repeatedly voiced concern about illegal migration and called for development of a single  
                                                          
17 Liga Online, November 9, 2001 
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European asylum policy to counter the challenge of “asylum shopping”, i.e., multiple 
application for asylum submitted by the same individual to a number of EU states in the 
hope that complicated and sometimes contradictory procedures of processing the 
applications will increase the chances to receive the desired permission to stay in the EU.  
 
Meanwhile, Western Europe continued building an “area of freedom, security and justice” 
within its frontiers, gradually lifting borders within their populations.  Migration within 
the EU was substantially liberalised by the Treaty of Rome (1957) and further by the 
provision for free movement of persons introduced by Article 8 of the Single European 
Act (1986, ratified in 1987) that envisaged the abolition of controls at the internal borders 
between the EU member states, necessary to facilitate free movement of labour within the 
common internal market that was expected to be established by December 31, 1992. The 
Schengen Agreement (1985) provided for gradual abolition of border controls on the 
common borders of Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. 
Subsequently, the Schengen Implementation Agreement (1990) provided for elimination 
of internal border checks, combined with tightening of the external borders of the EU, as 
well as the pursuit of a unified visa policy and co-ordinated national asylum policies with 
regard third country nationals that arrive and stay on the territory of the Schengen member 
states for up to 90 days. Long-term stay, however, remained subject to regulations by 
national immigration authorities. A common information system, Schengen Information 
System (SIS I) was introduced to facilitate information sharing about border crossings. 
The Schengen Implementation Agreement (1990), and the Dublin Convention on the State 
Responsible for the Examination of an Asylum Claim (1990, entered into force in 1997) 
required harmonisation of national asylum policies as they provided that asylum 
applications of claimants that enter the European Community illegally should be processed 
in the first EC/EU member state that he/she entered. The readmission agreements with 
other states were chosen as a mechanism of legitimising deportation of illegal migrants to 
the territory of  the state from which they arrived.  
 
However, individual member states of the European Community in the 1880s and early 
1990s perceived the control over their frontiers as one of the key features of national 
sovereignty. Moreover, there  were noticeable differences in historic circumstances, 
interests and perspectives of the states on specific aspects of immigration and asylum 
policies. Hence, the EC member states were reluctant to agree to dealing with such 
sensitive issues at the supranational level and opted for an intergovernmental approach, 
whereby issues of migration were dealt with by the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration, 
established in 1986 as a forum for dialogue and interaction between senior officials of the 
EC member states responsible for migration issues. In 1988, a Group of Coordinators was 
established by the European Council to facilitate further institutionalisation of efforts to 
respond to migration-related challenges and to pave the way to a common immigration 
and visa policy.     
  
A substantial contribution to the building of a common EU immigration policy was made 
by the 1992 Treaty of the European Union (commonly referred to as the Maastricht Treaty) 
that called for harmonisation of visa policies, information sharing, taking joint action 
against illegal immigration and harmonisation of national asylum laws. Seeking to 
increase control over immigration, both legal and illegal, the EU member states agreed on 
introduction of stricter visa requirements, tightening the external border "perimeter", and 
coordination in dealing with asylum applications. Title VI of the Treaty of the European 
Union set the objective “to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of  
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freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the Member States in 
the fields of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters and by preventing and 
combating racism and xenophobia”, among other things, by means of countering 
trafficking in persons. In 1995, Regulation 2317/95 on the implementation of Article 100c 
of the Maastricht Treaty was adopted by the Council of the EU. The Regulation introduced 
a list of 101 countries whose citizens needed visas to enter the European Union.  
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) made a radical step of taking the issues of asylum and 
migration policies from the authority of individual member states and communitarising 
them by means of incorporating them in Title IV (Cooperation in the Field of Justice and 
Home Affairs). The set of rules, regulations and instruments, designed for dealing with 
issues of movement of persons (visas, asylum, immigration, etc.), collectively referred to 
as the Schengen acquis, was introduced into the community framework. Not only the 
move reflected dissatisfaction with the deficit of democratic and transparent decision-
making in the third pillar, but also responded to the need of the extension of the acquis 
communautaire to the accession states. While the treaty introduced flexibility clauses for 
Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland, this option was not envisaged for the 
accession states who have to implement the Schengen acquis in full before actually joining 
the EU.     
 
The conclusion of the Europe agreements of the early 1990s and the start of the Central 
and Eastern European countries’ movement towards the EU membership was followed, on 
the one hand, with liberalisation of movement of nationals of the CEE states in the EU 
and, on the other hand, by the tightening of border controls and introduction of 
immigration restrictions by the CEE states for nationals of the third states and stateless 
persons. In 1991, the major intergovernmental Conference on the Movement of Persons 
from Central and Eastern European Countries gathered in Vienna to discuss ways of 
improvement of  border controls and strengthening police co-operation in the fighting 
against illegal immigration. The implementation of measures in the field of the JHA was 
included in pre-accession strategies for the CEE states. 
 
Regarded among “safe third states”, the CEE countries were encouraged to sign 
readmission agreements, seen as one of the mechanisms of fostering immigration control, 
expulsion of intercepted illegal migrants and rejected asylum claimants. In 1991, a 
“model” readmission agreement was signed between the five Schengen states (Germany, 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg), and Poland. The readmission agreement 
applied to both Polish and Schengen states’ nationals as well as to nationals of the third 
countries and stateless persons who arrived to the territory of the Schengen states through 
the Polish territory18, and was followed shortly with the decision to grant visa-free travel 
to Polish citizens in the Schengen states. That model readmission agreement was later 
used as the basis for a harmonised approach, formulated in the Draft Council 
Recommendation on a specimen bilateral readmission agreement between a Member State 
of the European Union and a Third Country, initiated by Germany and adopted by the 
Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers at the end of 1994. Some more readmission 
agreements were signed on bilateral basis, including those between Germany and Poland, 
Germany and the Czech Republic, Austria and Poland, Austria and the former 
Czechoslovakia. A significant impact was made by the provision under which Germany  
                                                          
18 Lavenex, Sandra. Security Threat or Human Right? Conflicting Frames in the Eastern Enlargement of the EU 
Asylum and Immigration Policies. Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, EUI Working Paper series, 
RSC # 2000/7 
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undertook the obligation to provide substantial technical and financial assistance to meet 
the costs of implementing that agreement. In 1994-1996, Germany was the first to sign a 
different type of bilateral readmission agreements – with countries seen as donors of 
illegal immigrants (including Romania, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Vietnam, and Algeria)19, applicable only to nationals of 
the parties to the agreements and designed to facilitate deportation of illegal migrants from 
those countries, but not followed with lifting the visa regime for those countries’ nationals.  
 
The Vienna Action Plan, presented by the JHA Council to the December 1998 Vienna 
Council, placed a common asylum and immigration policy high on the agenda, further 
developed by the Conclusions of the Tamper EU Council. In May 1999, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam came into force, signifying the integration of the Schengen acquis into the EU. 
Two months later the Europol became operational. In October 1999, a special summit on 
asylum and immigration, held in Tampere, Finland, adopted Presidency Conclusions 
dealing with the issues of migration, among other issues of justice and home affairs (JHA). 
As the first step in the common JHA, the summit called for the establishment of joint 
investigation teams to fight trafficking in human beings and terrorism. The Tampere 
conclusions also set the framework for the establishment of the Eurojust, a body whose 
task was to facilitate the co-ordination of national prosecuting authorities and support 
criminal investigations in cases of organised crime. 
  
The proposals for countering illegal immigration, that have been put on the table by the 
European Commission since the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force, include a Directive 
on temporary protection in case of mass influx of displaced persons, a proposal for the 
creation of a European Refugee Fund20, Communications on a common EU migration 
policy and a common asylum procedure, and a Proposal for a directive on minimum 
standards for conditions for the reception of asylum-seekers (February 2001). The 
agreement was also reached to work together towards establishing a Common European 
Asylum System. In March 2001 the Council of the EU adopted a regulation that 
introduced the 123-country negative list (or “black list”, as it is called by its critics) that 
required on all member states of the EU to abolish the practice of visa-free short-stay 
arrangements with countries of their choice and introduced mandatory visa regime with 
the listed 123 states. The EURODAC, a system seen as a tool for facilitating the 
implementation of the Dublin Convention and cutting opportunities for “asylum 
shopping”, was finally enacted in February 2002. Thus, the issue of management of 
international migration became one of the key aspects of the “third pillar” of the EU and 
the capability to co-operate with the EU member states’ bodies and institutions on the 
issue became one of the priorities for the accession states.  
 
Ukraine: a framework for trying to cope with the migration challenge 
 
The issues of migration from Ukraine to the EU and the candidate states, transit illegal 
migration through the territory of Ukraine further westwards, and actual as well as 
possible joint actions (to be) taken by Ukraine, the EU and the candidate states have been 
high on the agenda of the Ukraine-EU dialogue and bilateral dialogues between Ukraine 
and individual candidate states that have common borders with Ukraine. Development of 
sound policies on those issues is demanded both by Ukraine’s officially declared strategic 
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 goal of achieving full membership of the EU and by the political and practical necessity 
to foster security and stability in the region and counter negative consequences of the 
emergence of new division lines between members and non-members of the EU 
enlargement project.  
 
According to Article 33 of the Ukrainian Constitution, freedom of movement, freedom to 
choose the place of residence and freedom to leave Ukraine are granted to every person 
who stays legally on the Ukrainian territory. Article 26 of the Constitution stipulates that 
any foreigner or stateless person who stays in Ukraine legally enjoy the same rights and 
freedoms (except in cases specified by the Constitution, laws and international agreements 
to which Ukraine is a party), and may claim asylum. The legal status of refugees and 
asylum claimants is specified by the law “On Refugees”. Within the recent years, Ukraine 
has developed a visa policy concept, based on individual approaches to different countries, 
and approved laws “On Citizenship”, “On Legal Status of Foreigners”, “On the State 
Border of Ukraine”, “On the Border Guard Troops of Ukraine”, and “On Operative 
Investigative Activity”.  
 
Since the relations between the EU and Ukraine began to develop, slowly but steadily, in 
mid-1990s and particularly late 1990s and early 2000s, a number of documents forming 
the basis for co-operation in the field of managing migration and strengthening border 
controls have been signed. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between 
Ukraine and the EU, signed in 1994 and enacted in 1998, paid substantial attention to co-
operation in countering illegal migration and approximation of Ukraine’s legislation in the 
field of migration to the EU standards. The Strategy of Integration of Ukraine to the 
European Union21 (June 1998) emphasised that as a result of the EU eastward enlargement 
will create a common border of the EU and Ukraine and “a principally new geopolitical 
situation” in the region, but did not mention migration as such. Just a few month later, 
however, the Program of Integration of Ukraine to the European Union (September 2000) 
formulated priorities for dealing with international transborder illegal migration and 
migration (including labour migration) from the territory of Ukraine. The program outlines 
the needs to be addressed and frames for co-operation with the European Union on the 
matters of approximation of the Ukrainian migration and asylum legislation to that of the 
EU, creating conditions for joining the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees and the 1967 
Protocol to it. To counter the challenges that stem from illegal immigration and improve 
its prospects for European integration, Ukraine has created a broad (though still 
insufficient) legal framework, including the strategy of countering illegal migration, 
introduced by presidential decrees “On the Complex Program of Fighting Crime for 1996-
2000” (September 1996), “The Issue of Immigration Control” (February 1999), and the 
Program for Fighting Illegal Migration for 1999-2000, the law “On Immigration” (July 
2001). However, Ukraine’s efforts to counter illegal migration have been hindered by the 
lack of readmission agreements with countries of origin of illegal migrants and transit 
states. To cope, in mid-February 2001 the Ukrainian parliament passed a law "On 
Amending Some Legal Acts of Ukraine for Fighting Illegal Migration", introducing 
criminal liability for repeated illegal border crossing. Also, the Criminal Code (Article 19) 
introduced criminal liability for organising or managing trafficking in human beings. The 
awareness of the need for readmission agreements, however, is present at the level of 
executive authorities dealing with the issues, as well as the understanding that concluding 
such agreements with countries to the west of Ukraine only without synchronising the 
process with concluding similar agreements with its eastern neighbours, primarily Russia  
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and other CIS member states, may result in transformation of Ukraine from a transit 
country into a recipient country that will have to deal with the migration pressure on its 
own. Voicing his concern on the matter, State Secretary for European Integration of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Oleksandr Chaly stated at the European 
Conference in Brussels in October 2001 that the strengthening of controls at the EU’s 
external frontiers might cause the transformation of Ukraine into “a country where illegal 
migration will stay to settle down”22. The European Conference approved the decision to 
provide assistance in dealing with the challenge to countries from which illegal 
immigrants arrive to the EU. The list of such countries included Poland and the Russian 
Federation, but not Ukraine23.   
 
The proposals for improving the situation in the field of migration and continue the “visas-
for-Ukrainians” dialogue with the EU were formally presented as position papers and 
memoranda to relevant EU bodies: "Position paper for negotiations between Ukraine and 
the EU on minimising negative impacts connected with the EU enlargement" (early 2001), 
"Memorandum of Ukraine on concluding an agreement [on co-operation] between 
Ukraine and the EU in the field of the fight against organised crime" (at the Paris Ukraine-
EU Summit on 15 September 2000), and a position paper on "Reflection of the Ukrainian 
side on a Joint Action Plan on Common Action between Ukraine and the EU in the Area 
of Justice and Home Affairs" (at the third meeting of the Co-operation Committee 
between Ukraine and the EC on 18 December 2000).  
 
In January 2001, the President of Ukraine signed a decree “On Measures to Strengthen the 
Fighting Against Illegal Migration”24 that approved the Program for the Fighting of Illegal 
Migration in 2001-2004 and authorised the Ministry of the Interior of Ukraine to act as the 
co-ordinating body for the efforts designed to counter illegal migration. The Program 
outlined the key tasks in the area as keeping out illegal migrants who do not formally 
apply for a refugee status or asylum, cutting transitional channels of illegal migration, 
countering trafficking in human beings and enhancing immigration controls. By the end of 
2001 the Cabinet was to draft amendments to the laws “On the Legal Status of Foreigners” 
and a number of other related pieces of legislation that would ensure state funding of 
departure of foreigners who do not possess substantial funds or documents necessary to 
leave Ukraine, as well as to timely return of foreigners who arrive to Ukraine as students, 
and provide for responsibility of passenger carriers for transporting illegal migrants to the 
territory of Ukraine. The decree also ordered establishment of facilities for temporary stay 
of asylum claimants and detained illegal migrants in the Carpathian region and Kyiv by 
the end of 2003, and to pursue approximation of the Ukrainian legislation on border 
control issues and law enforcement in the field of migration with the EU legislation by the 
end of 2004. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Border Guard 
Committee of Ukraine were ordered to “take measures to complete the agreement and 
legal process of formalising the state border of Ukraine with the Republic of Belarus, the 
Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation” by 200325. In order to discourage the 
creation of opportunities for illegal migration, through mechanisms of joint ventures, tour 
operators, educational institutions, a number of annual preventive operations have been 
introduced: “Kordon” (“The Border”), “Rubizh” (“The Barrier”), “Inozemets” (“The 
Foreigner”), “Migrant” (carried out by the State Border Guard Committee, the Ministry of 
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 the Interior and the Security Service of Ukraine), “Pidpryjemets” (“The Businessman”) 
(conducted by the State Taxation Administration, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of 
the Interior, the Security Service of Ukraine), “Student” (carried out by the Ministry of 
Education of Ukraine, the Ministry of the Interior, the State Border Guard Committee, the 
Security Service of Ukraine), “Tourist” (carried out by the State Committee for Youth, 
Sports and Tourism, the Ministry of the Interior, the State Border Guard Committee, the 
Security Service of Ukraine), and “Magistral” (“The Highway”) (conducted by the 
Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of the Interior, the State Border Guard Committee, the 
Security Service of Ukraine, the State Customs Service). However, the variety of tasks and 
the diversity of the agencies involved (particularly given the lack of coordination and 
information exchange between them) give reason for well-founded doubts about 
effectiveness of such operations. So far the results of operations of the kind have been 
limited. According to Minister of the Interior of Ukraine Yuri Smirnov, the measures, 
undertaken by the militia and the border guards, designed to reduce the flow of illegal 
migrants to Ukraine, so far have brought no tangible results. The illegals enter Ukraine 
without much trouble through the eastern border and equally easily reach the eastern 
border of the country.”26 
 
On June 7, 2001, 351 out of 450 members of the Ukrainian parliament voted in favour of 
the law “On Immigration” that provided for introduction of an annual immigration quota 
(to be specified by the government) and for the establishment of a single national 
executive agency for migration. In early July the law was signed by the president of 
Ukraine and came into force one month later. The new law allowed legalisation of 
immigration status of a number of foreigners and stateless persons, for instance, those who 
arrived to Ukraine before March 6, 1998 under the April 1981 agreement between the 
USSR and Vietnam for professional training and work, or refugees from Abkhazia 
(Georgia) who have lived in Ukraine for at least five years. To qualify for immigration, 
such persons will have to apply for it within six months since the enacting of the new 
immigration law. Immigration will also be open for officially registered refugees, their 
parents, spouses and children under 18 who have lived in Ukraine for at least three years. 
Yet, positive effect of these measures so far have appeared to be limited by the scope of 
the problem as well as by the lack of adequate response to related challenges.  
 
The prospect for major improvement was opened by the commitment to develop the Joint 
Action Plan in the field of JHA and enhance co-operation in the field, stressed in the 
Conclusions of the EU-Ukraine summit in Yalta in September 2001. The Joint Action 
Plan, adopted at the end of 2001, identified as top priorities the negotiations of a 
readmission agreement, strengthening of management of borders and development of 
border infrastructure, establishment of a State Migration Service of Ukraine, addressing 
issues of immigration, co-operation in combating illegal immigration to the EU through 
Ukraine, trafficking in human beings, organised crime and terrorism27 and committed to 
consider the impact of the EU enlargement on the region and continuation of the dialogue 
on visa issues. The tasks and the commitment to pursue them were reconfirmed by the 5th 
meeting of the Cooperation Council between the EU and Ukraine on March 11, 2002.  
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Ukraine as a transit country: Illegal migration through the territory of Ukraine to 
countries of the EU 
 
For a variety of reasons, Ukrainian officials like to emphasise that Ukraine is pivotal for 
European security and stability and stress its “keystone” geopolitical position in the heart 
of the European continent. Depending on the context, Ukraine has been described either as 
a “bridge” or a “buffer” between the enlarging European Union and the rest of the “wider 
Europe” and territories farther to the east. As far as the migration issues are concerned, 
geography matters: Ukraine has been particularly attractive as a convenient (and one of the 
shortest) route to Western Europe, the destination of international illegal migrants.  
 
The state border of Ukraine include 4,247.86 km of the land sector, 1,414.73 km of the 
river sector and 1,351.6 km of the see line, including the 1,971.6-km border with the 
Russian Federation, 1,222-km border with Moldova, 1,084.2-km border with Belarus, 
608.6-km border with Romania, 542.3-km border with Poland, 135.1 km-border with 
Hungary, and 98.7-km border with Slovakia.28 The funding of the Border Guard Troops is 
provided at the more then modest (and obviously insufficient) level of about US$ 50 
million a year. That border line is protected by 38,000 border guard troops of the State 
Border Guard Committee. Less then 6,000 border guard troops protect the longest 
common border of Ukraine with another state – almost 2,000 km of a still virtual border 
with the Russian Federation, though that number of troops is likely to be increased shortly 
by almost 2.5 times as the border guard troops are moved from the western to the eastern 
frontiers of the country29.  Meanwhile, it is the eastern sector of the Ukrainian border and 
the Ukrainian-Moldovan border that are seen as critical for countering “new security 
challenges”, i.e., illegal immigration, drug trafficking, smuggling of weapons and illicit 
substances. Neither of those sectors of the border is officially demarcated, and for political 
reasons there are serious doubts if Ukrainian-Russian border will be demarcated in the 
foreseeable future. It is estimated that about 30 million foreigners cross the borders of 
Ukraine every year. In 1991-2001, 560 million border crossings had been registered. The 
border guard troops had prevented 182,000 illegal border crossings, apprehended 85,000 
illegal immigrants, mainly from Afghanistan (32% of the whole number of the 
apprehended illegal immigrants), India (25%), Vietnam (13%), Iraq (8%), Bangladesh 
(6%), China (4%), Pakistan (3%) and Sri Lanka (3%)30. The numbers of illegal migrants, 
apprehended at the Ukrainian state border, increased dramatically from 148 in 1991 and 
789 in 1992 to as many as 9,086 in 1993, 11,443 in 1994, with a decline to 9,790 in 1995 
and 7,224 in 1996, then a rapid increase to 10,776 in 1997, 11,744 in 1998, 14,646 in 
1999, and the drop to 5,422 in 2000 and further decrease to 4,621 in 200131. The decrease 
occurred, presumably, due to the improved border management and migration control. 
While most of those migrations have occurred through the Ukrainian-Russian border, new 
transit channels –through the territories of Belarus and Moldova - have emerged, as the 
efforts to tighten the control at the Ukrainian-Russian border began to be taken. About 
70% of the illegal immigrants were apprehended when attempting to cross the western  
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border of Ukraine. More than 80% of them still stay on the territory of Ukraine, as 
Ukraine does not have readmission agreements with their countries of origin and the 
government lacks funds for their deportation. Since 1998, over 138 thousand illegal 
migrants, apprehended on the territory of Ukraine, have not been deported because of the 
lack of funding for the deportation procedures32. The official figures reflect only a small 
proportion of the real number of illegal migrants on the territory of Ukraine (like on a 
territory of any other country), as real figures are practically impossible to give. The 
difference between official statistics of migration and the real figures emerge because the 
border guard troops count only apprehended illegal migrants (“violators of the border”), 
while the data provided by the Ministry of Interior reflect the number of protocols and 
fines imposed on foreigners who have been found to be living in this country illegally. 
Unlike in the legislation of most of European states, until the recent adoption of the 
Criminal Code trafficking in human beings had not been seen as criminal offence. 
Moreover, only slightly over a decade ago, before the collapse of the USSR, the problem 
of illegal migration through that country did not exist; hence, there were no state policy 
and institutions for dealing with the challenge.    
 
Presenting the draft law "On Immigration" to the Ukrainian parliament, Verkhovna Rada, 
in November 2000, official representative of President Kuchma in the parliament Roman 
Bezsmertnyi argued that both immigration to Ukraine and transit migration through the 
Ukrainian territory had been growing rapidly. According to various data, the estimated 
number of illegal migrants from countries of Asia and Africa in the territory of Ukraine 
exceeds 100,000 persons. However, the figure, currently available from the border guard 
and security services, reflects only the number of detained illegal migrants. According to 
Bezsmertnyi, the number of applications for Ukrainian citizenship increased from 5,763 in 
1994 to 72,797 in 1999. However, the number of claimants of citizenship, asylum or 
permanent residence permits is not the principle matter of concern. To date, only about 
3,000 persons, over 1,600 of them from Afghanistan, have a formal refugee status. Rather, 
the problem is the spread of illegal immigration and transit migration, and related 
challenges. According to Bezsmertnyi, at least 1,6 million illegal migrants had stayed on 
the territory of Ukraine. The costs for the Ukrainian budget, related to the presence of 
more than 85,000 apprehended illegal migrants, is at least US$ 300 million a year - a 
substantial amount of money for a country like Ukraine. In 1999-2000, illegal migrants on 
the Ukrainian territory became victims of 4,742 crimes and committed 1,240 crimes33. 
Trafficking in human beings had grown into a leading “specialisation” for the Ukrainian 
organised crime and the third most profitable activity after drug dealing and sales of stolen 
cars. An average cost of transporting an illegal migrant from a Middle East country to 
Western Europe through Ukraine is about $6,000. 
 
What are the reasons for transformation of international migration into one of the key 
issues for Ukraine in its relations with its neighbour states and Western Europe, 
particularly in the context of the EU enlargement? There are a number of objective and 
subjective, internal and external factors that make Ukraine an attractive transit route: its 
convenient geographical location, the disintegration of the “Iron Curtain” combined with 
the lack of well-guarded borders, its lax migration policy vis-à-vis a number of countries 
of the former USSR that enable almost unrestricted movement of those countries’ 
nationals in vast territories from the Far East to the eastern borders of Poland, Hungary, 
Romania and Slovakia, loop-holes in the legislation, as well as a huge shadow sector of  
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the economy, massive impoverishment of the population, in combination with the absence 
of conflicts and generally tolerant attitude to foreigners in the Ukrainian society. Internal 
factors that further complicate dealing with the illegal migration challenge include the lack 
of coordination of actions of seven ministries and agencies that are in change of 
countering illegal migration34, inadequate visa policy and the lack of clear rules of the stay 
of foreigners on the territory of Ukraine, technical deterioration of outdated border 
protection and control infrastructure and equipment, lack of resources for dealing with 
apprehended illegal migrants, and widespread corruption among border guards, the policy, 
customs officers35. The external factors include, in addition to the geographical location, 
the lack of readmission agreements with countries from which illegal immigrants arrive to 
Ukraine and the lack of practical co-operation in the field of JHA with the EU and the 
accession states.  
 
The costs of the failure to manage international migration properly and counter illegal 
migration to and through Ukraine effectively are high. While the current migration 
pressure on Ukraine cannot be compared with that on Western Europe, where the 
estimated 20-fold increase in immigration within the past decade has forced governments 
and the EU in general to address the unemployment problem and take measures to prevent 
intolerance and ethnicity-based conflicts, in the long run the inability to cope with the 
challenge will be damaging for Ukraine’s and the region’s security. According to head of 
the national bureau of the Interpol in Ukraine V. Radetsky, the number of immigrants in 
the country, both legal and illegal, is about one million36. Illegal migration as a kind of 
organised crime tend to grow and specialise, contributing to the increase of crime and 
involvement of broader segments of the Ukrainian society, particularly in the border 
regions, in criminal activities. For a vast number of residents of the border regions of 
Ukraine, as well as for their “counterparts” across the Ukrainian-Russian and Ukrainian-
Moldovan border, illegal migration, trafficking in human beings and smuggling has 
become the main source of income. According to Ukrainian security  experts, a highly 
efficient transnational system of management of illegal migration flows has been formed.  
 
The complexity of the challenges faced by Ukraine, the lack of unbiased information and 
capacity to counter the challenges effectively, have provoked a specific "side effect". 
While accurate data about correlation between illegal migration, organised crime and drug 
trafficking are unavailable, Ukrainian law enforcement authorities often tend to link the 
three phenomena in their public statements, thus, adding to increasing prejudice to 
representatives of "other" ethnic groups and countries in the Ukrainian society. The 
concern has affected Ukraine’s visa policy. As fighting illegal migration was identified as 
a key national security concern, in 2000 the number of visas issued by Ukraine to citizens 
of countries regarded as potential donors of illegal migrants - Angola, Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Vietnam, Ghana, India, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
China, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Somalia, and Sri Lanka - was 
radically reduced. In January-June 2000 about 149,000 Ukrainian visas were issued, 
almost 90% of them to citizens of European countries, the USA and Canada37. 
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Ukrainians themselves are affected by growing xenophobia in the EU and the candidate 
states where public apprehension of the influx of cheap labour, potential instability and 
effects of increasing heterogeneity of the population on national identity are on the rise. 
The reason for concern seems to be obvious: it is estimated that some 500 thousand illegal 
immigrants arrived to the EU states in 2000, compared to about 40 thousand in 1993. 
Ukraine is seen as one of the key transit territories: some 60-70% of illegal migrants are 
reported to arrive to countries of Western Europe through it. As the western border of 
Ukraine becomes "harder" with the adoption of the Schengen rules by the candidate 
countries that border on Ukraine and the “porosity” of Ukraine’s eastern and northern 
borders remains, thousands of illegal migrants are likely to stay on the Ukrainian territory. 
Since the situation in countries that are among leading donors of illegal migration is 
unlikely to improve fast, the challenge, created by illegal migration, as well as related 
challenges of organised crime, trafficking in human beings and drugs, are likely to remain 
among the main points of concern for Ukraine as well as for the EU. 
 
 
Ukraine as a source of migrant labour  
 
Transit illegal migration through the Ukrainian territory is not the only matter of concern 
and the reason why Ukraine is included in the “black list” of countries for which the 
procedure of obtaining a EU visa is particularly strict. There is also a problem of illegal 
labour migration from Ukraine to countries of the EU and Central and Eastern Europe. 
Unlike migrants from the East and South who come from countries shaken by wars, forced 
by poverty and overpopulation, and, hence, regarded as most likely asylum seekers, 
migrants from Ukraine (and, in most of cases, from Moldova) usually enter countries of 
the EU and CEE as tourists but then get undocumented employment in the informal sector 
of the host countries’ economies. Such “tourist workers” constitute the predominant 
majority of Ukrainians who cross the country’s western border. While according to the 
official statistics only about 28,200 Ukrainian citizens worked abroad in 199938, it has 
been estimated that up to 200,000 (and, according to some estimates, even up to 800,000) 
Ukrainians work illegally in Poland39, about 10,000 in Hungary40, and about 50,000 in 
Slovakia. In addition to 17,500 Ukrainian citizens who have working permits in the Czech 
republic, about 100,000 work there illegally41. Similarly, in addition to 8,000 Ukrainians 
who hold formal permits to work in Italy, over 120 thousand Ukrainians stay in that 
country illegally42. Currently Ukrainian diplomats are negotiating with Italian counterparts 
the possibility of “legalising” some of Ukrainians presently in that country as a part of 
Italy’s annual 185-thousand immigration quota in exchange for an agreement to return the 
illegal migrants to Ukraine. Of 303 thousand registered immigrants in Portugal, there are 
at least 80 thousand Ukrainian labour migrants. The real figure, however, is about three 
times higher, as many of Ukrainians work in the country illegally.43 Due to poor economic 
condition and slow pace of transformation, Ukraine is likely to remain a potential risk to 
the EU as a donor of illegal labour migrants and a transit area for organised crime. Illegal 
labour migration of Ukrainian citizens creates tension in Ukraine’s relations with the EU  
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members and the applicant countries. The influx of cheap labour from Ukraine causes not 
only concern of the authorities of the EU states but also protests of local trade unions. For 
instance, in August, 2001, the General Union of Workers of Spain demanded from the 
national Government to put an end to the activity of companies engaged in employment of 
illegal immigrants from Ukraine44. 
 
The need to cope with the issues remain a high priority for Ukraine and the European 
Union. It is clear, however, that defensive measures alone taken by the EU member states 
and the candidate states will not prevent illegal employment of Ukrainian citizens on their 
soil. Alone, Ukraine will be unable to promptly cope with the task of radical reduction of 
the unemployment rate and significant decrease of the living standards of the population in 
order to reduce the incentives to emigrate, and simultaneously serve as a barrier to illegal 
migration to the EU. Long-term effective solutions are only possible if elaborated and 
pursued jointly by Ukraine, the EU and the accession states in question, and accompanied 
with general efforts targeted at improving Ukraine’s economic conditions, creation of jobs 
and other incentives to stay. Unless urgent and adequate measures are taken, the supply of 
illegal labour force from Ukraine and illegal migration through Ukraine will continue to 
exist, encouraged by the demand for it on the part of the shadow sector of economy in the 
EU countries. 
 
To address the issue of managing labour migration from Ukraine and social protection of 
its citizens, Ukraine has already made relevant agreements with some countries (Latvia, 
Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic), and entered into negotiations with other candidate 
states. The EU enlargement raises the issue of an agreement with the EU about the 
preservation of those agreements in an acceptable format. Ukraine is a party to 12 
multilateral agreements on labour and social security issues within the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). The labour migration legislation includes two bilateral 
agreements on mutual social security guarantees – with Spain and Latvia, and 17 
intergovernmental agreements in the pension sphere, labour and social security – with 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Vietnam, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, 
Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. As the EU enlargement takes place, the 
agreements with the accession countries will be made void, thus, leaving a substantial 
legislation gap in the field of regulation of migrant labour.   
 
The steps that need to be made in managing labour migration from Ukraine to the EU and 
the accession states should include official recognition of the fact of the existence of both 
supply of Ukrainian migrant labour and demand for it abroad by the Ukrainian authorities 
and authorities of the EU member states and the accession states. The tasks to be 
accomplished for effective management of the process should include joining Articles 18 
and 19 of the European Social Charter and approximation of Ukraine’s labour migration 
legislation to that of the EU.  
 
The demand for the immigrant labour in the European states should also be recognised and 
reflected in relevant agreements and mechanisms - possibly, quotas for labour immigration 
of professionals having specific skills that are required in the European labour markets at a 
given time. While there are about 15 million unemployed in the EU now, there is a 
desperate need for skilled labour in some sectors, primarily the information technologies, 
as well as for unskilled labour in services that are not attractive for the EU nationals. 
Demographers predict that the EU population will reach its high at 376.5 million by 2005  
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but will decline by 14% over the next 50 years to 311 million during that period. Without 
immigration Spain will lose 9.4 million people and Italy will lose 16 million45. The ageing 
of population will add to the need to attract migrant labour to maintain the welfare state. It 
is estimated that by 2050 the number of senior citizens aged over 65 will reach 28% of the 
population of Germany, 37% of the population of Spain, and 34% of the population of 
Greece, and the number of the EU population of working age will decrease by 30%. 
Nowadays, in Germany, Finland, Belgium, Italy and Austria, more than 30% of the labour 
force are at least 50 years old. In order to cope with the challenge of the ageing labour 
force and to keep the working age population constant, the EU will need to admit 79.6 
million immigrants within the next 50 years or 1.4 million per year46. In this situation the 
adoption of sound labour migration and general immigration policies is a political decision 
that needs to be taken to secure long-term sustainable economic growth. Hence, there is a 
broad field for a constructive dialogue on the matter with the EU for the countries like 
Ukraine and Moldova.   
 
 
The visa regime dilemma  
 
It seems to be generally recognised that a visa regime itself does not serve as a credible 
and effective deterrent for illegal immigration and a barrier for terrorism, transnational 
organised crime, particularly smuggling and trafficking. The example of one of the 
September 11 terrorists having his visa application approved some time after the terrorist 
attack, shows how irrelevant the visa procedure is in such cases. While obtaining a visa 
has been a much-debated complication for exchange and travel of people, it has never 
been effective enough to halt illegal immigration – there are no data available that would 
show correlation between rejected visa applications and decreased illegal migration 
figures. Besides, the text of the Schengen agreement does not stipulate that severe visa 
restrictions should be imposed on nationals of any state.    
 
Currently Ukrainian citizens can travel visa-free to 15 countries: ten countries of the CIS 
(except Turkmenistan), Mongolia and three EU accession states - Poland, Hungary and 
Romania. The Baltic states introduced visa procedures for Ukraine in early 1990s. The 
visa regime, introduced by the Czech Republic and Slovakia in the summer of 2000, 
showed potential negative consequences for exchange between those countries and 
Ukraine. For instance, in 2000, the Transcarpathian, Lviv and Chernivtsi regions 
accounted for 43.3% of foreign travel, as a significant part of the population of those 
regions is engages in crossborder “commercial tourism”47. The number of trips of 
Ukrainian citizens to Slovakia in 2000 fell almost two-fold against 1999, and even greater 
– in the first half of 2001. The flow from Slovakia to Ukraine also became scantier 
(104,000 in 1999, 70,600 in 2000, 20,600 in the first half of 2001)48. In order to cope with 
the new challenge, on March 1, 2001, Ukraine and Slovakia introduced a simplified visa 
regime that involved issuing free visas for up to 180 days to a number of categories of 
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professionals, children and students, and half-price visas for individuals travelling within 
bilateral cultural exchange programs. Similar arrangements, as well as provisions for 
multiple affordable visas for frequent travellers and some other selected categories, and 
special arrangements for the population of the border areas have been discussed since then 
as possible solutions for the situations when the would-be new EU member states – 
Poland, Hungary, and, at some point, Romania, will have to impose visas on nationals of 
Ukraine and Moldova. In 2001, the increase in the number of qualified staff at Slovak 
consulates also had a positive effect and served as an illustration of the importance of 
effective bureaucracy at the consulates and border crossing points as a way to soften the 
shock of the introduction of new visa regimes. Similarly, following the EU’s decision to 
move Bulgaria to the “white list” of states, Bulgaria announced the decision to impose 
visas on Ukrainians from June 2001 onwards, but shortly chose to postpone the step till 
October and make the visa regime as liberal and efficient as possible, due to consideration 
of potential damaging effect that the reduction of the number of Ukrainian tourists coming 
to Bulgaria could have on the country’s tourist industry. Bulgaria imposed visas on 
Ukrainians in October 2001, but at the introduction of visas, the ethnic composition of the 
Ukrainian population was not duly taken into account. For instance, the Association of the 
national-cultural communities of Bulgarians of Ukraine lodged protest with the Bulgarian 
leadership that, in their opinion, it had not taken into account the interests of 300 thousand 
ethnic Bulgarians living in Ukraine49. Noteworthy, in addition to the lengthy procedure of 
obtaining a visa, the visas introduced by the accession states ($53 for Bulgaria, $27 for 
Slovakia, $28 for the Czech Republic) are more expensive than the Schengen visas – often 
too expensive for most of Ukrainians.  
 
So far Poland and Hungary have decided to postpone introduction of visas for Ukrainians, 
and Romania is likely to delay for as long as possible the introduction of visas for 
Moldovans, but they will have to introduce visas to comply with the accession 
requirements. The introduction of visas for Ukrainians by Poland will have a particularly 
strong effect on Ukrainians, both economically and psychologically. About 4,43 million 
Ukrainians visited Poland and about 927,500 visited Hungary in 2000 (as compared to 
120,500 who visited Romania and 74,100 who visited Bulgaria)50.  
 
The Ukrainian authorities urge the EU to take into account possible negative implications 
of introduction of visa regimes with Ukraine by the accession states and call for 
“minimisation of the negative effects of the introduction of visa procedures and 
toughening of border control for Ukrainian citizens”51, arguing that the Ukraine – EU visa 
dialogue “should rest, first and foremost, on the harmonisation of the internal social and 
political situation in Ukraine with the EU standards”. Yet, besides the expressed 
commitment to continue the dialogue, there is a risk that the search for credible options, 
acceptable for all of the decision-making parties involved will be far from complete by the 
time Poland and Hungary will have to introduce visa regimes before joining the EU by the 
end of 2003. 
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Dealing with migration challenge in the region: some recommendations and 
conclusions 
 
Notwithstanding the efforts to reduce the gap between secure and wealthy North and poor 
and conflict-shaken South, assistance and investment in the economies of the third world 
countries will not have an immediate effect of resolving the pressure to migrate; hence, the 
problem will remain for many years to come. Similarly, non-accession countries of 
Eastern and Southern Europe will be experiencing difficulties of their slow transition and, 
hence, the migration incentives for their populations will remain. Therefore, the Ukraine-
Moldova-Romania area is likely to continue experiencing strong migration pressures and 
struggle to respond to them in an adequate manner. 
 
Dealing with the issues of migration in the region in the context of the EU enlargement 
and adoption of the Schengen acquis by the candidate states requires solutions in two main 
areas: (1) streamlining visa and immigration policies of the European Union and the 
candidate states towards citizens of Ukraine and Moldova who seek to enter the EU and 
the candidate states legally; (2) co-operation between the European Union, the candidate 
states, Ukraine and Moldova in combating westward illegal migration through/from the 
territories of Ukraine and Moldova.     
 
The enlargement creates a fundamentally new situation on the European continent and 
draws the borders of the European Union immediately to the boundaries of Ukraine, 
affecting everyday lives of hundreds of millions of people. According to the State 
Committee of Ukraine for the State Border Protection, at the Polish-Ukrainian border 
alone, about 10 million border crossings are registered every year. The cross-border 
contacts and trade have created hundreds thousands of jobs at both sides of the border. The 
introduction of visas by the accession states will discourage millions of Ukrainian and 
Moldovan citizens who wish to travel abroad for tourism or business purposes, but will 
hardly deter thousands of illegal immigrants and organised traffickers in human beings. 
Furthermore, without comprehensive solutions that would address problems in Ukraine 
and Moldova, the tight western borders and the visa regime of an enlarged EU may shift a 
great deal of the burden of the migration-related problems on these two countries and 
create additional challenges to their security and stability – which, in their turn, will create 
risks for the broader European security.  
 
Ukraine and Moldova are eager to continue and expand the dialogue with the EU. 
However, the ambitious objectives, like those set out in the Program of Integration of 
Ukraine to the European Union, remain largely unfulfilled, as in addition to the factors 
described in the previous paragraphs of this paper, Ukraine’s and Moldova’s efforts to 
counter illegal migration and manage legal movement of people require coherent policies 
and implementation mechanisms, which, in their turn involve introduction of new 
institution, training of personnel, technical re-equipment and information support. The 
factors, obviously, are not unique for these two countries: they challenge implementation 
of sound migration policies and border management by other transition states as well as by 
some of the EU candidate states. Therefore, viable solutions are necessary for resolving 
the dilemmas of migration. Similarly, as it is unlikely that the European Union will agree 
to waive visa restrictions for Ukrainians in the short-to-medium term (i.e., by 2007), a 
number of steps can and should be taken by all the parties involved (i.e., the EU, Ukraine 
and the accession countries, Romania included) to continue the dialogue and “civilise” that 
lengthy and cumbersome procedure.  The conditions for taking those steps will include  
21 
developing a common framework for joining efforts of  bringing Ukraine's own visa 
policy in line with the EU's stringent Schengen border regime. 
 
Such a common framework should include elements of co-operation in the field of justice 
and home affairs that are incorporated in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
between the EU and Ukraine, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU 
and Moldova, accession partnerships between the EU and the candidate states that have a 
common border with Ukraine, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, and the Joint 
Action Plan in the field of the JHA between the EU and Ukraine. Such a common 
framework should involve development and implementation of a joint multilateral 
program of countering illegal migration in the region under the auspices of the European 
Union, the International Organisation for Migration (in which Ukraine holds an observer 
status since 1993 and which it should join as soon as possible to improve its capacity of 
dealing with the issue), and more broadly, the UN, and the OSCE. Recently, the 
International Organisation for Migration has carried out a series of pilot projects on 
“Immigration Control and Management of the Common Border” at the Ukrainian-
Moldovan, Ukrainian-Russian and the Ukrainian-Belarussian parts of the border. While 
the sustainable results and critical changes in the quality of border protection and 
migration management are too early to expect, the projects may be seen as examples of a 
positive approach to dealing with the issue. IOM representatives from Bulgaria, 
Macedonia and Romania took part in the 4th regional meeting organised by the Southeast 
European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) counter trafficking task force in Bucharest. The 
meeting brought together representatives from Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Greece, 
Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Turkey, France, Germany, Italy, the US and Ukraine in 
order to work on a plan of action to combat trafficking and smuggling in human beings. 
The plan involves exchange of information between relevant agencies of the participating 
states, coordinated common investigations against criminal groups engaged in trafficking 
and smuggling, as well as co-operative measures to insure the identification and safe 
repatriation of victims to their country of origin. The involvement of local, national and 
international NGOs, policy networks and experts is another element seen as critical for 
launching such a comprehensive multilateral effort and a broad awareness raising 
campaign. 
 
Responding to the complex challenge of countering illegal migration and optimising 
control of migration flows to the requirements of the Schengen acquis requires joint action 
and coordination of efforts of all relevant agencies and concentration of management of 
the migration issues within one agency. At the policy level, there is a need for a national 
migration policy that would take into account Ukraine’s situation in the changing Europe 
and build on achievements of relevant Ukrainian agencies and institutions in countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe and the EU. A comprehensive migration policy needs to 
involve co-operation with relevant EU agencies responsible for the implementation of the 
Schengen acquis and transfer of experience through twinning programs. Technical 
provisions for improving the efficacy of such a migration policy shall include 
modernisation of the border infrastructure, installation of adequate computer technology 
and personnel training.  
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Exchange of information on migration between Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and CEE and 
the EU states could serve as an initial step towards development of such co-operation and 
creation of a single computerised database. While reservations about sharing such 
information between EU and non-EU states may be justified in terms of possible leakage 
of such information due to corruption of individual officers who may have access to such 
data, there is a need to strengthen trust-building measures to minimise such possibilities 
and proceed with information sharing. Setting up common border crossing checkpoints 
may be useful for increasing trust and transferring skills of effective border control.  
 
Effective border management and control of the movement of migrants through the 
territory of Ukraine require development of an up-to-date database on all visas issued to 
citizens of countries that are considered to be potential donors of illegal migrants, the 
movement of stateless persons to or through the territory of Ukraine, as well as 
information about all border crossings by citizens of countries that do not require visas to 
enter Ukraine, particularly of countries and regions of the former Soviet Union where 
conflicts and deteriorating standards of living create incentives for emigration. The list of 
countries with substantial incentives for emigration and/or a record of high emigration 
statistics should be updated regularly to facilitate control over the movement of those 
countries’ nationals through the borders of Ukraine. The criteria for including a country in 
such a list (and excluding it from the list once the specified conditions cease to exist) may 
include, for instance, the presence of an armed conflict, poor socio-economic conditions 
and standards of living, overpopulation. Another potentially effective (but technically 
difficult) mechanism of immigration control is a selective monitoring of invitations, 
arrivals and departures of citizens of countries that are considered the donors of illegal 
migrants and stateless persons in cases of arrival of such individuals to Ukraine for study 
or tourism purposes.  
 
Consultations of relevant governmental officials and joint working groups of experts from 
Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and relevant accession states and the EU should be held to 
work out proposals for introduction of streamlined visa issuing procedures that will 
include introduction of multiple-entry visas for specific groups (like frequent travellers for 
business or academic purposes), setting reasonable visa fees, expanding the network of 
consular institutions and training consular personnel.  
 
Ukraine’s visa dialogue with the candidate states and the EU should be based on 
reciprocity principles and negotiation of readmission agreements, synchronised with 
similar readmission agreements with the Russian Federation, Moldova and Belarus. Since 
most of illegal migrants arrive to Ukraine (and, similarly, to Moldova) through territories 
of member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, any measures to 
counter illegal immigration and transit migration through Ukraine, taken by Ukraine 
unilaterally, will prove ineffective unless they are accompanied by conclusion of 
readmission agreements with individual member states of the CIS and facilitated by 
constant information exchange on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Such information 
exchange will be made more effective by development of a regularly updated database on 
illegal migration.  
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A mechanism for Moldovan-Romanian-Ukrainian co-operation in the area of countering 
illegal migration and trafficking in human beings as organised criminal activities may be 
developed within a co-operative effort of the BSEC participating states that signed an 
Additional Protocol to the agreement on co-operation in combating organised crime at the 
5th meeting of ministers of internal affairs and public order of the BSEC member states in 
Kyiv, Ukraine, on March 15, 200252. To make any mechanism effective, however, there is 
a need to expand the interaction between Moldova, Romania and Ukraine within the 
framework of coordinated efforts agreed on by representatives of the governments of 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Macedonia, Greece, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine who met 
in Bucharest in May 2001 to discuss effective cross-border solutions to the problems of 
trafficking in human beings and illegal immigration and expressed commitment to 
coordinated efforts to combat trafficking in human beings and illegal immigration at the 
national, regional and international levels, as well as to protection of trafficking victims, 
their human rights and the dignity.  
 
The approach to migration adopted by the EU states and by the accession states that have 
to implement the Schengen acquis as a necessary condition for their future EU accession is 
largely based on perception of international migration in general, and migration from the 
territories of the East European non-accession states primarily as a security threat. While 
unsuitable for offering viable long-term solutions to the real problems that have to be 
admitted, studied and alleviated through co-operative undertakings, this narrowed 
perspective may be detrimental to regional co-operation between the accession and non-
accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as between countries of Eastern 
Europe and the enlarged European Union. Finding a credible and sustainable alternative to 
it should be a priority for Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and other states involved. 
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Possible ways of activization of trade and economic relations at regional 
and cross-border levels in the triangle Moldova-Romania-Ukraine 




The fundamental principle of integration with the civilized European society is the 
accomplishment of an active policy of good neighborhood and regional cooperation. Thus, 
regional cooperation focuses its attention on the mechanisms of consolidation of a good 
vicinity as it is called to fill these relations with constantly growing potential of interaction 
and interdependence. 
 
Regional cooperation appears as a phenomenon functioning and developing in several 
basic directions:  
 
• Cooperation between the states of region; 
• Cooperation between separate regions of the states; 
• Cross-border cooperation of border territories – “euro-regions”.  
 
Regional cooperation, especially in the form of cross-border cooperation (of “euro-
regions”), is designed to stimulate not only the economic growth and  life standard of 
communities located in peripheral areas of the states, but also to transform into a tool of 
protection and development of national minorities on both sides of border. Moreover, the 
“engagement” of the various states by means of “euro-regions” favors the unification of 
Europe, weakens the threat of new dividing lines on the continent.  
 
The basic principle of regional cooperation of the neighbor states is the deepening of 
multilateral friendly relations between the border administrative-territorial units according 
to nationwide priorities of each of the countries. Regional cooperation is used for the 
development of the effective mechanism of mutual relation between internal policy and 
the international safety, particularly by the resolution of problems of social-economic 
sphere, improvement of conditions of free trade, investment climate, integration with the 
European communication and transport networks. 
 
II. The basis, specificity and preconditions of development of regional Cooperation 
between Moldova, Ukraine and Romania 
 
Development of trade and economic relations within the framework of regional 
cooperation between the countries of the region - Moldova, Romania and Ukraine - is 
carried out on all above-mentioned directions and has certain specificity. The practice of 
tripartite cooperation starts only in the nineties of 20th century (the emergence of 
independent Moldovan and Ukrainian states).  
 
The international legal bases of good vicinity and regional cooperation were founded as a 
result of signing of a series of international accords, agreements and other statutory acts: 
 
• The accord of good vicinity, friendship and cooperation (October 1992); 
• The agreement between the government of Ukraine and the government of the 
Republic Moldova about cooperation of border regions of Ukraine and administrative-
territorial units of the Republic of Moldova (March 1997); 
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• The agreement about good vicinity and cooperation between Romania and 
Ukraine (May - June 1997); 
• The Decisions of tripartite Ukrainian-Moldovan-Romanian summits in Izmail 
(July 1997) and Chisinau (October 1998); 
• The agreement on creation of “Upper Prut” Euro-region, signed in Botosani 
(Romania) in September 2000 and the Statute of “Upper Prut” Euro-region, authorized by 
the decision of the Council of “Upper Prut” Euro-region in November 2000 in Edinet 
(Moldova); 
• The Protocol on cooperation between Chernovtsy area of Ukraine, Bavarian 
district Schwaben and Suceava district of Romania (May 1997). 
 
The cooperation of the states really became more active beginning with 1997, as a result 
of Izmail (July 1997) and Chisinau (October 1998) Declarations of Presidents of Moldova, 
Romania and Ukraine and signing of the Protocol on tripartite cooperation between the 
Governments of Moldova, Ukraine and Romania (July 1997). 1998 was created the 
“Lower Danube”, whose founders were the authorities of three Romanian districts, three 
districts from Moldova (Cahul, Vulcanesti, Cantemir) and the Odessa region of Ukraine, 
and in september 2000 the Upper Prut Euro-region was created, including two Romanian 
counties (Suceava, Botosani), six Moldovan districts (Briceni, Glodeni, Edinet, Falesti, 
Riscani, Ocnita) and Chernovtsy region of Ukraine.. 
 
Thus, the prospects of tripartite regional cooperation assumed the development of direct 
contacts and mutually advantageous cooperation between administrative-territorial 
units of Ukraine, Romania and Moldova primarily within the framework of the created 
Euro-regions, in particular by giving sense to the condition of their normative-legal 
base. In the states of the European Union, the overall objective of the created euro-regions 
consists in improvement of economy of these territories. In our case, the problem is more 
substantial, as besides the economic, national-cultural, social-psychological objectives, it 
also includes the financial purposes. By means of Euro-regions, it was supposed to attract 
foreign investments as the international organizations and private investors are inclined to 
finance not central, but sooner local regional projects where it is possible to control their 
accomplishment and to see results of cooperation more easily. 
 
At the present moment, the important precondition of successful development of trade and 
economic relations of the parties from the region is the creation of conceptual base for 
increase of efficiency of processes in this sphere at the regional level, and also 
development of the plan of action, oriented towards the improvement of functioning of the 
borders in Moldova-Ukraine-Romania triangle, including within the framework of 
tripartite Euro-regions, as a whole. Today, the given problem is subject to wide discussion 
at the level of the European structures and international organizations resulted from the 
necessity of solution of several, practically mutually opposed tasks.  
 
First, the European Union is objectively interested in the protection of its own borders in 
the East. In this case, the openness of borders of the countries, which in the near future 
appear to be direct neighbors of the European Union, and also Ukrainian-Russian border, 
does not promote at all the reduction of the number of cases of illegal migration or 
contraband fluxes at the future borders of the European Union.  
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Second, the external border of the EU cannot carry out the extremely protective functions, 
though, at the given stage, concerning the region examined by us, the question lays in this 
very fact. Together with it, the specified function of external border of the European 
Union should not limit the perspectives of development of regional and cross-border 
cooperation, particularly in trade and economic sphere. 
 
Thus, the mutual interest of both future eastern members of the EU and the states 
adjoining to them, in the access to the markets of potential partners causes finding by 
external border of the European Union of the second function - the original bridge for 
expansion of civilized communications of all interested parties at the border and wider 
levels. In trade and economic sphere the question lies, first of all, in the construction of the 
optimal scheme, including based on the already existing mechanisms, maintenance and 
intensification of such contacts. This task, in view of objective political, ethnic, economic 
realities in the region, is rather problematic as the simple review of the problems of the 
border trade and economic cooperation connected to the lack of complex, simplified, 
precise and transparent norms of transit across the border of transports, goods and 
services, no less than discussion of perspectives of improvement of the situation, would be 
insufficient. 
 
Therefore, except for above-stated, our focus should also include wider problems, 
including of political nature, which define both the character of interstate relations, and 
directly the situation at the borders of Moldova-Ukraine-Romania triangle. 
 
 
III. “The Specific position” of Moldova in the context of interests of the EU concerning 
the situation of state borders of the countries from the region 
 
The study of the problem of consolidation of the control over the functioning of frontiers 
in the above-stated region is caused, first of all, by the transformation of the Republic 
Moldova into an object of special interest of the EU. During the last year, one could notice 
a constant growth of attention of the leadership of the European Union towards Moldova. 
On the one hand, it is determined by the expected transformation of the Republic of 
Moldova in a “limitrophe state” (after the probable inclusion of Romania in the EU) in the 
most direct, for Brussels, sense. 
 
The dominant moment of the present position of the EU leadership regarding the situation 
of Moldovan borders is the question of maintenance of stability on eastern borders of the 
European Union, de-blocking of disputed units (particularly the Transdniestrian) and the 
provision of a quite rigid optimal regime, in the context of EU interests, for the circulation 
of people, goods and services in this zone. For Brussels and the countries of the Central 
European Initiative, the condition of multilateral relations in the Moldova-Ukraine-
Romania triangle is rather significant too. 
 
Unlike Ukraine, also having common border with Romania, the Republic of Moldova is 
caught in the given situation in a special position: in order to prevent the growth of the 
anti-Romanian moods in Moldova, the official Bucharest will insist on the maintenance of 
a preferential regime for crossing of the Moldovan-Romanian border. In this case, in the 
foreground for the EU appears the necessity of maintenance of the “external” Moldovan-
Ukrainian border at a level, which is getting closer to its own standards, in other words – 
significantly consolidating this border. 
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* * * 
 
The present internal political condition in the Republic of Moldova, the situation at the 
eastern borders of Moldova and also some aspects of bilateral Moldovan-Ukrainian 
relations are examined by the European Union as factors bearing certain threats for the 
accomplishment of the above-mentioned EU position concerning the situation at the 
Moldovan borders as a whole. 
 
The European Union is obviously concerned about the ongoing Moldovan-Transdniestrian 
conflict and, as a consequence, the presence in the Transdniestrian region of Moldova of 
an uncontrolled by the Chisinau authority, out of the field of action of international legal 
norms and incompliant with the European rules and standards of trade, transit of the goods 
and cross-border interactions. Brussels is concerned with such illegal operations on and 
through the territory of unrecognized Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic (TMR): 
 
• Uncontrollable movement of persons at a full openness of administrative borders 
of Moldova and Transdniestria and sufficient openness of Romanian-Moldovan borders; 
• Illegal operations of production, selling and transit of weapons; 
• Operations with drugs; 
• Smuggling operations, uncontrolled by the authorities of the Republic of 
Moldova movement of “legal” products; 
• Uncontrolled and illegal financial operations, “black” offshore. 
 
The elimination of the given situation is considered as one of the priority tasks of the 
European Union. The optimal means for the solution of this problem is the prompt 
integration of the region in a unique state and legal space of the Republic of Moldova, 
primarily the establishment in Transdniestria of unique Moldovan norms regulating, first 
of all, foreign trade activities of the region. The efforts of official Chisinau regarding 
restoration of integrity of Moldovan political and economic space, minimization of a share 
of goods smuggled through the eastern Moldova border will be supported unequivocally 
by the European Union. At least some directions of activity of the Republic of Moldova in 
this key will meet approval, in particular: 
 
- Provision of a new regime of customs-certification regulation, implemented by the 
Moldovan side on September 1, 2001 after the inclusion in the WTO, as the European 
circles are interested in gradual transition of leadership subjects from Transdniestria in a 
mode of tax-budgetary relations with Chisinau; 
- The necessity of organization together with Ukraine of border customs 
maintenance on Transdniestrian sector of Moldovan-Ukrainian border, creation by the two 
states of joint customs posts along its perimeter; 
- Common measures of consolidation of the regime of the Moldovan-Ukrainian 
border regardless of its specific sector; 
- Any innovations regarding the consolidation of the control over fluxes of goods, 
suppression of smuggling, to a certain degree - regulation of movement of people (here it 
is possible to include the monitoring systems: “Control-GT” - system of electronic control 
of transit cargoes; “Control RM” - system of the account of the basic material resources 
for the strengthening of control of production, storage and sale of goods subject to excise; 
pre-shipment inspection). 
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The above-mentioned measures are designed to affect significantly the situation at the 
Transdniestrian sector of Moldovan-Ukrainian border and also at the Moldovan borders in 
general, particularly by gradual legalization of process of circulation of people, goods, 
services and reduction of underground component of trade and economic relations of 
Moldova at the border level. 
* * * 
The important factor determining the positive prospects of minimization of a shadow share 
of frontier trade and economic relations in region is the solution of the issues connected to 
the establishment of a joint Moldovan-Ukrainian control over the Transdniestrian sector of 
the common border and the flux of products passing through it. 
 
The basic moments of positions of the parties in the specified problem are: 
 
- Creation of common customs will be unconditionally used by the Moldovan side 
for the intensification anti-Transdniestrian efforts, particularly the greatest possible 
suppression of export activity of Transdniestrian economic agents lacking budgetary and 
tax relations with Moldova (i.e. practically all economic sphere of TMR). 
 
Any concession in favor of the Moldovan side in the relevant issue is extremely harshly 
perceived by the Transdniestrian administration. Hence, Tiraspol interprets, providing 
rather credible arguments, what is specified as direct infringement of the existing legal 
base of normalization of Moldovan-Transdniestrian relations whose guarantors are 
Ukraine, Russia and European community, in the person of OSCE. 
 
Thus, the position of Ukraine in the issue of the joint control together with Moldova over 
the Transdniestrian sector of the common border, particularly over the fluxes of goods 
passing through it, is rather vulnerable. On one hand, the position of the Republic of 
Moldova, as well as the EU, is characterized by an increased requirement towards the 
Ukrainian side to respect more consecutively the sovereignty and integrity of Moldova. In 
this context, Kiev’s support of Tiraspol will cause negative reaction in Chisinau, Brussels 
and other European capital cities. Already today, the EU perceives harshly enough the 
steps made by Ukraine towards Transdniestria, calling Kiev to recognize further 
certificates ST-1 issued by Commercial and Industrial Chamber of Transdniestria, that as a 
whole may represent one of the factors complicating the relations between Ukraine and the 
European Union. 
 
On the other hand, as a consequence the further ignoring of interests of Transdniestria will 
increase the tension in the region, as the introduction by Moldova on September 1, 2001 of 
new customs security and new customs seals (which, as a matter of fact, represented a  
customs and economic blockade of Transdniestria) has already returned Tiraspol and 
Chisinau to the phase of revision of initial demands regarding the status of Transdniestria, 
thus denying the accomplished, including with the intermediary participation of Ukraine, 
normative-legal base of settlement of Transdniestrian conflict during the past eight years. 
Besides, Ukraine also experiences significant economic losses in conditions of a 
maintained customs conflict between Moldova and Transdniestria.  
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The volume of trade turnover of Transdniestria with Ukraine for the first half of the year 
2001, i.e. practically on the eve of implementation by Moldova of new customs regime, 
amounted to 34.1 million US Dollars, including export to Ukraine – 4.1 million US 
Dollars and volume of import from Ukraine - 30 million US Dollars. 
 
More than 30 Transdniestrian enterprises maintain economic contacts with more than 55 
large enterprises from Ukraine. The greatest part of export-import transactions is carried 
out by Moldovan metallurgical plant (ММP) in Rybnitsa, which during the specified 
period has purchased in Ukraine raw material of more than 25 million USD. Each month 
ММZ buys in Ukraine from 50 up to 60 thousand tons of scrap metal. Through the 
Ukrainian ports, the Rybnitsa Plant ships each month 75 thousand tons of metal-roll.  
 
One of the largest enterprises from Transdniestria, the Joint-Stock Company “Tirotex” 
imports the cotton (more than 10 thousand tons per year) through the ports of Odessa and 
Ilichivs’k. The shoe factories from Transdniestria each year purchase in Ukraine raw 
material and materials for industrial needs of more than 1 million dollars. The objects of 
Transdniestrian electro-technical branch also purchase in Ukraine raw material and 
materials of more than 1 million US dollars each year. In its turn, the Moldovan 
Hydroelectric Power Plant each year receives from Ukraine materials, equipment and 
spare parts with a value of more than 1.5 million US dollars. Besides, the territory of 
Ukraine is used for the transit of cargoes from Transdniestria to Russia and other CIS 
countries, whose value amounts to more than 80 million US dollars (without transit of 
energy carriers).  
 
Thus, from the pragmatic point of view, the restraint of these transport fluxes, and also the 
failure to fulfill by the Transdniestrian partners the treaty obligations with the Ukrainian 
side will result in under-reception by Ukraine of the profit from work with Transdniestrian 
economic agents, which naturally determines the position of Kiev in the issue of 




IV. The situation and problematic issues of regional trade and economic cooperation of 
Ukraine and Republic Moldova. 
 
The analysis of trade and economic relations of Ukraine and Republic Moldova proves 
that after the collapse of the USSR and the Council for Mutual Economic Aid, a number of 
problems appeared in mutual relations: 
 
• Disharmony of border and tax systems which maintains the tendency of further 
deterioration in conditions of increase of differences in technical norms and rules,  
• Complication of general certification of the goods and services. 
 
At the same time, the development of some mechanisms of optimization of trade and 
economic cooperation within the framework of commissions on economy, infrastructure 
and tourism of “Upper Prut” and “Lower Danube” euro-regions is called to provide the 
increase of efficiency of bilateral relations. 
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As an illustration, we will consider the specificity of trade and economic relations of 
Republic Moldova with Chernovtsy region of Ukraine.  
 
Presently, more than 50 enterprises of Chernovtsy area are involved in trade and economic 
relations with Moldova. The analysis of parameters of foreign trade of the region with the 
Republic of Moldova in 1995-1999 indicates its reduction. The creation of “Upper Prut” 
Euro-region promoted activization of bilateral trade and economic contacts at the regional 
level. In particular, the external economic turnover of Chernovtsy area with Republic 
Moldova in 2000 amounted to 2.2 million US dollars (export – 2.1, import – 0.1 million 
USD), which is 2.4 times bigger than the value of 1999, and by the end of 2001- almost 
3.0 million USD. 
 
In the period between January and November 2001, the volume of foreign trade of 
Chernovtsy region with Moldova amounted to 2657.67 thousand USD (export – 2436.56, 
import – 221.17), in comparison with the similar period of 2000 this value has grown with 
60.5 %. 
 
In 2001, following groups of goods are exported from area to the Republic Moldova: 
 
• Fruits and nuts – 571.20 thousand USD (30.31 %); 
• Wood and wood products – 363.26 thousand USD (19.28 %); 
• Products from ferrous metals – 242.10 thousand USD (12.85 %); 
• Pharmaceutical production – 187.91 thousand dollars (9.97 %). 
Imported: 
• Cereal crops – 43.24 thousand USD (21.95 %); 
• Seeds and fruits of essential oil plants-109.91 thousand USD (56 %); 
• Electric machines and equipment – 33.04 thousand USD (16.77 %). 
 
In the Chernovtsy region, there are nine registered joint Moldovan-Ukrainian enterprises. 
At the situation on 1.10.2001, there were Moldovan investments in the economy of the 
area amounting to 79.53 thousand USD. In 2001, the processes of mutually advantageous 
cooperation between structures of agriculture of border areas became essentially more 
active. Thus, the development of cooperation in manufacture of agro-industrial production 
through border agricultural cooperation becomes one of the important factors for the 
establishment of priority branches of the region. 
 
At the same time, during the accomplishment of obligations between the subjects of inter-
regional programs, the Moldovan side focuses attention on the existence of some 
problems, connected with absence of complex, simplified, precise and transparent norms 
concerning moving through the border of transport, goods and cargoes. According to 
their estimations, the system of official registration of documents existing today for 
crossing border is rather bulky, expensive and time consuming. 
 
Particularly for the export of vegetable production for processing from Moldova to 
Ukraine, it is necessary: 
 
• Quarantine permission of General State Quarantine of Ukraine; 
• Phytosanitary certificate of the country-manufacturer, and also inspection of 
protection of plants of Ukraine; 
• The contract on delivery; 
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• Commodity-transport documents which state the size of the batch, documents 
proving that the cargo is under the customs control; 
• The certificate of compliance with the State Standard of Ukraine on agricultural 
production, including the certificate of origin and conformity of the Republic Moldova; 
• The document identifying the person declared upon reception of the certificate of 
recognition; 
• Payment of VAT, custom fees; 
• The permission for transportation with freight truck, convoy and other 
documents. 
 
The registration of the above-mentioned documents and payment of services thus 
essentially increase the cost price and terms of delivery of contracted fruit-and-vegetable 
production, which quickly spoils, practically interfering with the accomplishment of the 
international cooperation in the given branch. The similar situation develops at the 
transportation of seeds, fertilizers and also other production and raw material. 
 
The agricultural production from the northern areas of Moldova, as a rule, until recently 
has been processed at the Ukrainian enterprises and construction materials of the 
Ukrainian enterprises had an essential demand in Moldova. But the existing today taxation 
of goods and services, the complicated procedures of border crossing, necessity of mutual 
recognition of certificates, and also a number of other documents issued by different 
structures, make the development of exchange of products in the Euro-region, as well as 
attraction of internal and external investments extremely unprofitable. 
 
 
V. Situation and problematic issues of regional trade and economic cooperation with 
Romania (According to the example of Chernovtsy area of Ukraine) 
 
The creation of euro-regional structure with the participation of Chernovtsy area and 
northern counties of Romania promoted activization of trade and economic cooperation 
between economic agents of both sides. 
 
Presently, about 20 Moldovan-Romanian joint enterprises are registered in the area. The 
basic directions of their activity are production and sale of consumer goods, construction 
materials, tourist services, repair and technical support of automobiles, construction, 
processing of agricultural production. 
 
The work experience of the representative of Trade & Industrial Chamber in Suceava 
(Romania) in the study of the juncture of Romanian market and also the accomplished 
marketing researches show the interest of Romanian and Ukrainian businesspersons in the 
development of trade and economic relations. The greatest interest of the Romanian side is 
noticed in the following Ukrainian production: wood and construction materials (roofing 
slate, cement, bricks, ruberoid, glass), metal rolls, automobile tires, mineral fertilizers, raw 
material for paint industry (pigments). According to the commercial inquiries received by 
the representative of Chernovtsy Trade and Industrial Chamber in Suceava, the annual 
minimal need for mineral fertilizers amounts 10 thousand tons, automobile tires - 7-8 
thousand pieces. In addition, at the intermediary participation of representation of 
Chernovtsy TIC in the beginning of 2002, were signed contracts concerning export of 
forest products to Romania with a value of 2 million euro. With their help, in 2001 sixteen  
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contracts and agreements were signed between the Ukrainian and Romanian 
businesspersons with a total value of 1 457 500 US dollars and 359 600 euros. 
 
In the year 2000, the foreign trade turnover of Chernovtsy area with Romania amounted to 
1303.66 thousand dollars. In January-October 2000, a revival of bilateral foreign trade was 
observed. The turnover amounted to 1580.85 thousand USD, which is almost 2 times 
greater than the value of the similar period of 2000. 
 
The foreign trade connections with Romania involve about 30 economic agents of the 
region. 
 
In the course of 9 months, 2001 from area was exported: 
 
• Wood and wood products with a value of 297.91 thousand $ US (40.52 % of 
total exports of the goods); 
• Fertilizers of 184.24 thousand US dollars (25.06 %); 
• Products from ferrous metals of 70.5 thousand USD (9.59 %); 
• Electric machinery and the equipment of 72.80 thousand USD (9.9 %); 
• Catechu, paints and varnishes, mastic, ink with a value of 26.84 thousand USD 
(3.65 %). 
Imported: 
• Paper and cardboard, paper products of 303.04 thousand USD (37.28 % of the 
total import of the goods); 
• Products of inorganic chemistry of 192.09 thousand USD (23.63 %); 
• Furniture, medical-surgical furniture, bed accessories, illumination devices of 
78.35 thousand USD (9.64 %); 
• Pharmaceutical production of 64.26 thousand USD (7.91 %); 
• Ferrous metals of 57.46 thousand USD (7.07 %); 
• Tannic or paint extracts, tannin and its derivatives, paints and varnishes, mastic, 
ink of 41.6 thousand USD (5.55 %). 
 
With the purpose of expansion of economic cooperation of the region with Romania in the 
future, was planned the creation in the region of joint Ukrainian-Romanian enterprises for 
processing of wood and agricultural production, and also was planned to organize activity 
in Botosani, Suceava and Chernovtsy of commercial structures for the sale of goods of 
regional producers. 
 
Behind the estimations of experts, the future of Ukrainian-Romanian trade and economic 
relations, including within the framework of “Upper Prut” Euro-region, depend on the 
solution of such issues: 
 
- Settlement of the custom fees and payments (for example, import customs share in 
Romania of tire production from Ukraine make 30 %, of mineral fertilizers - 10 %, glass - 
15 %, slate, roofing material, cement - 10 %, metal products - 15-20 %. At the same time, 
the share of CEFTA countries is practically zero. The specified facts essentially constrain 
the bilateral commodity circulation); 
- The solution of transportation problems related to the delivery of cargoes both on 
railway, and auto transport (the reduction of terms of delivery of cargoes and 
preservation of their quality, as according to the results of the meetings held with the 
Romanian businessmen not once was raised the question of  rather unreasonably long  
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terms of delivery of the Ukrainian goods in DAF conditions; an effective utilization of 
existing broad-gauge railway tracks which conduct to the territory of Romania, 
particularly through territory of the Republic Moldova; creation at the  terminal stations 
(for example in city of Iasi,, Romania) of certified warehouses). 
 
A characteristic aspect of the functioning of “Upper Prut” Euro-region is the inclusion in 
this structure, within the framework of partnership agreements, of the western partners of 
Chernovtsy region in the cross-border cooperation - Carinthia (Austria) and Swabia 
(Bavaria Land, Germany). Their participation in the Euro-region is considered as one of 
the necessary conditions of successful development of euro-regional cooperation, 
including trade and economic, and regulation of relations within projects with particular 
regional units in the EU countries, as well as the relations with the appropriate 
international structures and programs. 
 
According to estimations of foreign partners, the general approach of development of an 
effective mechanism of mutual relations between internal policy and international safety in 
frameworks of cross-border cooperation demands creation by the members of Euro-region, 
as well as by the states, of appropriate infrastructure for the accomplishment of joint 
projects. The basic features of such infrastructure should be its capacity in the existing 
social-economic and normative-legal conditions in the founding countries, the 
acceptability for euro-regional partners on the part of the EU and potential investors and 
creditors. 
 
The creation of a capable and constant infrastructure is based on principles parity and non-
interference in the internal legislation and competence of participant countries. For the 
accomplishment of a set of cross-border projects, coordinated with the governments, 
partners and the authorized structures of EU, for the development of regional economic 
and trade relations, it is necessary to allocate to the enterprises-executors of joint projects 
the coordinated part of compulsory tax and customs payments (established by the internal 
legislation of the states) as appropriate interstate investments in cross-border projects 
under the following conditions: 
 
- Projects and participant enterprises relate to the branches of social and economic 
sphere, which are called as the priority governments of participant countries; 
- Projects and the enterprises involved in Euro-region will accomplish preliminary 
expert examination in the Working Commissions of the structure with the mandatory 
participation of representatives of interested central authority of the trustee-countries and 
authorized experts on behalf of donor partners  from the European Union, and also on 
behalf  of investing (financing) establishments; 
- The use of means of the enterprises, which remain in their possession according to 
the mechanism of state and local investment, will be under the constant control of the 
above-mentioned structures. 
 
The presented mechanism of financing will promote the improvement of conditions for 
external investment in the Euro-region; will provide stimuli to enterprises participating in 
the projects for maximal increase of production volumes. 
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From the point of view of the western partners of “Upper Prut” Euro-region and potential 
investors, the symbiosis of the specified mechanism will support projects by the 
coordinated joint financing by PHARE/TACIS program on “Cross-Border cooperation”, 
will allow to involve specific grants and credits of the European Reconstruction and 
Development Bank, Global Ecological Fund, OECD programs and UNIDO/UNEP on 
ecologically clean production. 
 
In addition, the decision making concerning the introduction of the Schengen visa regime 
in the neighboring countries will negatively affect the trade and economic relations (in 
particular the restrictions of small trade connected to it, and also harm the industry in 
economically weaker developed peripheral areas of Ukraine, Romania, the Republic 
Moldova). 
 
The western experts specify that this problem is caused by the “opening” of the Russian-
Ukrainian border that makes the “European solution” of the problems at the southwestern 
borders Ukraine in immediate future impossible. 
 
Taking into account that neither Ukraine, nor the adjacent countries in the considered 
region are capable to accomplish independently projects, which would promote economic 
integration of border regions, the western partners consider as reasonable the support by 
the European Union of projects of integration character. In particular, at the level of 
European structures, it would be necessary to consider the problem of assignment of 
means for the for modernization of the border equipment, including for simplification of 
crossing through border of passengers and transport, which will be complicated after 
introduction of the Schengen regime, and also to achieve optimum connection of two 
purposes (which do not contradict with each other) - fast customs registration and an 
effective control. Visa procedure should become cheaper and easier. 
 
According to estimations of the Austrian partners of “Upper Prut” Euro-region, in 
accordance to the existing conditions of financing of TACIS program and other 
programs of EU, the probability of creation of the necessary infrastructure and constant 
interest of regional and business structures concerning long economic relations is 
considered rather low, taking into account the real situation in Ukraine and the neighbor 
states. 
 
The steps that have been made by the members of “Upper Prut” Euro-region concerning 
the cancellation of local fees and payments for crossing of border for the inhabitants and 
the legal persons registered in the territory of the Euro-region, have improved slightly the 
situation. But, essential changes of economic growth and increase of collections in the 
state and local budgets due to growth of incomes of regional trade and economic 
cooperation are possible only in case of a coordinated solution by the governments of 
Ukraine, Romania and Moldova of problems related to the reduction and simplification of 
payment of fees and payments for products and services made and used in the territory of 
Euro-region members, unification and mutual recognition of the documentation on such 
goods and services, and also due to other kinds of stimulation of specific cross-border 
cooperation according to the European standards. 
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As a whole, the realization of the specified actions is constrained by the following factors: 
 
1. In the legislation of three countries, the legal bases for the accomplishment by 
their border administrative-territorial units of direct joint activity in sphere of the general 
interests and cooperation with the European partners stipulated by constituent documents 
and decisions of Euro-regions are not determined. 
2. There are no mechanisms of interaction of the governmental and parliamentary 
structures for consideration and coordination at a tripartite level of issues of cross-border 
cooperation between the members of Euro-region, and also their European partners. 
3. The normative-legal basis for joint financing of cross-border projects (crediting, 
concentration of local, regional and state budgetary appropriations and means of private 
and international structures) and maintenance of the appropriate guarantees is not 
elaborated. 
 
The consideration of these problems at the session of CEI Workgroup on inter-regional 
and cross-border collaboration in Warsaw 11.04.2001 has proven that such a situation is 
typical for other administrative-territorial units of Romania, Ukraine and the CIS 
countries. It is obvious, that the specified problems will further appear along the border 
between Poland, Slovakia and Hungary with Romania on one hand, and also Russia, 
Byelorussia, Ukraine and Moldova – on the other. 
 
 
Conclusions and recommendations concerning the activization of border trade and 
economic cooperation between Ukraine, Romania and Moldova  
 
The development of full border trade and economic contacts between regions of Ukraine, 
Moldova and Romania remains to be the important component both for the relations 
between the specified states and processes of European integration in each of them.  
 
The most important condition of an intensification of regional cooperation between the 
countries of the region is the development of complex, precise norms of transit through 
borders of transport, goods and services. In addition, the actions oriented to the 
improvement of efficiency of functioning of frontiers of Ukraine, Moldova and Romania 
should precede the solution of this problem with the purpose of prevention of the frequent 
phenomena of illegal migration and smuggling of goods in the large quantities. In the 
given context, the presence in the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova of a 
zone, uncontrolled by Chisinau and not compliant with the European rules and standards 
of trade, transit and cross-border interactions, represents itself as the basic obstacle of 
unification of customs and trading norms at the regional level, first of all on the part of 
Moldova. 
 
As prospects of settlement of Transdniestrian conflict depend on a set of  political and 
economic arrangements and taking into account that the official Chisinau does not exclude 
an opportunity of providing Transdniestria with rather wide status within the Republic of 
Moldova, including right of independent foreign trade activities, the analysis of the future 
of regional cooperation between the countries of the region should take into account the 
realities of the process of normalization of relations between the Republic of Moldova and 
the Transdniestrian Republic, particularly in the economic sphere. 
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In that case, the preservation of customs and trading sanctions in relation to Transdniestria 
on behalf of Chisinau will testify, without consideration of their political orientations, the 
inability or unwillingness of Moldovan authorities to develop effective mechanisms of 
attraction of Transdniestrian side  for the solution of economic problems which also 
represent the interests of Tiraspol. In addition, the absence of the appropriate legal base for 
the development by Transdniestria of trade and economic contacts will further lead to the 
use of half-legal methods with external partners. Ignoring existing arrangements 
concerning the account of interests of Transdniestria in the establishment by the Moldovan 
party of foreign economic relations will complicate the development of acceptable 
mechanisms for the  settlement of Transdniestrian problem, namely - creation of a 
common economic space that would include both parts of Moldova, directly influencing 
the situation at the state borders. 
 
* * * 
 
Considering the situation of cooperation between Ukraine and border administrative-
territorial units of neighboring countries, one of the most important directions of 
activization of economic development of region is the adoption of appropriate solutions, 
which will promote activization of frontier trade at the regional level. 
 
In particular, first of all it would be reasonable to: 
 
1. Introduce quotas on excise-free exchange of goods, which are accomplished in 
frontier areas (for example, in Chernovtsy - vodka products, and from Suceava (Romania) 
and Moldova - wine and wine). 
2. Introduce quotas on duty-free exchange of goods and production, which are 
accomplished in the region (for example, from Chernovtsy – ceramic bloc, brick, 
confectionery products, from Suceava and Botosani (Romania) - raw material for textile 
industry, and from Balti and Edinet (Moldova) - vegetables, fruit). Undertaking the 
specified steps, Ukraine partly supports losses on duties. At the same time are created 
conditions of updating of capacities of the Ukrainian enterprises, which presently stagnate. 
3. Regulate the monetary turnover in the region and create a common bank 
system. It is expedient to open branches of banks of the adjacent country in frontier areas 
of Ukraine, and also branches of the Ukrainian banks in frontier districts of Romania and 
Moldova. It will make possible the accomplishment of currency transactions, at the sale of 
production, through own banks that will simplify the procedure of payment for production 
(a problem of returning of currency means for the exported goods today is one of the most 
stringent). In addition, in places of crossing of the Ukrainian - Romanian border there are 
no exchange points of national currencies. By opening of such points, it is possible to raise 
the rate of hryvnia in frontier areas of neighboring countries.  
 
* * * 
 
Starting from necessity of the solution of the above-mentioned problems, which already in 
the near future may essentially complicate the situation on the future borders of the 
European Union and practically completely block mutual relation within the framework of 
Euro-regions, it is necessary to consider and present the coordinated recommendations 
concerning activity in the following directions:  
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- Consideration by the central authorities of Ukraine, Romania, Moldova of 
opportunities of coordinated optimization of customs and other procedures of crossing of 
borders, a mutual recognition and official registration of papers, reduction of size and 
payment through the intermediary of a common operator of the state payments and taxes 
for the goods and services which are manufactured and used (consumed) in the Euro-
region, that, in its turn, will affect positively the economic growth and will increase the 
collection in the state and local budgets. 
 
- Definition, according to the current legislation of each of the countries, of special 
functions of central authority bodies concerning their participation in the preparation and 
accomplishment of cross-border projects of Euro-regions, and also simultaneous 
delegation to the heads of limitrophe administrative-territorial units that are members of 
Euro-regions of the right to sign the appropriate documents concerning such projects with 
definition of specific procedures for their preliminary and final coordination at the level of 
the governments of the three countries. 
 
- The agreement concerning the creation, functioning and coordination of activity in 
the territory of the Euro-region’s members in these three countries of Regional 
Development Agencies and the appropriate funds and financial structures which will 
provide the coordinated rendering the technical assistance and concentration of necessary 
means which will be allocated by the local, regional, state budgets, partners of Euro-
regions, other investors and international organizations for the accomplishment of cross-
border projects. 
 
- Provision of common recommendation to the EU, CEI, NATO, OECD, UNIDO, 
EBRD, GEF and other international structures concerning the provision of the “Upper 
Prut”  Euro-region with a pilot status for the improvement of modern mechanisms of 
cross-border cooperation at the future eastern borders of the European Union: regarding 
the issues of inter-regional cooperation along the historical overland trading and transport 
routes, on the basins of the border rivers, and also in traditionally connected branches of 
fuel and energy, agro-industrial, forest and wood processing, construction sectors, of water 
supply systems, cross-border tourism, medical-recreational activity, culture, education and 
a science. 
 
(It would be simultaneously expedient to consider the problem of reception of the pilot 
status also by the “Lower Danube” Euro-region – regarding the issues of interactions at 
sea coast, in Danube and Dniester deltas and sea, river and pipeline transport corridors.) 
 
- Consideration with the EU and other international structures of issues of closer 
interaction between the international programs which operate in territory of the CEI and 
CIS countries, for provision of joint formation by these Euro-regions together with the 
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Conflicting Security Concerns across the Ukraine-Moldova Border 
Dr. N.Belitser, Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy, Kyiv, Ukraine 
 
Moldova and Romania are currently the only neighbouring countries with which Ukraine 
still have unsettled border problems (not touching an issue of the Ukrainian-Russian border 
that may prove to be much more difficult to resolve). Notwithstanding the objective 
difficulties stipulated by the inherited legacy of Russian and Soviet imperialist policies, 
that had drawn and redrawn those borders proceeding from their own interest, some 
additional factors of more subjective nature could also be identified as hampering the 
processes of delimitation and demarcation of the disputed pieces of land (and island). 
Certain coolness and mutual mistrust are evident in both Ukraine-Moldova and Ukraine-
Romania bilateral relations. By all means, such a situation has negatively influenced a 
process of settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict, which remains a serious threat to 
regional and European security and stability, and the main security concern of Ukraine. A 
hope to reach any progress in resolving this painful problem depends much on whether a 
coordinated strategy and a plan of concerted actions of the three countries most interested 
in it, would be elaborated. Indeed, the aim of preventing further strengthening of the 
Transdniestrian separatism, and curbing totalitarian regime established in the self-
proclaimed Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic by its leader Igor Smirnov, is in the best 
national interests of Moldova, as well as of Ukraine and Romania. Whereas such a potent 
regional power as the RF, in pursuit of its own political and geopolitical interests, might 
have developed quite different plans and intentions. Taking into account these 
circumstances, it seems reasonable to identify the factors that negatively affect trilateral 
Moldovan-Ukrainian-Romanian relations, and to seek jointly possible ways to overcome 
existing difficulties. One of the promising approaches would be to present each side’s 
perspective concerning the weak points and troubled areas, thus providing a space for free 
and open discussion to be followed by defusing the tensions and ensuring the increased 
confidence and partnership relations. Therefore, the issues below will be addressed as seen 
by some actors from within Ukrainian civil society. 
 
 
Bilateral Ukrainian-Moldovan Relations. 
 
Recently, these relations by no means can be regarded as dynamically anf positively 
developing. A number of reasons may explain an obvious lack of friendly cooperation 
between the two neighbouring post-Soviet states. While some of them are objective by 
nature, subjective perceptions often based on mutual suspicions, distrust and other 
sentiments contribute to this negative trend. Moreover, whereas subjective causes of 
coolness in Ukrainian-Moldovan relations may actually be conditioned by the reasons 
quite different across the border, too often they are also related to a scarcity of objective 
informational coverage of the developments on the other side of the borderline with the 
ensuing misinterpretations and misperceptions.  The lack of a political will, strong enough 
for establishing fruitful cooperation, seems  be common to both sides, as well as low level 
of mutual interest within the respective societies, traditionally concerned with more potent 
regional players.  
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The situation was further exacerbated after the Party of Moldovan Communist (PCM) won 
on 25 February 2001 the parliamentary elections,53 and on 7 April the head of PCM 
Vladimir Voronin was officially sworn into office as the new president of Moldovan 
Republic. 54 Subsequent pro-Russian bend in the Moldovan foreign policy, despite the 
same tendency (traditional for the pre-election times) in Ukraine, has caused additional 
complications with regard to bilateral Ukrainian-Moldovan relationship. A kind of 
stagnation or even deterioration of the long-standing efforts to resolve a number of 
important issues of bilateral relations can be admitted. Some of these issues should be 
considered as a priority for the foreign and domestic policy of both countries. 
 
Let us address some of them, taking into account the latest developments.  
 
 
Delimitation and demarcation of the Ukrainian-Moldovan interstate border.  
 
The agreement on interstate border between Ukraine and Moldova has been signed in 
1999, and ratified by Ukraine in spring of 2000. According to this agreement, Chisinau 
should have transferred to Ukraine a part of a road from Odessa to Reni near the Palanka 
village, in exchange for Ukraine’s commitment to provide for Moldova a part of territory 
ensuring Moldova’s access to the Danube riverbank. Such a decision raised, however, 
protests from the Palanka residents, supported also by Moldovan intelligentsia and 
national-radical parties, thus preventing its ratification by the Moldovan parliament. 
Promises by the president Voronin to promote ratification of the agreement in June 2001 
using such a leverage as a “party discipline” has failed, too. As a result, Kyiv switched to a 
more assertive position, and during the first visit to Ukraine of the Moldovan Premier 
Vasile Tarlev on 9-10 July 2001, he was told that in case of further delay with ratification, 
Ukrainian side would take some economic sanctions concerning, inter alia, the rigid parity 
of cargo transit through the territories of both countries. 55 This threat compelled the 
Moldovan Prime Minister to make concessions, and indeed, negotiations on the 
delimitation and demarcation of the interstate border gained some impetus.56 Recently, the 
border agreement has been eventually ratified by the Moldovan parliament, and the joint 
demarcation commission has been formed that completed its first organizational meeting in 
Chernivtsy by reaching a decision on the beginning of concrete steps on demarcation and 
establishment of check points. 57  
 
Though these developments can formally be regarded as positive, without proper 
informational campaign to justify such kind of decisions and gain for them some public 
support, they may incite an additional mistrust in the relationship between the two nations. 
There were indications of certain aggravation of the already existing Moldovans’ 
suspicions of what had been perceived as Ukrainian selfishness and even potential 
aggressiveness, marring the prospects of further mutual support and friendship at the hard  
                                                          
53 According to the first count, the PCM received 49,9% of the votes, and only after recounting the figure 50,7% 
was declared thus meaning the victory of the PCM (see “Communists of Moldova and the Future of the 
Country’s Ethno-Political Conflicts” by Priit Jarve, ECMI Brief # 3,  March 2001.  
54 See: “Moldova Elects New Communist president” by Angela Sirbu, TOL Week in Review, 2-8 April 2001. 
55 See: “Communist Moldova: A Show on the Political Championship of the CIS” by Olesya Yahno, 11.07.2001, 
at http://part.orrg.ua (in Russian). 
56 “Ukraine and Moldova Agreed on Five Checkpoints in the State Border”, 19.11.2001, News at 
http://part.orrg.ua (in Russian) 
57 “Moldova and Ukraine Reached a Decision on the Beginning of a Border Demarcation”. 06.03.2002, News at 
http://part.orrg.ua (in Russian). 
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way to democracy and European integration. (For example, during the state visit of Vasile 
Tarlev to Kyiv, a rally took place in Chisinau under slogan of “Not a Bit of Land to 
Ukrainians!”). 
 
A problem of customs. Rather difficult turned out also a question of customs regulations 
aimed at the effective suppression of large-scale smuggling of arms and drugs across the 
border of the self-proclaimed Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic (PMR). During the 
working meeting of the two presidents in Vinnitsa on November 9 2001, they reached only 
what has been called a “political decision” on the issue. 58 The most problematic matter 
remained the joint control of the Ukrainian-Moldovan border, because Transdniestrian 
border guard prevents their Moldovan counterparts from performing their duties at the 
essential part of the interstate border, located at the territory of the PMR. Since Moldova 
suffered huge financial and economic losses due to illegal trade and trafficking across 
Ukraine-PMR border, in the summer of 2001, decisive steps were undertaken consisting of 
introducing a new custom stamp to be applied at all Moldovan border crossings, including 
those between Transdniestria and Ukraine. This move has been declared by the PMR 
president Igor Smirnov as an attempt to establish economic blockade for Transdniestria, 
and to hamper its trade with neighbouring Ukraine. For the effective implementation of 
this measure aimed at taking control over the “black hole” of the PMR part of Moldova’s 
border, Moldovan customs officers should have been deployed on the Ukrainian side of the 
border, at joint Ukrainian-Moldovan crossing points. Ukraine’s hesitation to consent with 
such a decision or, rather, its repeated refusals to allow Moldovan custom officers on its 
side of the border 59 fuelled anti-Ukrainian passions in Moldova. These reached its 
culmination at the end of 2001-beginning of 2002, when the issue was made a subject of 
international discussion. The Memorandum “On the Situation on the Eastern Border of 
Moldova” has been submitted by Moldova to the OSCE, Council of Europe, European 
Union and other European institutions. Kyiv, together with Tiraspol, was charged with 
promoting smuggling across the Ukraine-PMR border; the reluctance to establish joint 
Moldovan-Ukrainian customs controls was presumed to be caused by the illegal profits in 
which some of Ukrainian authorities might have had their share. In the official 
governmental response the Ukrainian side characterized these steps as “unfriendly”, 
though introduction of the new custom stamp was recognized as the internal affair of 
sovereign Moldova. However, in the same document this move was declared as 
inconsistent with the bilateral agreement signed between Moldova and Ukraine on 8 May 
1997, and since this decision had not been agreed upon with the Ukrainian side, it was also 
said that the old stamps (in the possession of the PMR customs) “remain valid according to 
international law”. 60  
 
This critical phase created what can be considered a diplomatic crisis in Moldovan-
Ukrainian relations – a situation that both countries, taking into account their actual, rather 
difficult circumstances and prospects, could by no means benefit from.  
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At the same time, in all official statements it has usually been emphasized that whatever 
issue of bilateral relations is addressed, Ukraine always proceeds from the general notion 
of the state sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Moldova. For example, 
while tackling the particular issue of border crossings, Ukrainian Prime Minister Anatoliy 
Kinakh stated in November 2001 that “Ukraine is not going to decide on check points and 
customs at the Ukrainian-Transdniestrian border separately from the rest of Ukrainian-
Moldovan border”. 61 Indeed, recent developments allow to assume that recognizing 
eventually essential losses following deterioration of bilateral interstate relations, both 
sides reached mutually acceptable agreement. A clear indication for this are media reports 
according to which Ukraine, while announcing on the beginning of the demarcation of the 
Ukrainian-Moldovan border, stated that this step should be supplemented with the 
establishment of joint customs controls. 62 That signifies the final acceptance of exactly 
that contested point on which Moldovan side so hotly insisted – for quite a while, without 
evident success. It remains to be seen whether the another suggestion of Moldova, namely, 
on deploying at border and customs controls along the troubled area of Transdniestria, in 
addition to Ukrainian and Moldovan, also international customs officers from European 
countries such as Germany, Austria, and Portugal, will be also accepted by Ukraine. 
Positive response to such a proposal would actually mean not only acquiring a practical 
help for curbing those large-scale smuggling and trafficking illegal activities that alarmed 
many regional security concerns, but also passing a test for the sincerity of the intention of 




The Transdniestrian conflict. The history of this conflict has been widely covered by 
numerous research and analytical papers, comments, and media reports. Although Ukraine, 
together with the OSCE and the Russian Federation, is one of the three official 
intermediaries in the settlement of the conflict between the Republic of Moldova and its 
break away region – the self-proclaimed Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic - its actual 
role in the process is much weaker than that played by Russia and therefore, attracts less 
attention. (For example, although both Ukraine and the RF act as guarantor states 
facilitating agreements between Moldova and Transdniestria, only Russia’s remnants of 
the 14th Army troops are still stationed in the conflict area, whereas Ukraine has 10 
military observers). Besides, Ukraine’s true intentions and positions in regard to this 
particular conflict seem raising some doubts in Moldova and beyond.  
 
As one of the reasons stipulating this mistrust, Ukraine’s standpoint might have been 
compromised by the insistence with which Igor Smirnov, the leader of the self-proclaimed 
PMR, repeatedly call on the Ukraine’s military presence in the security area, and makes 
requests on bringing Ukrainian peace-making troops to the Transdniestrian territory (thus 
joining the trilateral peace-making forces). It has been implied, probably, that after the 
withdrawal of Russian militaries stationed in the conflict zone, Ukrainian “Slavic brothers” 
would serve as a reliable force to protect predominantly Slavic population of the PMR 
against the possible military aggression from Chisinau. In fact, as has been rightly 
emphasized by one of the leading Ukrainian think tanks, “Ukraine, however, does not 
share this approach. On the contrary, its concept consists in reducing the level of military  
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saturation in the security area after a mechanism to ensure the political and military 
guarantees of security is worked out, reduction in the level of military presence should go 
hand in hand with increase of the role of military observers”. 63 
 
In retrospect, it could be stated that for Ukraine this particular conflict has presented from 
its very beginning maybe the most serious security concern of all of the others raging in the 
territory of the post-USSR. Its immediate vicinity caused, inter alia, a sudden influx of 
about 40,000 of refugees whom Ukrainian authorities were urged to deal with in 1992. 
Therefore, in contrast to the well-known geopolitical interests and aspirations of Russia, 
from the very beginning of this conflict, its successful settlement – in the sense of 
obligatory preserving the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova - has been in the 
best national interests of Ukraine. On 8 December 1991 Ukraine recognized the 
independence of Moldova within the borders of MSSR, and in the letter of greeting 
dispatched to the first elected president of Moldova, Mircea Snegur, Ukrainian president 
Kravchuk stated that Kyiv would like to give a new sense to Moldovan-Ukrainian 
relations, compatible with the new realities. 
 
Ukraine’s interest in settling the Transdniestrian conflict had been evident within the CIS 
framework, as well as in a wider international context. It was not accidentally that at the 
Kyiv meeting in March 1992 the heads of CIS countries adopted a Declaration in which it 
was stated that the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova is the key element for 
the entire stability in the region. Further activities of the Ukraine’s government that sought 
to mediate the conflict at its rather early stage, were focused at trying to engage broader 
international participation. For example, a meeting of specialists to try to defuse the 
conflict included those from Ukraine, Romania, Hungary, Russia and Moldova; Ukrainian 
government also called on the CSCE’s Chair-in Office, Jiri Dienstbier from 
Czechoslovakia, to intervene. 64 (Unfortunately, at the time, the CSCE was just beginning 
to set up its Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna, and it was overwhelmed with the 
escalating crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Therefore, the CSCE Mission to Moldova has 
been established only on 4 February 1993, i.e., after – not before the short but bloody 
fighting between the Moldovan military and the units of the Transdniestrian Republican 
guard supported by the Russian 14th Army). Therefore, initial attempts to bring an end to 
the conflict were undertaken by the Moldovan President Snegur, Russian President Yeltsin, 
Ukrainian President Kravchuk, and Romanian president Iliescu. At a summit in Moscow 
on July 6-7, 1992, the parties agreed to a cease-fire and to send a trilateral peacekeeping 
force consisting of Russian, Moldovan, and Transdniestrian troops, thus leaving aside a 
question of possible Ukrainian involvement in peacekeeping operations.  
 
Later on, Ukraine continued its efforts by such steps as signing with the RF the Agreement 
on transit through the Ukrainian territory of military units, arms and military equipment 
provisionally located in Transdniestria (1997), signing, along with the Presidents of 
Moldova and Russia, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, and the Transdniestrian leader a 
“Memorandum on the Basis for Normalization of Relations between the Republic of 
Moldova and Transdniestria (8 May 1997, Moscow), and initiating a meeting of mediators 
and conflict parties that was held in Odessa on 19-20 March 1998. At this meeting, two 
important agreements were signed by both the Moldovan President and Transdniestrian,  
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namely, "Measures of Confidence and the Development of Contacts" and a "Protocol on 
Several Priority Steps to Activate the Political Settlement of the Transdniestrian Problem". 
According to those agreements, the peace-making forces of the opposing parties should be 
reduced, and the mechanism to implement security guarantees to be launched. 65  
 
It is important to note that at that time, the Transdniestrian side also committed not to 
oppose to the withdrawal of Russian arms from its territory.66  However, in defiance to the 
readiness of Moldova to observe its obligations, to reduce their servicemen presence in the 
conflict zone, and to complete their withdrawal by 12 October 1998 even in a unilateral 
way, Transdniestrian side actually blocked the implementation of the Odessa agreement. 
This has been done through making unrealistic demands as, for example, for the official 
examination by Chisinau of such document as Declaration on the Transdniestrian 
Statehood, also by impeding the regular meetings of the Joint Control Commission (the 
JCC has been established to supervise the activities of the RF peacekeeping contingent 
stationed on both sides of the Dniester river). In general, it is already evident that the 
Transdniestrian side of the conflict often disregards its own commitments, and reveals 
strong resistance to the very idea of demilitarization of the security zone. Despite the PMR 
resistance, the then Moldovan leadership declared its intention to continue the reduction of 
the peace-making forces to the level envisaged by the Odessa agreement. The Co-Head of 
the Joint Control Commission from the Moldovan party also emphasized that the measures 
taken for the settlement of the conflict, and for promoting the renewed contacts between 
people, were highly appreciated by the population inhabiting both banks of the Dniester, as 
well as by international community.  
 
Supporting these initiatives of Moldova, Ukraine tried to re-activate its role in the 
Transdniestrian conflict settlement. A settlement plan has been proposed consisting of 
several consecutive steps for the implementation of the Odessa agreements, and suggesting 
precise terms for each of them. These measures included determination a status of the 
PTMR, schedule of meetings of the leaders of the sides of conflict, and a control 
mechanism for observing the guarantees of settlement, including the bringing of military 
observers' missions to the security zone. Ukraine was the first party-guarantor to send its 
10 observers pursuant to the Odessa agreements, and to allocate from the state budget the 
funds necessary for their activities. 
 
According to these proposals, determination of the PMR's status would be addressed by an 
expert group consisting of representatives of states-guarantors and the OSCE. On 30 
November 1998 a meeting of the expert group at the deputy minister level was held in 
Kyiv. Representatives of Ukraine, Moldova, Russia and the OSCE participated in the 
meeting, whereas representatives of the PMR did not arrive. Taking into account that the 
most difficult problem of the conflict settlement remained that of the PMR’s status, 
Ukraine has then suggested to apply a principle of a "suspended status". 67 These 
developments were followed by signing on 16 July 1999 of the Kyiv Joint Statement by 
the President of Moldova and the Leader of Transdniestria, together with the 
representatives of the guarantor states, the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation and  
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the President of Ukraine. In this text it was agreed that the parties will construct their 
relations on the following principles: common borders and common economic, legal, 
defense and social domains.  
 
One more step forward took place on 20-24 March 2000, when the OSCE Mission together 
with the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized a "Working Table" on the 
Transdniestrian settlement in Kiev. Participants included the heads of the experts' groups 
from both the Moldovan and Transdniestrian sides, the three mediators (Russian 
Federation, Ukraine and OSCE) as well as experts on international law, constitutional 
systems and conflict resolution. The specialists produced recommendations on the 
structure, state organs, and division of competencies of the “common state”68, and stages 
and possible guarantees for implementation of the settlement.69  
 
From this brief overview of Ukraine’s position it follows that at the level of the official 
policy, public statements of democratically-minded leaders, and practical steps, not a 
single sign of Kyiv’s actual support for separatists was ever visible - in sharp contrast to 
that of Russia. (At earlier stages, the latter provided such a support not only by military, 
but by political means as well. It was reported, for example, that on 5 April 1992 Russian 
Vice President Rutskoi visited Tiraspol to show support for the Russian enclave, and after 
returning to Moscow, urged the Russian State Duma to recognize the “Dniester Republic” 
70). Despite this undisputed fact, Ukraine’s role in the Transdniestrian conflict has often 
been questioned, and a number of rumours circulated within the breakaway region, as well 
as in the rest of Moldova. Regrettably, these may to some extent be justified by occasional 
publications in Ukrainian media, like the one claiming that “Transdniestria is actually for a 
long time our ally, though some politicians stubbornly try not to see it… Ukraine should 
change decisively its policy towards Transdniestria… and to turn [this region] into the 
devoted sworn brother”.71  It should always be kept in mind that in Ukraine, like in any 
other country, quite different types of media exist, including that known as being anti-
Western and Russia- and Slavs-oriented. Therefore, no wonder that rather notorious 
publications appear targeting not only Moldova but also all other countries, nations and 
political groupings (including still condemned “Ukrainian nationalists”) that do not share 
such preferences, or do not recognize Ukraine’s belonging to “East-Christian, Slavic 
Brotherhood”. Certain indecisiveness in dealing with the sides of conflict, and in 
particular, direct contacts of Ukrainian president Kuchma with the leader of 
Transdniestrian separatists Igor Smirnov also contribute to Moldova’s mistrust when it 
comes to Kyiv’s true positions and intentions.72    
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Surprisingly, assumed Ukrainian plans and ambitions relating to the Transdniestrian region 
become also a matter of consideration by a number of political analysts and experts 
engaged in studying regional conflicts. As was noted by one of researchers, “further 
hardening the attitudes of the Russian population were widespread rumours that Ukraine 
and Romania were preparing to make a swap of the Transdniestrian region to be returned 
to Ukraine in exchange for Ukraine’s turning over former Romanian territory now within 
its borders. Even though the government of Ukraine went to great lengths to deny that such 
a possibility was being ever considered, it nonetheless gained considerable credibility 
among major portions of the Russian population of Transdniestria”. 73 What appeared as a 
further surprise for Ukrainian authorities and society as a whole was that some vicious 
intentions of Ukraine to avail from this conflict by annexing the disputed territory were 
also seriously considered by some researchers and analysts. In particular, a quotation from 
a paper published by such a respectable agency as The Conflict Studies Research Centre 
(Directorate General Development and Doctrine, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 
England), could be present as a striking illustration. It reads as follows: “Officially Kyiv 
was definitely coherent in supporting the withdrawal of the Russian Army from 
Transdniestria and the maintenance of the integrity of the Republic of Moldova, although it 
could not control the involvement of some paramilitary units (UNO-UNSO) that fought on 
the side of separatist guards against Moldova. Needless to say, the ethnic dimension 
persisted in Ukraine, as many diplomats and politicians saw the independence of ex-MSSR 
as very fragile, and started to prepare themselves for a scenario of fast annexation of PMR 
territories to Ukraine, a policy strongly opposed by Russia, who strove to maintain this 
strip of land for whatever reasons and arguments as a region of strategic interest. From 
Tiraspol's point of view, a scenario of annexation by Kyiv was clearly an option, but not 
without conditions. They would condition their adherence to Ukraine by a significant 
regional autonomy, which was viewed as not too appealing to Kyiv. In fact, Ukrainian 
authorities would fear to keep intact a politically strong autonomy as a link to Novorossia, 
a chain of Russian speaking oblasts which starts in Tiraspol, and ends in Crimea. 
Obviously, by taking this step, Ukraine would easily become the target of several 
neighbouring countries, deprived of their historical provinces by Tsarist and Soviet leaders 
to the benefit of the current Ukraine, and which given a chance, would claim back their old 
territories…“74 This extended quotation and other similar considerations may serve as a 
clear demonstration of how poorly Ukrainian realities, troubles, and concerns are 
understood from the outside.  
 
 
Recent Developments. Unfortunately, positive trends in the whole process of 
Transdniestrian conflict settlement seemed to stagnate in 2000, and later developments can 
be regarded rather as its deterioration that was stipulated by general destabilization of the 
Moldovan political situation, and immediate availing from this by the Transdniestrian 
leadership that took this advantage to strengthen its independence from Moldova. The 
reasons for this – to be assessed and analyzed by all interested parties - seem to be of 
particular importance for the future of both Moldova and Ukraine, and should be well 
learnt as a bitter lesson by populations of both countries.  
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Return of communist rule in Moldova – a lesson for Ukraine. In retrospect, negative 
trends in Moldova’s general situation and particularly, in the attempts to reach some 
progress in settling the Transdniestrian crisis seem be triggered by the events following the 
decision of the parliament of Moldova to restrict powers of the then President Petru 
Lucinski by constitutional amendments in July 2000. A failure to agree on his successor 
caused a constitutional crisis, the parliament was then dissolved and early elections were 
called for February 2001. Destabilization of the internal political situation in the Republic 
of Moldova was immediately availed by the authorities of the Transdniestrian region that 
in a very provocative move of August 2000, established its own Foreign Ministry, a 
representative of which subsequently attended a Russian-sponsored “summit conference” 
with the invited “foreign ministers” of Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabkh, and South Ossetia. 75 
The self-proclaimed PMR also began to use its own stamps and seals at customs clearance.  
 
Meanwhile, at the noon of the 2001 parliamentary elections in Moldova, one more attempt 
to push forward the negotiations process at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 
Ukraine, Russia and Moldova (Kharkiv, February 16, 2001) was undertaken by Ukraine. It 
looks, however, like a kind of repetition, in a weaker version, of basic principles agreed 
upon earlier. In the document signed by the three Foreign Ministers it was said that 
“having discussed the results of the negotiation process on regulation of the conflict 
consequences in the Transdniestrian region of Moldova, [they] welcome the resumption of 
dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol within the framework of the existing mechanism 
of negotiation process that has become possible due to combined efforts of both sides and 
mediators. It was noted that in the course of the last meetings in Budapest and Kyiv, the 
parties of the negotiation process had worked out a common vision of possible ways of 
reaching final settlement of the crisis.”76 
 
This cautiously optimistic vision, however, has not been confirmed by the events that 
ensued after the communists came to power as a result of the Moldovan parliamentary 
elections on 25 February 2001. (The PCRM won just over 50 % of the vote, and gained 77 
seats out of 101; since in Moldova, the president is chosen not by popular elections but by 
parliament, in early April 2001 the PCRM leader Vladimir Voronin was elected as the 
country’s new president). 
 
For the time being, after communist rule in Moldova has lasted for over a year, it is already 
possible to compare their pre-election promises and intentions with actual results of the 
activities in all of the main spheres of public life, domestic and foreign policy. In particular, 
the inaugural address by the leader of the Moldovan Communist Party (PCRM) Vladimir 
Voronin should be recalled. Voronin criticised his predecessors saying that they had 
reduced Moldova to humanitarian catastrophe and dire poverty, and had brought Moldova 
the unhappy distinction of being the most corrupt country in Europe and the poorest 
country in the CIS. He declared his wish to create “modern socialism” by forging closer 
ties with Russia and increasing the role of the state to improve the economy, which has 
shrunk by two-thirds since 1991. According to his words, Moldova should become a 
“European Cuba” that must hold out against “imperialist predators” in Europe, as Cuba had 
in the Americas.77 At the same time, observers noted conspicuously absent statements  
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about making Moldova a member of the Russian-Belarus Union, and to give Russian 
language official status – the promises widely used during the PCRM election campaign.78 
With respect to the Transdniestrian conflict, on the very day of his election as a President 
of Moldova, Voronin told journalists that solving the problem of the breakaway region of 
Transdniester would be a matter of priority.  
 
 
Moldovan Communist government and Transdniestrian conflict. Indeed, there was a 
short period following communist victory when a prospect of reconciliation between the 
central authorities and those of the breakaway region seemed realistic. 79 In particular, it 
could have been expected that the pre-election Communist declarations on bringing 
Moldova into the Russia-Belarus Union, and introducing Russian as the official language 
would promote further approximation of the positions pertaining to both Igor Smirnov and 
Vladimir Voronin.80 It was already announced by some political analysts that “after 
national elections of 2001 in Moldova the contacts between the President of Moldova and 
the leader of Transdniestria have intensified. A new agreement by them was signed on 16 
May 2001 in Tiraspol”. 81 
 
It should be noted, however, that from the very beginning of this new stage of Moldova-
Transdniestria dispute, despite the Voronin’s declared intention to make settlement of the 
problem of the breakaway region of Transdniestria a priority, actual developments by no 
means showed that this commitment was also shared by the other side. For example, in 
defiance of the official invitation sent to Tiraspol, not a single representative of the PMR 
authorities visited a ceremony to greet the newly elected Moldovan president. 82  On April 
9, the first meeting between Voronin and Smirnov did take place, and it was agreed to hold 
regular monthly meetings to speed up negotiations toward resolving the 11-year-long 
dispute. However, very soon, on 13 May 2001, those good intentions of the Moldovan 
government to improve relations with the leadership of the Transdniestria region were 
subjected to a difficult trial. That day, border guards at a checkpoint between Transdniester 
region and the rest of Moldova prevented president Voronin, who was going to visit the 
monastery Noul Neamt, from crossing the (de facto existing) Moldovan-Transdniestrian 
border, and told him that the order to bar his entry had been given by what they called “a 
higher authority” in Tiraspol. 83 And though this (intended?) offence aimed, perhaps, at 
making impossible the next round of bilateral negotiations scheduled for May 16 in 
Tiraspol, the meeting did take place. A number of agreements were signed, including those 
on economic cooperation, the free access of journalists to cover news events on the two 
sides of Dniester, coordination of tax policies, removing custom points, guaranteeing 
foreign investments, and recognition of each side’s official documents. Although these 
agreements have been considered as a tentative first step towards larger autonomy for the 
breakaway region, this step did not lead to actual improvement of bilateral relations that 
remained tense, or to the implementation of the above decisions. The same pertains to the 
previous gesture of the Transdniestrian officials of releasing Ilie Iliascu, who spent nine  
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years in prison on charges of pro-Romanian terrorist acts. According to some analysts, Igor 
Smirnov’s decision to liberate this political prisoner in fact only strengthened his standing 
by showing him to be a magnanimous leader with whom one can to negotiate. Also, since 
this move was believed to be stipulated by the intervention of the Russian Foreign Minister 
Igor Ivanov, it was therefore regarded as strengthening the separatist’s position and 
Russia’s influence in the region.84    
 
Indeed, the communists’ victory in parliamentary elections in Moldova did ensure its 
closer ties with Russia, and more benevolent attitude of the Russian officials towards the 
two main contested issues – the status of Transdniestria and the presence of Russian troops 
in the region. These unresolved issues prevented the two countries from signing a basic 
treaty for 10 years following Moldova’s independence. Frequent visits to Moscow by 
president Voronin, and his negotiating such a treaty eventuated by a success. Bilateral 
treaty was finally signed, and Moldova seemed at last gaining official Russian recognition 
of its independence and territorial integrity. This treaty, having been promptly ratified by 
the Moldovan parliament, later has also been ratified by the Russian Duma. 85 However, 
neither this treaty nor further concessions made by the new government of Moldova to 
Moscow as well as to Tiraspol, promoted any real advancement in settling the frozen 
conflict. As William Hill, the chief of the OSCE mission to Moldova, told journalists in 
Chisinau on 13 July 2001, after a fast start the negotiations between Moldova and the 
separatists have “slowed down”. He also said that the complicated problems of the 
Transdniester’s “special status” necessitate making “bigger compromises” and that this 
takes a longer time, though added that “in general, the situation is positive and must be so 
maintained by proceeding without further delays in implementing solutions already agreed 
on”. Hill also informed that OSCE member states have begun contributing to a fund that 
would finance the dismantling of those parts of the Russian arsenal that cannot be 
evacuated from the Transdniester. 86   
 
Additional difficulties have also arisen with regard to Russia’s obligations under an 
agreement signed in 1999 at the Istambul summit of the OSCE, which called for the 
removal of the military hardware by the end of 2001, and removal of equipment, light 
ammunition, and withdrawal of all of its troops by the end of 2002. Despite Voronin’s 
frequent visits to Moscow, and meetings and discussions with the RF president Putin, those 
operations have often been halted by the protests coming from the breakaway 
Transdniestrian region, with wide possibilities for Russia to refer to them while pursuing 
its own interests. Indeed, in 2001 Russia began destroying weapons and ammunition 
deposited in the region, and taking away military hardware.87 But the operation was 
suspended in the end of August “because of protests by Transdniester residents”. 88 (In 
August, a group of protesters from Transdniestria prevented OSCE observers from entering 
the area where the Russian military equipment was arranged to be destroyed. Other 
protests against the removal of the equipment took place in Tiraspol and other cities of 
Transdniestria). Transdniestrian officials often expressed their general discontent with the  
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plan, and called off their protests only after Moscow promised to cancel approximately 
$300 million in Tiraspol’s gas debts, which amounts to about one-third of the province’s 
total debts for gas. Therefore, according to Russian officials cited in the Moldovan media, 
on 14 November the final trainload of Russian military hardware was shipped out of the 
breakaway province, though local observers expected that Russian military would have a 
harder time meeting the deadline for defusing the estimated 40,000 metric tons of 
ammunition, which has been stored in depots in the Transdniestrian city of Colbasna. 89 
 
Most recent events suggest even more rigid position to be taken by Russia, which is now 
considering maintaining its forces in the region as peacemakers. According to the RFE/RL, 
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Trubnikov, Moscow's top mediator in the 
dispute between Moldova and Transdniester, during his visit to Moldova on 31 January-1 
February did not deny reports that Moscow was working on an additional agreement to 
keep Russian forces (about 2,500 soldiers constituting the so-called Transdniester 
Operative Group of Russian Troops) in the breakaway region as "peacekeepers." After 
meeting with separatist leaders in Transdniester Trubnikov said that Moscow will fulfill 
the 1999 agreement, but that Russian forces may stay in Transdniester to help consolidate a 
future agreement on the region's status, and admitted that "Russian troops do not intend to 
leave [Transdniester]. We will fulfill [the 1999 OSCE agreement] even more actively, in 
the hope that [the] OSCE, too, will be interested in having guarantees for the [future] 
Transdniester status and for consolidating this status… We will discuss this problem with 
our colleagues within the OSCE." 90 
 
Portuguese diplomat Manuel Marcello Curto, the OSCE's representative in the 
Transdniester dispute, said the organization has not yet received a concrete proposal from 
Moscow regarding its troops. Curto, during his fact-finding mission to Moldova, said on 1 
February 2002 that "If it [the proposal] comes to the [OSCE] forum, we will have to have 
an extremely serious debate with Russians within the OSCE, but I would prefer not to 
imagine things, not to put [forward] hypotheses. I would like to wait for the evolution of 
the events. I repeat myself, as far as of today, February 1, 2002, the Russian Federation has 
not put forward any idea of a peacekeeping operation." 91 
  
The next turn of further escalated tensions between Moldova’s central authorities and those 
of the separatist Transdniestria relates to the internal political crisis in Moldova for which 
the communist government is fully responsible (addressed in more detail in the Appendix). 
Exhibiting impotence to manage the widespread crisis caused by certain decisions of 
parliament and government of Moldova, president Voronin on 4 March 2002 claimed that 
the large-scale public protests were being paid for out of a fund of $200 million set up by 
the leader of the breakaway region of Transdniestria. 92 These allegations, ridiculed by the 
opposition media, have been a striking illustration of the incompetence and inability of the 
Moldovan communist government to achieve any positive results in settling the 
Transdniestrian conflict, and confirm its eventual and final failure. From the outside of 
Moldova, this situation presents a kind of paradox, because pro-Russian, anti-Western and 
anti-Romanian aspirations of the now empowered party seemed quite closely coinciding  
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with those of the Transdniestrian leadership. (Let us recall that to justify their separatist 
“state-building” activities, the PMR’s authorities always referred not only to the short but 
bloody conflict of 1992, but also to the persisting threat of Moldova’s unification with 
Romania, and to the “ethno-nationalist forces” that turned the Moldovan SSR into the 
independent Republic of Moldova). Therefore, although all other communist promises 
were obviously doomed to fail, this one might have occurred to be realistic. Whereas in 
fact, the Transdniestrian leadership is now not inclined to accept any kind of compromise 
lower than a confederation of “two equal states”, therefore, a regress rather than progress 
has been the “achievement” of the policy undertaken by Moldovan communist authorities. 
In this context, no wonder that the last attempt of Ukraine to push forward the 
reconciliation process has failed, too. (In the beginning of January 2002, Ukrainian 
president proposed to both Moldovan and Transdniestrian authorities to meet at the 
territory of Ukraine, but this proposal was blankly rejected by the official diplomatic 
response from the Moldovan Foreign Ministry 93). 
 
From these developments it is also evident how little dividend, in the context of the 
Transdniestrian conflict, Moldova’s new rulers received from its “closer relations” with 
Russia, to which all the hopes to settle this conflict had been linked. It seems obvious that 
over this period, the self-proclaimed PMR only strengthened what it is called its 
“statehood”, and that this turn has had a negative impact on the Ukrainian security 
situation, and on the regional stability as well.   
 
In terms of bilateral Ukrainian-Moldovan relations, aggravation of the Transdniestrian 
conflict has also contributed to their further deterioration. One can speculate that facing the 
results of their failed policy, Moldova’s authorities resorted to the traditional for 
communist ideology receipt of looking for the internal and external enemies to make 
somebody else responsible for their own mistakes and drawbacks. This time, their 
conventional adversaries consisting, apart from Transdniestrian leaders, of West, NATO 
and, of course, Romania, seemed to be supplemented by Ukraine. This might have rather 
negative consequences, especially taking into account traditionally tense pre-election 
situation in Ukraine sensitizing the society to various influences. This time, the election 
campaign has been accompanied by the intensified pressure on Ukraine of different 
political forces, concerned not only with the situation in Crimea (where registration of the 
leader of Crimean communist, and speaker of Crimean parliament Leonid Hrach was 
cancelled by a court’s decision), but also by what was named “the desire of Ukraine to play 
a role of new regional leader”. 94 In particular, highly provocative statements appeared in 
Russian media, like, for example, “Ukraine seems to be favouring an idea of taking under 
its jurisdiction both Transdniestria and Gagauzia” (!!!?) in order to slacken Russian 
influence in the region”. 95 At the same time, Moldovan media reports referred to signs of 
“warmer relations” between Kyiv and Tiraspol, and charged Ukraine with the attempts to 
influence international organizations in order to make them more benevolent towards 
Transdniestria. In particular, the Moldovan deputy Foreign Minister Ion Stavile has been 
quoted as saying that “in Memorandum recently provided by Ukraine to international 
organizations, pro-Tiraspol attitudes are clearly expressed concerning Moldova’s 
introduction of new customs regulations” 96. Even more unexpected for Ukrainian politics  
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came speculations on the agreeable perception of the information on certain rapprochement 
between Ukraine and Transdniestria by… the USA Ambassador to Ukraine, due to which 
the USA is “more and more inclined to recognize the right of Transdniestrian population to 
determine their political future”.97 Such irresponsible speculations would certainly make 
no good for either Ukraine or Moldova, while rendering bilateral relations more and more 
tense – for whose benefit? Whereas according to Ukrainian media reports, during the 
recent informal CIS summit in Kazakhstan, Ukrainian president Kuchma, conferring with 
the Moldovan president Voronin, confirmed once again Kyiv’s commitment to keep 
friendly and good neighbourly relations with Moldova, and to settle the Transdniestrian 
conflict proceeding from the notion of preserving Moldova’s territorial integrity. 98 
 
It should also be noted that during the recent acute political crisis in Moldova, an official 
statement by Ukrainian government on the matter was that “while the situation in today’s 
Moldova raises deep concerns in Ukraine, because Moldova is our friendly neighbouring 
country and our partner in GUUAM, Ukraine has no intention and is not going to interfere 
into its internal affairs, as well as into those of any other state” (a statement by Igor 
Dolgov, official representative of the Ukrainian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 99 Whereas 
president Voronin expressed the intention to provide support for Ukrainian communists 
during the forthcoming parliamentary elections, thus eliciting rather angry reaction in 
Ukraine followed by addresses delivered to a number of the CoE structures. Such 
intentions were characterized as violation of international law standards and, inter alia, of 
the Charter of the CoE of which both countries are member states. According to Vasiliy 
Kostytsky, the Vice-President of the European People’s Party group of the CoE 
Parliamentary Assembly, this move is a direct interference into the Ukrainian internal 
affairs that may also lead to escalation of confrontation in Europe. 100 (Though it should be 
admitted that much more scandalous interference of Russia into the election campaign in 
Ukraine, caused by passions around the cancellation of registration of the Crimean 
communist leader Leonid Hrach, brought about much milder and more restrained protests 
of the Ukrainian authorities).  
 
The most important lesson to be taken from this story is that working together as a team for 
reaching progress in Transdniestrian conflict settlement, Ukraine and Moldova would have 
much better chances to succeed than when giving in to mutual distrust, suspicions and 
accusations. Whenever the discontent between our two countries has been surfaced, the 
Transdniestrian side of the conflict is the one to benefit, and to continue strengthening its 
de facto independence from the Republic of Moldova.  One more obvious consequence is 
that worsening of the Ukrainian-Moldovan relations objectively strengthens Russia’s grip 
on its former subjects, and inevitably facilitate its efforts to remain the strongest and most 
influential regional power.  
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Results of a domestic policy of ruling Communist Party of Moldova as a lesson for 
Ukrainian electorate.  
 
During the early stage of communists governing the country, things might have been 
perceived as going not so bad – in compliance with the vision that today’s communists are 
already not the same as those in Soviet times, and being closer to the modern European 
Left. Indeed, the first steps of the Moldova’s president Voronin displayed his desire to 
balance between the country’s eastern neighbours and the West, in contrast to the overt 
condemnation of “imperialist predators” made in his inaugural speech. Moreover, just 
during the past year, Moldova has managed to join the two international agencies, namely, 
the Stability Pact for Southern and Eastern Europe and the World Trade Organization, thus 
proceeding well ahead of Ukraine that is pursuing similar aims. Although the socio-
economic situation of Moldova remains difficult, and the country is officially recognized 
as the poorest in Europe, according to the governmental report, Moldova registered a 4 % 
growth in GDP and a 3,3 % reduction in the inflation rate during the first half of the 
2001.101 The Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev admitted, however, that the economic growth, 
to a large extent, resulted from the improving economic situation in neighbouring countries 
– Russia, Ukraine, and Romania – on which the Moldovan economy relies. At the same 
time, huge external debt that amounts to 40 % of the budget (in contrast to 10-12 % in 
previous years), and suspension of relations with international financial institutions create 
not especially optimistic prospects for further developments. What gave some hopes was 
the strong criticism of government’s activities provided then by president Voronin when 
100 days of new government were evaluated. According to a local analyst, while 
criticizing both the government and the parliament that “had become increasingly 
dictatorial”, Mr. Vladimir Voronin actually opposed orthodox communist doctrine, and 
this speech contrasted sharply with his inauguration speech. 102  
 
These steps, together with the initial restrain from implementing the promises to bring 
Moldova into the Russia-Belarus Union, and to make Russian the second official language, 
allowed one to expect rather peaceful, evolutionary way of one more shift from communist 
to more liberal doctrine during the next regular elections, and of Moldova’s European 
integration to be realized in a course of a natural change of generations.  Such a forecast 
seemed to comply with the results of public opinion poll conducted by the Institute of 
Public Policy, and released on 4 December 2001. According to the survey, 38.9 % (instead 
of 50 %) would vote for the PCMR if the elections took place on 9 December, whereas the 
next largest group, 34,8 %, would not vote for anybody or were still undecided. These 
results have shown slow but sure drop of the communists’ popularity, and still considerable 
confidence in president Voronin who has gained a support of 70 % of respondents 
(whereas Prime Minister Tarlev has had 43 %). 103   
 
Unfortunately, old habits of dealing with opponents seemed to prevail, and subsequent 
evident inability to improve the country’s internal situation or achieve any progress in 
settling Transdniestrian conflict stipulated further moves of Moldova’s communist 
government that destroyed completely all modest achievements, if any, that it might put on 
a display after the first months of coming to power.  
                                                          
101 “Moldova Evaluates 100 days of New Government” by Angela Sirbu, TOL Week in Review, 31 July - 6 
August 2001. 
102 Ibid. 
103 “Survey Confirms the Popularity of Moldovan Communists” by Angela Sirbu, TOL Week in Review, 4-10 
December 2001.  
54 
The first signs of the forthcoming crisis appeared as early as in June 2001, when the ruling 
party and president Voronin decided to “rewrite” the history (of Romania) now taught in 
schools, and in general, to change Romanian identity for the “Moldovan” one. This was 
met by rather sharp reaction of university professors, schoolteachers and students who 
organized in Chisinau a protest demonstration, then amounting to only over a hundred 
people. (It should be noted that in Moldova, a growing proportion of population regards 
Moldovan identity as artificially constructed by Stalin - the “father of Moldovan nation” - 
who created the Autonomous Republic of Moldova in 1924.)104 However, instead of 
recognizing this reaction as an indication of a possibility of stronger protest actions, 
threatening to bring about a serious political unrest, and to restrain from pedalling the 
issue, communist authorities made the next unwise step by supplementing 
“Moldovanization” with the prospect of the reversed “Russification” of the country. 
According to the governmental decision dated 18 December 2001, from 1 January 2002, 
Russian should have become mandatory in primary schools, and receive a status of an 
official language, “to be used by central public authorities, the organs of central and local 
public administration, the judiciary, and in other walks of the state’s social life”. 105  
  
The subsequent events developed impetuously, and protest actions gained impetus with 
each next week. For better understanding of the on-going processes, and in order to 
identify the main stages of the developing political crisis, the available information has 
been arranged chronologically, with a prospect of presenting also a clearer picture for 
Ukrainian readers (see Appendix). 
 
The chronicle of a political crisis brought about by the ruling communist Moldovan 
government, as well as the following developments, can serve to summarise all the 
misfortunes that the reverse from democracy to old, Soviet-type policy can impose on the 
population of a post-Soviet country. And though a brief account on these drastically 
destabilising events would be no news for either Moldovan or Romanian societies, for 
Ukraine this information is of outmost importance and topicality.  
 
Because, though lard-line leftists in Ukraine have already had practically no chances to win 
a decisive majority in the next parliament – as the actual results of the parliamentary 
elections on 31 March 2002 proved convincingly - the rhetoric used by many political 
parties claiming to be “centrists” in certain points resembled closely that of Moldovan 
communists. Also, the attempts of the incumbent power-holders to strengthen their 
positions by relying on the support from Russia were evident. These turns of Ukraine’s 
policy increase each time when their actual or alleged crimes, or simply reluctance to push 
forward democratic reformation of the old structures inherited from the previous regime, 
compel the West to distance from Ukraine, and to agree with leaving it within the Russian 
sphere of influence. What an outcome could follow is convincingly illustrated by the 
Moldova’s recent hard experience. Therefore, this lesson should be learnt in every detail, 
and the appropriate conclusions drawn. To make this process more effective, trilateral 
cooperation at all levels – from governmental to various civil society structures - within the 
Ukraine-Moldova-Romania framework is highly desirable. Establishment of such an axis 
would contribute greatly to the decisive European integration of all three countries, and  
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would ensure addressing in a coordinated manner a number of crucial problems of regional 
security – first and foremost, the Transdniestrian conflict.  
 
The future of Moldova after the crisis is overcome would only benefit if traditional close 
ties with Romania are re-established, are supplemented by turning Ukraine, its another 
neighbour, into one more genuine ally. Much of hard work has to be done for this, but such 
an accomplishment would be a real asset for both countries, as well as for strengthening 
regional and European stability. Concrete steps for starting such a rapprochement could be 
proposed by each side, and be discussed and agreed upon at a joint meeting – the sooner 
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9 January 2002: the storm of protests over the introduction of mandatory Russian 
classes in schools and the decision to make Russian the second official language erupted in 
the capital of Moldova; thousands of young people, members of intelligentsia and 
representatives of ethnic minorities organized demonstrations in the main square of 
Chisinau. The banners and posters claimed: “Down with the Communists”, “Stop 
Russification”, and “We want to Europe”. Demonstrations continuing the next weeks 
attract more and more participants. 
 
22 January 2002: Moldova’s Communist government temporarily suspended the 
activity of the country’s main opposition party – the Popular Christian Democratic Party 
(PPCD) – for “inciting public demonstrations” to boost the status of the Russian language. 
Moldovan Minister of Justice Ion Morei warned that if the antigovernment demonstrations 
continue, the party might be permanently banned. This move intensified protest actions, 
and sparked harsh criticism abroad, accusing Moldova’s communist leadership of openly 
violating democratic principles. Walter Schwimmer, General Secretary of the CoE, called 
the decision “disproportionate” and “in violation of the principle of freedom of 
expression”, whereas Adrian Severin, president of the OSCE parliamentary Assembly, 
acknowledged with great concern “the deterioration of the political dialogue in Moldova, 
as well as the ever-increasing number of measures taken by the country’s leadership which 
might decouple the country from European value structures and institutions”.  
 
31 January 2002: the PPCD has sent a letter to the CoE, claiming that non-Russian 
ethnic minorities in Moldova “continue to be the victims of an assimilation policy through 
the russification promoted by state authorities”. The letter also provides important data on 
a number of pupils belonging to different ethnic and religious groups. According to current 
Education Ministry data, 36,601 (6.19 %) of pupils are Ukrainians whereas Russians 
constitute 31,270 (5.28 %). It follows that "Despite the legislative framework, the actions 
of the Moldovan authorities prove that the largest group of pupils belonging to national 
minorities became the target of a rough assimilation policy through russification. These 
pupils do not study in their mother language, but in the language of another ethnic 
minority. Thus, out of the 36,601 pupils of Ukrainian origin, 36,297 are studying in the 
Russian language, and only 374 pupils in the Ukrainian language," the letter reads.  
 
3 February 2002: the Secretary General of the Council of Europe Walter Schimmer 
demanded explanations from Moldova concerning its political and human rights issues 
according to Article 52 of the European Convention on Human Rights. (It was only the 
second time that the Council of Europe had employed the same article of censure, Article 
52. The previous instance related to Russia’s record in Chechnya). 
 
19 February 2002: the number of protesters growing, this day it surpassed 40,000.  
Protests also spread to Moldova’s second-large city, Balti, where some 200 students 
demonstrated in solidarity with the striking students in the capital. The demonstrators' 
demands, which initially were limited to ending mandatory Russian classes for 
schoolchildren and pro-Russian history textbooks, were expanding. This day, for the first  
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time, they demanded the government, president, and parliament to resign. PPCD’s leader 
Iurie Rosca addressed the demonstrators saying, "The time has come for us to save 
democracy in Moldova, to do away with communism for good." He invited the parliament 
that will hold the next day a special session to examine the socio-political situation in 
Moldova, “to do this together with the Christian Democratic MPs and that the session be 
broadcast live on television and radio". Later on, when the protesters passed by secret 
police headquarters and then the Russian Embassy, they chanted, "We don't want a 
Bolshevik president!" and, "We don't want any more communists or KGB!" as well as, 
"Down with the occupiers!"  The same day, the Russian Foreign Ministry protested against 
what it termed "anti-Russian actions aimed against the Russian Embassy" in Chisinau, 
condemned the organizers “from inside the country or outside it”, and warned that these 
protests risk unleashing yet another conflict in Southeastern Europe.  
 
20 February 2002: parliamentary session canceled, apparently at the behest of the 
Communists (who have 71 out of the 101 seats in parliament whereas the opposing PPCD 
has just 11 seats). The head of another opposition party, Dumitru Braghis of the Braghis 
Alliance, backed the Christian Democrats' call for the resignations of the government and 
president, saying Moldova needs a government that can help improve the economic 
situation.  
 
21 February 2002: president Voronin delivered a speech to the nation. He said that 
the country was being “affected by the virus of nationalism, extremism, and madness”. He 
also strongly condemned the PPCD and its leader Iurie Rosca, calling them “political 
terrorists”.   
 
24 February 2002: anti-governmental demonstrations reached a peak; a meeting 
held on the Chisinau central square attracted 70,000 (according to other sources about 
80,000), the highest number since demonstrations began on 9 January. Either national 
television or national radio has not broadcast any news about the demonstrations. Earlier 
this day, tens of thousands of anti-protest leaflets were dropped from a plane. 
Demonstration organizers told the press that the traffic police had received an order on 23 
February to conduct technical checks on buses that would eventually take protesters to 
Chisinau. Moreover, the organizers claimed that in the counties of Soroca, Balti, and 
Lapusna, the police abusively withdrew buses' license plates and technical control 
certificates in order to keep drivers from transporting participants to the capital city.  
 
26 February 2002: National Television staff members presented a declaration to the 
management with demands to counter censorship and interference by the Communist 
government. The demands were later endorsed by about 500 employees of the national 
radio service, Teleradio Moldova.  "The company has become a brainwashing tool used 
against the population, and news consumers are deprived of the right to receive accurate 
and balanced information," the declaration said, referring to national and international 
legislation guaranteeing such rights. The declaration also stated that "the authorities have 
reinstated Soviet-style political censorship at the national radio and TV stations."  
 
1 March 2002: at a meeting of the heads of CIS countries president Voronin said 
that he hoped to create a bilingual country. His vision of it consists of: “all Russians and 
Ukrainians of Moldova would speak “Moldovan”, and all Moldovans would also speak 
Russian, thus creating “a true bilingualism”.  This intention was highly praised by Russian 
president Putin, who thanked Voronin for the successful settlement of problems relating to  
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Russian language functioning in Moldova, and assessed the current policy of Moldovan 
authorities as “politically correct, well balanced, and aimed at satisfying all political forces 
by democratic means”.  
 
4 March 2002: the Constitutional Court of Moldova ruled that the bill to make 
Russian the second language was unlawful. Meanwhile, president Voronin who repeatedly 
accused Romania of interfering in Moldova’s affairs, went further by claiming that the 
protests – both in the media and in the Chisinau downtown – were paid for from a special 
fund established for this purpose by the Transdniestrian leader Igor Smirnov.  
 
5 March 2002: the management of Moldova state television forbade journalists to 
broadcast about the ongoing protests in Chisinau.  When the news announcer attempted to 
read the text of the station's report on the protests, audio was cut off and the broadcast was 
interrupted. After being restored, the announcer attempted to read out the text of a protest 
by journalists against President Vladimir Voronin, but audio transmission was again cut. 
Some 4,000 employees at TeleRadio Moldova continue a "Japanese strike", performing 
their duties but declaring that they are on strike.  
 
7 March 2002: the European Popular Party (EPP, holding a majority of seats in the 
European Parliament and - along with the PPCD - being a member of the Christian 
Democratic International) expressed "high concern" at developments in Moldova. It 
adopted a resolution stressing that "the latest events in Chisinau may be regarded as an 
attempt to demolish a state based on the rule of the law; a failure to respect human and 
minority rights; a limitation of the judiciary's power; control and censorship of the media; 
and television in particular." The statement also criticized the "harassment of the 
opposition and political persecutions, including several members of the Christian 
Democratic Popular Party (PPCD); the undermining of local autonomy and the excessive 
politicization of the state administration; the halt in the privatization process and threat of a 
recollectivization of the national economy; the blockade of foreign investment and 
relations with international lenders; the violation of international treaties. 
 
14 March 2002: the European Parliament passed a resolution on the human rights 
situation in Moldova. The resolution, forwarded by the European People's Party and 
European Democrats (EPP-ED), calls on the government and the parliament of Moldova to 
"refrain from any decision that may endanger the social and political stability of the 
country" and to "continue the process of economic and social reform as a demonstration of 
the sincerity of its international commitments established, also in the framework of the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Moldova and the European Union and 
the WTO". At the same time, the European deputies urged the Moldovan government to 
fully respect basic democratic rules and procedures, to guarantee respect for basic human 
rights and the rule of law, and to not abuse its political majority to dissolve the democratic 
opposition. Noting that Europe monitors "with growing concern the persistent conflict on 
crucial principles and matters of democracy between the Moldovan government and the 
Christian Democratic Popular Party (PPCD)," the European parliamentarians condemned 
the government's attempts to curb the opposition by its proposals to dissolve the opposition 
PPCD and to lift the parliamentary immunity of its leaders. They also noted with concern 
the recent decisions by the government regarding the introduction of Russian as the second 
official language of Moldova and the mandatory teaching of the Russian language in the 
Moldovan educational system, as well as the administrative reorganization of the country 
aiming at a return to the former Soviet style of local administration. The European  
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Parliament also indicated the lack of success in economic development and reiterated that 
Moldova is at present the poorest country in Europe. It was also said that the Council of 
Europe and the European Commission would assist actively within the mandate of the 
OSCE in the settlement of the conflict with Transdniestria.  
 
21 March 2002: an outstanding member of the Moldovan opposition, Vlad 
Cubreacov, the deputy president of the Christian Democrat Popular Party (PPCD) and a 
member of both the Moldovan parliament and the parliament of the Council of Europe, 
went missing, leading the opposition to claim that disappearance is part of a continuing 
“campaign of political reprisals.” A number of possible explanations have been floated, 
including the possibility that Cubreacov was kidnapped for his political activity.  
 
22 March 2002: the Legal Committee of the Moldovan Parliament reviewed an 
appeal issued by the attorney general for the parliamentary immunity of Cubreacov, Rosca, 
and Secareanu (the leaders of the PPCD) to be lifted. The committee asked for further 
evidence of the parliamentarians’ guilt and will reconsider the issue on 28 March. PPCD 
argues that, even if his Moldovan parliamentary immunity were lifted, “Vlad Cubreacov 
could not be prosecuted, arrested, or sentenced without consent from the Council of 
Europe in virtue of his European parliamentary immunity." It has called upon European 
governments and international organizations, to apply international legal norms "so as to 
put an end to the terror and dictatorship in the Republic of Moldova”. 
 
23 March 2002: the PPCD issued a press release claiming that "Vlad Cubreacov 
went missing at a time when the police and security forces reprimand and intimidate 
people throughout Moldova who have been participating in the anti-Communist protests 
since 9 January and who want to take part in the great popular assembly on 31 March." 
(PPCD Deputy Chairman Vlad Cubreacov disappeared on the night of 21-22 March.) The 
PPCD believes that either Communist activists or their supporters organized the 
disappearance of Cubreacov. "This act is part of a dangerous political campaign and was 
certainly orchestrated by anti-national, anti-democratic, and anti-European circles seeking 
to baffle the assembly at the end of March," the statement claims.  
 
25 March 2002: the PPCD announced resuming daily protests and preparation “The 
Grand National Coalition of Voters to be held on 31 March. Prosecutor-General Vasil 
Rusu warned that the planned event has not been authorized and is illegal. 
 
26 March 2002: OSCE Chairman in Office Jaime Gama visited Chisinau to discuss 
with Premier Vasile Tarlev and Foreign Minister Nicolae Dudau the current situation in 
Moldova, the stalled negotiations with the separatists authorities in Tiraspol, and the 
process of Russian arms evacuation. He said that the disappearance of Vlad Cubreacov has 
seriously affected Moldova’s international image. 
 
31 March 2002: between 50,000 and 80,000 protesters from all over Moldova 
attended the Grand National Assembly of Voters in Chisinau. A resolution was approved 
calling on the parliament to outlaw within 48 hours any fascist or communist party and 
their symbols. The protesters vowed to continue their actions until the government resigns. 
A resolution was adopted that also called on President Vladimir Voronin to resign, and 
early parliamentary elections to be run. Two separate declarations demanded clarifying the 
disappearance of PPCD Deputy Chairman Vlad Cubreacov, and the unconditional 
withdrawal of Russian troops from the Transdniester. Other opposition formations, among  
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them the newly established Liberal Party, sent representatives to the demonstration. 
Several thousand demonstrators remained in Chisinau's main square overnight.  
 
2 April 2002: negotiations between protesters and government failed because 
delegation of the “National Committee for the Defense of Democracy”, speaking on behalf 
of the opposition, was received by second-echelon representatives of the government and 
the presidential office who blindly rejected all the demands (the cabinet resignation, early 
elections to be called, and the Party of Moldovan Communists to be outlawed along with 
fascist parties). The protesters announced that they would continue demonstrations, 
whereas Dumitru Braghis, leader of the Braghis Alliance, the strongest opposition 
parliamentary group, declared that his faction will boycott debates until a genuine dialogue 
is established between the government and the protesters, and that the government must 
resign and be replaced by one of national unity representing all parliamentary formations. 
The situation was further aggravated by the Bessarabian Metropolitan Church (under 
Bucharest jurisdiction) submitting again an application for being officially registered (in 
full compliance with the decision of the European Court of Human Rights obliging 
Moldovan authorities to register the church).  Since Moldova’s appeal against this decision 
has been rejected, further resistance to observe the European Court’s decision may lead to 
Moldova’s expulsion from the Council of Europe.  
 
3 April 2002:  President Voronin accused the opposition of   provoking "internal 
tension" and of  being financed by Romania and the Transdniester. Former Premier 
Dumitru Braghis, who recently joined the opposition to demand that the government 
resign, was also charged with being on foreigners' payrolls.  
 
4 April 2002: the parliament approved a recommendation of its Judicial and 
Immunity Committee to lift the immunity of PPCD Chairman Iurie Rosca and PPCD 
parliamentary group leader Stefan Secareanu. The decision on lifting PPCD Deputy 
Chairman Vlad Cubreacov's immunity has been postponed "until his disappearance" is 
elucidated, whereas Prosecutor-General Vasile Rusu l requested that the immunity of 
PPCD deputies Eugeniu Garla, Valentin Chilat, and Viorel Prisacaru to be also  lifted. The 
same day, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy called on European and 
international human rights organizations to immediately act in order to "save democracy in 
Moldova," The council also appealed to the population to "display solidarity with the 
democratic opposition in its categorical protest against communist dictatorship."  
Meanwhile, the Romanian government rejected all of the Vladimir Voronin's 
allegations, calling them "false and unrealistic." Romanian Government spokesman 
Claudiu Lucaciu said that ever since the tensions erupted in Moldova three months ago, the 
Romanian authorities have refrained from issuing official statements on the issue precisely 
to avoid creating the impression that they are involved in them in any way.  
 
5 April 2002: pressure on protesters and intimidation of other opposition forces 
intensified. Some of the children of striking journalists at Teleradio Moldova were taken 
into custody by police for no apparent reason other than wearing badges with the national 
colours. Justice Minister Ion Morei demanded explanations from the Social-Liberal Party 
concerning its participation on 31 March in the “illegal” Great National Assembly of 
Voters.  The same day, Russian Duma ratified the basic treaty with Moldova, and president 
Putin congratulated president Voronin with the 10th anniversary of diplomatic relations 
between the two countries. 
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6 April 2002: according to the PPCD leader Jurie Rosca, he came to help PPCD 
Deputy Valentin Chilat whom police tried to force into a car, and to abduct “just as they 
had abducted Vlad Cubreacov”. 
 
8 April 2002: Chisinau city Prosecutor's Office has launched a criminal investigation 
against PPCD Chairman Iurie Rosca and PPCD deputy Valentin Chilat concerning their 
involvement in a tussle with police on 6 April. Rosca’s claim that police officers treated 
them brutally and refused to identify themselves was denied by Chiril Motpan, the Head of 
the Public Relations Directorate of the Interior Ministry. He also stated that the ministry's 
employees are not obliged to identify themselves to anyone while operating on the street, 
but have the right to request identification from others at any time. Secretary General of the 
CoE called on the Moldovan government to refrain from using force, and expressed the 
CoE concern with the situation in Moldova. Two CoE rapporteurs on Moldova arrived in 
Chisinau for a fact-finding mission, focused in particular on a disappearance of Vlad 
Cubreacov (who is also a member of the PACE). A fact-finding mission to Moldova was 
also undertaken by Polf Ekeus, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. 
The nonstop, around the clock protests continue, with dozens of tents being erected 
outside the parliament and presidential buildings. Parent’s committees and staff members 
of various schools and high schools issued a statement that they intend to continue protest 
actions until the main request of the National Council of the Defense of Democracy 
(namely, resignation of the Communist government) is fulfilled.    
 
9 April 2002: at a press conference, CE rapporteur Josette Durrieu  characterized 
Moldova as a “country lacking democracy and a country whose integrity and sovereignty 
are not properly managed by the government." He also said that current political crisis has 
been caused by the government attitude towards opposition. Both rapporteurs confirmed 
that Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin will not change his procedures for handling the 
crisis, but that he might agree to a referendum in order to end it.  
 
10 April 2002: the Popular Christian Democratic Party (PPCD) submitted a 
complaint against Moldova to the ECHR concerning the decision of the Moldovan 
Supreme Court to stop the anti-governmental protests. 
 
11 April 2002: the National Council for the Defense of Democracy initiated a 
dialogue with all anticommunist, non-corrupted groups sincerely devoted to democratic 
values and to aspirations of European integration. The aim of such a dialogue would be to 
identify optimal solutions to the ongoing political crisis in Moldova and to find common 
actions to fulfill the resolutions of the Grand National Assembly of 31 March. (Resolutions 
called for the legal ban on fascist, Nazi, and communist parties; the resignation of the 
Communist government; and for early parliamentary elections.) Meanwhile, the PPCD 
filed several lawsuits against Communist leaders, namely, two libel suits against President 
Voronin, a suit against the leader of the Communist parliamentary group Victor Stepaniuc, 
and against one more communist leader Vadim Misin. These suits followed Voronin’s 
statement that  PPCD leader Rosca is a political terrorist and that the PPCD leaders are 
willingly provoking street violence and making provocations in order to destabilize the 
political situation in Moldova. Stepaniuc claimed that street protests initiated by the PPCD 
were fascist and that the PPCD initiated the 1992 war, whereas Misin would face a lawsuit 
for comments he made in a television interview that Rosca and other protesters were paid 
millions of dollars for their actions. Meanwhile, Rolf Ekeus, the high commissioner for 
national minorities of the OSCE, made a statement calling for constructive dialogue  
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between the opposed forces in Moldova, and emphasizing that the importance of studying 
the official state language by all Moldovan citizens must not minimize the use of minority 
languages.  
 
17 April 2002: Walter Schwimmer, CoE Secretary-General, met in Strasbourg with 
the three Moldovan Parliamentary group leaders in order to end the political crisis through 
political dialogue. PPCD Chairman Yurie Rosca presented, during this meeting, a proposal 
consisted of 12 measures, including new parliamentary elections, the cessation of 
amendments to the constitution, and President Voronin’s resignation as chairman of the 
Party of Moldovan Communists. Despite the optimistic release issued by Secretary-
General, stating, among other things, that the three leaders reached a consensus on 
Moldova’s future in Europe, leader of the PMC parliamentary group Victor Stepaniuc 
refused to sign a CoE proposal (containing most of PPCD points). Meanwhile, public 
opinion poll conducted by the Bucharest-based IMAS institute has shown the sharply 
increased popularity of the PMC: 73 % of respondents would vote for them if the elections 
were held, whereas the opposition would receive only 6 % of votes. This poll also showed 
that 55 % of respondents believed that Communist government performed better than the 
previous one, while only 30 % adhere to the opposite. 
 
19 April 2002: confronting sides in Chisinau failed to reach a compromise on a 
document aimed at diffusing existing tensions. The Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE 
decided to discuss the situation in Moldova at the PACE session on 24 April. This decision 
resulted from a report submitted to PACE by Moldova rapporteurs Josette Durrieu and 
Lauri  Vahtre. Meanwhile, the European Court on Human Rights agreed to examine 
urgently the PPCD’s complaint against the Moldovan government. 
 
24 April 2002: the PACE adopted a resolution expressing concern over the 
“continuous deterioration” of the political situation in Moldova. It recommended 
Moldovan authorities to register the Bessarabian Metropolitan Church by 31 July, to 
submit for examination by CoE experts the new Criminal Code and the Administrative 
Code, and to grant Teleradio Moldova the status of a public organization. The PACE called 
on the authorities to ensure the independence of the judiciary, and to impose moratorium 
on actions relating to studying history and compulsory foreign-language education in 
schools. The assembly also called on protesters in Chisinau to stop demonstrations, 
whereas authorities, on their side, should stop persecutions and intimidation of the PPCD 
deputies.  The leaders of the three Moldovan parliamentary groups who attended the 
session all praised the resolution and recommendations, and promised to implement it. 
Meanwhile, the strikers’ committee at Teleradio Moldova said that in the very day of the 
adoption of the PACE resolution, the management intensified censorship, and forbade the 
broadcasting of the reports in both Moldovan and Russian on the forthcoming PACE 
resolution. The committee said that Moldova’s population is subjected to an “information 
blockade”.  
 
29 April 2002: the PPCD announced that it has ended the protests against the 
government, in compliance with the PACE resolution and recommendations, and that it 
expected the government to fulfill its promises to implement those recommendations as 
well.  
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30 April 2002: the Chisinau municipal tribunal rejected the appeal of three PPCD 
leaders a verdict of a lower court that fined them for organizing unauthorized 
demonstrations. The lawyer representing the three leaders said that this decision showed 
that the Communist authorities did not honor their pledge to respect the PACE 
recommendations, and that “dialogue with the Communist leadership is impossible”.  
 
3 May 2002: the same conclusion has been reached by the general Conference of the 
Union of Moldovan Journalists, that issued a resolution stating that freedom of media is 
not observed in Moldova, and that the state-owned media “has dangerously slid” into 
promoting hatred and ethnic segregation, and indulges in “gratuitous slandering, 
provocation, and instigation” contravening the Code of Professional Ethics.  
 
 
Subequent events relating to the developments in both domestic and foreign policy in 
Moldova have shown that though formally, the acute phase of a political crisis, 
characterised by non-stop demonstrations and protest actions, has been overcome, the 
existing tensions and their deeply rooted causes remain practically intact. Continued 
persecutions of the participants of the protest actions, uncertainty with the registration of 
the Bessarabian Church, not a sign of progress in changing the status of the Teleradio 
Moldova, and many other indicators confirm the PPCD chairman opinion that the 
authorities ignore the PACE recommendations. 107 The main good news of the following 
period was the re-appearance of Vlad  Cubreacov who was found alive on 25 May near the 
border with Transdniester.108 And though the enigma of his abduction has not been solved, 
and even used for further provocative speculations aimed at compromising CCPD and 
other oppositional bodies, 109 this very fact cannot but be praised by those people in 
Ukraine who are well aware of similar “disappearances” with much more tragic outcome.  
 
                                                          
107 RFE/RL Newsline, v. 6 # 100, 30 May 2002.  
108 RFE/RL Newsline, v. 6 # 98, 28 May 2002. 
109 RFE/RL Newsline, v. 6 # 102, 3 June 2002. +- 
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National Control System of transactions with strategic goods in the 
Republic of Moldova  
S.Spataru,  Head of division, I.Lupan, Deputy head of Division, Ministry of  Economy, 
Moldova 
 
According to legal framework in this field, that we will discuss in detail in next chapters, the 
notion of “ strategic goods “ includes: 
 
a) goods, technologies and services of dual – use ( civil and military );  
b) arms, munitions, military equipment, afferent technologies and services; 
c) goods, technologies and services used in production and utilization of weapons: nuclear, 
chemical or biological and of missiles able to deliver all types of weapons; 
d) other goods, technologies and services that need a special control  in the interest of 
national security or of foreign policy according to the agreements and international 
arrangements signed by RM. 
 
From the definition of strategic goods is clear the risk that presents the proliferation of this 
type of products and the necessity in export control of this type of goods. 
 
“Export control” can be defined as a summary of laws that regulate the export of pieces and 
technologies that can be used by other countries to produce Mass Destruction Weapons ( 
MDW ) and laws that regulate the transfer of simple arms.        
 
Export control, physical defense, evidence and control are considered to be the basic elements 
in the prevention of MDW proliferation. 
 
The main problems in the field of control of dual – use goods or technologies  are in the 
export control of these technologies that can be used both for civil and military reasons. For 
example, computers with high rate of processing speed can be used to make scientific 
research in scientific departments, at the same time they could be used for creating and 
developing nuclear programmes. In this case licencing officers make an estimation where,in 
case of export, could be used these technologies – in military programmes or for civil 
purpose. At the same time, the globalization of economic relationships, inclusively 
development of telecommunications and transport systems stated the problem of  MDW 
proliferation at the World level. This problem becomes more important because of regional 
and local conflicts in so-called non-controlled territories.  
 
Every country that wants to be recognised as a reliable partner in establishment of regional 
and international security creates its own efficient system for strategic goods control. 
 
International collaboration in this field continues for a long period of time, starting in ex-
soviet epoque. Even in the time of “ cold war “ with many different positions between USA 
and USSR, both countries shared the idea of prevention the MDW proliferation, because they 
realized a possible major danger for the whole World. 
 
Consolidation of necessity for collaboration in the field of export control appeared when USA 
found out about the existing nuclear programme in India and USSR – about nuclear 
programme in China. 
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At the same time, an actual concept about “ a new war “ exists, especially after tragic events 
that took place in USA on September 11, and convinced all people that the terrorism presents 
a major danger not only for some states, but also for all nations, a real threat for peace and 
security. 
 
At present there are officially 5 countries that have nuclear weapons – Russia, USA, China, 
France and Great Britain. Also, there are nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan. In the 
opinion of all countries Israel has nuclear weapons, too. The majority of foreign specialists 
consider that Iran, Irak, Libia and Northen Korea also have interest in obtaining nuclear 
weapons and are already developing military programmes. At the same time, there are a lot of 
states which in the past were developing arming programmes and now they will be interested 
in obtaining nuclear weapons and afferent components. 
 
As regards the Republic of Moldova, which is not a nuclear country, but more than that, 
adopted the statute of permanent neutrality it seems that respective problems must not affect 
it. In some cases, described lower down, can produce opposite conclusions. 
             
Cuanta case 
 
Scientific research institute “Cuanta” ss. was part of the military-industrial complex of the ex-
USSR and was working by the side of “Signal” plant (at present “Semnal”ss.). 
 
The main directions of activity of the Institute: 
 
 -establishment and production of communications means; 
 -establishment and production of technology for information processing through satellite link 
channels; 
 -establishment of telemetering and data translation systems; 
 -establishment of unmanned delivery systems. 
 
The nominalised enterprise during 1996-1997 signed two contracts with Iran regarding 
production of equipment for telecommunications to be used in civil purposes. 
 
When the time for loading and delivery of equipment came , in accordance with the contracts, 
the delivery was stoped and from the State Department of the USA was sent a note to the 
Government of the Republic of Moldova in which was expressed the concern and 
dissatisfaction regarding collaboration of “Cuanta” ss. with firms from Iran which were 
working on the developing programme of ballistic missiles and its behaviour was a motive of 
concern for World Community.  
 
As the American Part mentioned, if we will not stop such cooperation it can have a negative 
impact on the image of our country at the world level, and in final instance can lead to the 
application of sanctions from the State Department of the USA with ceasing technical 
assistance . The decision will depend by the involvement of the Government of the Republic 
of Moldova in this problem. 
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Despite of all negotiations carried on with American Part on that matter and was ceased            
the activity of the enterprise with Iran, as result, the “Cuanta”ss was still dissolved. The main 
cause of this consequences-control system was imperfect  and were commited many gaps in 
these transactions, inclusively non-verifying the end-users of this items. 
 
 
Production of munitions in the Transnistrian region 
 
Recently, on the february 4, 2002 in mass-media, that is to say in “Panorama” magazin was 
published an article “In Usama’s supermarket” in which the author ( Mrs.Elizabetta Burda) 
makes characteristics of that region and of its possibility of production. 
 
From the author’s words, in accordance with the opinion of the Intelligency agencies from 
abroad, special here are concentrated arming and training centres of persons from “al-Qaeda”. 
There the munitions are produced even in the glass plants.Despite of the fact that this 
enterprises look very peaceful , according to the people that worked there , every day are 
leaving vins from the plants with  hand grenade throwers “Gnom”, trench mortar                   
“Vasilek”, sets of launching air – crafts missiles “Duga”, guns “Makarov”, automatic guns 
“Policeman” very popular for terrorists and many others. The end-users of this staff are 
terroristic groups as “al-Qaeda”, “Hamas”, “Hazbollah” and such countries and regions as 
Iran, Irak, Cecenia, Palestine , Karabah.  
 
All this transantions are performed through the “Seriff” company - the only company that has 
a licence for the foreign economical activity . In accordance with esstimation of the 
Intelligency agencies the affair number per year of this company is 4 mld dollars USA(by 47 
times bigger than the official  IGP of the Transnistrian region). 
 
 
Transit through the Republic of Moldova and intermediating 
 
The transit represents an important part of the foreign economical activity of the Republic of 
Moldova. The analyse of the strategic goods transit is a very recent problem and one of the 
main measures for the achievement must be the improvement of custom procedures in the 
pass points of the state border. As an example of the importance of  scrupulously control is 
the case when in 1999 on the Chisinau airport from technical reasons landed an airplane from 
Ukraine. The police found, on the board of the airplane, 5 thousand units of non – declared  
munitions destined to be transported in ex – Iugoslavia. Another case that can be mentioned 
was the intention of transit transportation of nuclear trash from the nuclear power plant 
Kozlodui in Bolgaria which till now has no success, despite the fact that participation of 
Moldova in this transaction would have brought considerable financial sources in the state 
budget.  
 
An acute problem is the intermediating strategic goods transactions. The countries which wish 
to obtain strategic goods inclusively nuclear compounds are using services of  intermediars, 
brokers and agents from the third countries. In this case an important role is in cooperation 
with field agencies with the view of  discovering these attempts. 
 
To summarize those from above, we would like to mention the considerations that impose the 
necessity of development and implementation of NCS in the Republic of Moldova. These 
considerations can be devided in two categories: internal and external. 
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The domestic (internal) considerations include:  
 
• National security concerns; 
• Economic policy concerns; 
• Informational defficiency regarding strategic goods that were imported in the country (an 
alarming sign may be considered the case that took place on September 2000 when 
Organization for Prohibition the Proliferation of Chemical Weapons asked for 
explanations for 20 Kg of Arsenic trichloride nondeclared by Moldova as being imported, 
but at the same time Ukraine declared this substance as being exported to the Republic of 
Moldova);  
• An effective control of exports and affiliation to the international regimes of 
nonproliferation and of export control allow an almost unlimited access to materials, 
equipment, software, technologies that are necessary for the reorganization process of the 
national industry. 
   The international (external) considerations include: 
• Consolidation of the favorable image of the Republic of Moldova as reliable partner in 
the problem of prevention the MDW proliferation; 
• Respecting basic principles of the foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova; 
• Respecting international arrangements for prevention the MDW proliferation and of other 
strategic goods used for military purposes; 
• Respecting international agreements signed by the Republic of Moldova; 
• Participation to the international efforts regarding export control of strategic goods; 
• The existance of developed strategic goods export control regime and of national 
authority capable of administration in this field represents one of the conditions for the 
admittance of our country to the European Union and its structures.  
 
From all mentioned considerations we would like to discuss in detail about the     
characteristics of international arrangements and agreements to which Republic of Moldova 
adhered and imposed the obligation of creation of a national control system. 
 
Untill now the Republic of Moldova signed the following international treaties that have 
prerogative to the problem of nonproliferation and impose the necessity of creation of a 
National Control System in the Republic of Moldova ( selective ): 
 
1. Treaty of conventional army in Europe (established in Paris on November 19, 1990, 
came into force in the Republic of Moldova on July 16, 1992) and Convention 
regarding maximal levels for conventional arms and quantity of technics in 
conection with Treaty of conventional army in Europe (established on November 3, 
1992 in Budapest, came into force in the Republic of Moldova on July 16, 1992). 
The main obligations of participant countries to these two Treaties are:  
• Participant states to forbear from threat with or without use of power against 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in another way 
incompatible with goals and principles of the United Nations Charter. 
• Achievement of a stable and secure balance of conventional army in Europe at the 
lowest levels. 
• Elimination of the launching capacity of an atac by surprise and initiation of a vast 
proportion offensive action in Europe. 
• Diminution untill certain level (determined by treates) of the total quantity of 
munitions and conventional equipments. 
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• Carrying on conventional arms control process with the view of stability and security 
insurance in Europe. 
 
 
2. Treaty of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (established in Washington, London and 
Moscow on July 1, 1968, came into force in the Republic of Moldova on November 10, 
1994). 
 
The main obligations of participant countries to the Treaty are: 
 
• Prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation; 
• Facility of warranties application of the International Agency of Nuclear Power for 
peaceful nuclear activities; 
• Direct and indirect control of nuclear weapons and exploding devices proliferation; 




3. Convention of prohibition the development, establishment, stock and use of chemical 
weapons and their annihilation ( adopted in Paris on January 13, 1993, came into force 
in the Republic of Moldova on April 29, 1997). 
 
The main obligations of participant countries to the Convention are: 
 
• Total exclusion of the possibility of  chemical weapons use; 
• Total prohibition of development, establishment , stock and use of chemical weapons 
as well as direct or indirect transfer of these to other states; 
• Ceasing all military preparations for chemical weapons use; 
• Destruction of all chemical weapons that possess the participant states to the 
Convention; 
• Use of chemical substances that are on the lists of the Convention only for                  
scientifical and medical reasons. 
 
 
4. Convention of marking plastic explosives for their detection ( signed in Montreal  
on March 1,  1991, came into force in the Republic of Moldova onJune 21, 1998). 
 
5 Convention of prohibition the use, stock, produce and transfer of anti-personal 
mines and their destruction ( established in Oslo on September 18, 1997, came into 
force in the Republic of Moldova on March 1, 2001). 
 
6 Convention of prohibition and use restriction of some classic arms that can be 
considered as productions of excessive trauma effects or hiting with no 
differentiation ( established in Geneva on October 10, 1980, came into force in the 
Republic of Moldova onMarch 8, 2001).  
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Untill now strategic goods control process was regulated by Government’s Decision Nr.283-
1”With regard to mode of licencing import and export of items and dual-use goods with 
special destination that needs special intelectual efforts, special load traffic and production of 
items with military destination through the territory of the Republic of Moldova” from May 
10, 1995. This decision has a temporary character and do not correspond to the international 
practice in this field.The approved Nomenclature by this decision is a general one ( has 3 
pages) and is referring, especially, to the munitions, arms and transport devices therefore. 
 
As a result of evolutions on the international level and taking into considerations the necessity 
in puting up-to-date the control mechanism as well as list of items that are under control, the 
Ministry of Economics, together with other ministries and competent departments, established 
the Law with regard to export, reexport, import and transit of strategic goods control( Nr. 163-
XIV from July 26, 2000, came into force on october 27, 2000). 
 
In total this Law contains 5 chapters and 16 articles by which are determined necessary 
competencies to make an all-inclusive control. Concomitant in the Law are defined the basic 
notions used in the text, field of law’s application, principles in accordance with which is 
performing the export, reexport, import and transit of strategic goods control, as well as other 
main moments. 
 
At the same time in this Law are stipulated strategic goods categories that are under control. 
 
The competence of Parliament and of Government of the Republic of Moldova is well 
defined, as well as of law’s subjects. 
 
In accordance with this Law the Government is charged to determine a unique regime of 
licencing export, reexport, import and transit of strategic goods and to coordinate the 
interactions of central public authorities in the field of control. 
 
By adopting this Law in the Republic of Moldova was set the creation base of stable and 
efficient national control system that gives us the possibility to apply a unique treatment to all 
economical agents in the process of licencing the export, reexport, import and transit of 
strategic goods. At the same time the Law gives us the possibility to bring up to life a viable 
cooperation mechanism of governmental structures involved in the process of regulation and 
control. 
 
At the same time, was established and constituted an unique mechanism of working out the 
state policy in the field of strategic goods control, as well as implementation mechanism of 
this policies, being created counteract conditions of arms illicit trading, stop conditions of 
non-approved transfer of information and technologies. 
 
An important compound of the national export and import of strategic goods control system is 
Interdepartmental Committee of export, reexport, import and transit of strategic goods control 
costituted by Government’s Decision Nr. 1039 from October 3, 2001, which is the permanent 
body of the Government of the Republic of Moldova that supervises the control activity in 
this field. Interdepartmental Committee examines and takes decisions regarding the remitance 
of licences for export, reexport, import or of transit licence for all strategic goods, other 
documents for control regime. At the same time accomplishs the control of respecting 
Commitments and international Agreements regarding nonproliferation of mass destruction  
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weapons and of other strategic goods used for military purposes. Also analyses and evaluates 
all aspects relating to strategic goods trading.  
 
For the implementation of the mentioned above Law, were worked out and approved by the 
Government on April 3, 2002 the normative acts: 
 
1. Interdepartmental Committee Regulations of export , reexport, import and  
      transit of strategic goods control which establish the functions and activity  
      procedures of the Committee as well the way of taking decisions. 
2. Regulations with regard to export , reexport, import and transit of strategic  
      goods control regime that establish the rules and principles of application, remitance,  
             prolongation and annulment of documents connected with export, reexport, import  
             and transit of strategic goods, examination and releasing terms of licences and  
             certificates, the obligation of the licence applicants, as well the way of interaction of  
             central public organs involved in control activity of strategic goods transactions.  
      3.  Nomenclature of strategic goods that are under control, as base being the European  
            Union Control List, that was assumed as a basis by all European Union Countries, 
            USA, Japan, Australia, Poland, Czech Republic and Baltic Countries. The rest of  
           countries are in the process of implementation of the mentioned list. 
 
Nomenclature includes the main control regimes applied in our days according to the 
international agreements: 
 
Wassenaar Arrangement controls the export of conventional Arms and  Dual-use Goods  
and Technologies; 
Australia Group by which is established a firmly regime to prevent the proliferation of 
chemical and biological weapons and has a system of multilateral export control; 
Nuclear Suppliers Group controls the export of materials, equipment, nuclear weapons and 
their nonproliferation; 
Missile Technology Control Regime supervises the nonproliferation of equipment, 
materials, technologies that can contribute to the development, establishment or stocking of 
missiles capable of delivering mass destruction weapons and their guidence systems. 
       
 
In accordance with NCS the principles of performing strategic goods export control are: 
 
• respecting basic directions of foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova; 
• repecting interests of national security; 
• respecting international commitments regarding nonproliferation of mass destruction 
weapons and of other strategic goods used in military purposes;  
• control of the end-use of strategic goods that are under control within the framework of 
nonproliferation regime; 
• free access to normative acts that regulate export, reexport, import and transit of strategic 
goods control; 
• participation to the international efforts regarding strategic goods export control; 
• keeping confidentiallity of secret information. 
 For the implementation NCS exists two aspects less known by the countries that are in the 
process of national control system implementation and namely the “ catch – all “ procedure 
and the necessity of establishment the cooperation relationships between Government and 
Industry that are widly used in countries with rich experience in the field of control. 
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“Catch – all”  procedure 
 
To the establishment of afferent lists to nonproliferation and export control international 
regimes, the experts take into consideration, in the main, inclusion of all materials, equipment, 
installations, software, technologies that can contribute to proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and of missiles capable of delivering all types of weapons of mass destruction.   
 
However, it is posible that some articles, technologies or services will not be covered in 
national lists, that can coincide with those international or can be more comprehensive, taking 
into consideration the national interest. For this reason was constituted “catch – all” 
procedure. 
 
To apply this procedure within the framework of export control regime, national legislation 
put under control and export of other items that are not on the list, covering strategic items 
determined by Government’s decisions, under conditions that exporter is informed by 
competent auhorities, in accordance with the law, that respective items are or can be mant to, 
in total or in part, or can contribute to: 
 
a) development, production, handling, functioning, maintenance, detection, stocking, 
identification or dissemination of weapons: nuclear, chemical or biological; 
b) development, production and stocking missiles capable of delivering all types of weapons 
of mass destruction; 
c) development, production, marketing, stocking and utilization of munitions, arms and of 
other military items. 
 
If the exporter knows that some items, in total or in part, are meant to one of purposes 
mentioned above, he is obliged to inform the competent authorities who decide to licence or 
not the respective export. 
 
 
Relationships Government – Industry 
 
Activity experience in the field of control allowed to come to the conclusion regarding 
necessity in direct interactions with industry, bringing into life system of relations based on 
trust given to the involved organs in export control. The goal of the governmental bodies is to 
persuade the enterprisers that the purpose of export control is not in introduction of additional 
and unfounded restrictions, sustained by actual legislation, but represents an activity that 
serves to the insurance of their goals, too. 
 
At present, in continue, takes place the development and improvement process of national 
control system, takes place the reorganization of control bodies, inclusively of those from 
neighbour states where economic agents have business relations, appear new normative acts 
in the field of export control. The necessity to inform in time the industry about modifications 
in the rules of international transfers under this conditions become a more present problem. 
 
Often to the Ministry of Economics are addressing autochthonous economic agents with 
solicitations in helping them to solve different problems that appear in their way of activity, 
because was modified the control procedure in partner’s country with whom they have 
business relations and new demands appear. 
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That’s why, it is important to organize for industry round tables, workshops, conferences, 
supply with informative materials goal of which will be to inform economic agents about 
international obligations in performing export/import transactions with strategic goods, 
process of licencing economic agents who carry on transactions with strategic goods, 
examination of  problems with which are confrunting economic agents in the process of 
performing commercial operations. 
 
The experience of foreign countries, inclusively our own experience, allow us to come to the 
conclusion regarding enterprises’s role, which voluntarily and consciousely create their own 
departments of export control. The enterprises that invest financial means in insurance of 
measures in the field of export control, in consequences are entailed by state organs to solve 
in common different problems, taking into consideration interests of the state for national 
security.  
 
All these in cosequence, lead to the company success and allow to avoid possible financial 
expenditures that can appear in case of administrative sanction application when are violated 
legislative standards in the field of export control. 
 
In the Republic of Moldova, in comparison with other states, (for example Russian Federation 
and Ukraine oblige the enterprise to create their own internal control system and represents a 
compulsory demand in the process of licencing commercial transactions), the establishment of 
the export control services within the framework of enterprises at present it is not regulated by 
legislation.       
 
The national authority in the field of export, reexport, import and transit of strategic goods 
control responsible for application of the Government policy in this field is Office Control of 
dual-use goods circulation within the framework of the Ministry of Economics. 
 
The main functions and prerogatives of the Office (selective): 
 
a) regulation: initiates normative act projects, works out regulations in common with 
other competent authorities, works out methodological norms, mechanism and 
procedures and instructions specifically for export control in concordance with 
international demands; initiates in common with competent institutions bringing up to 
date of the Nomenclature in accordance with assumed international arrangements by 
the Republic of Moldova. 
b) licencing: verifys, in written or  factual, by case, the relevant aspects regarding 
settlement, performing or ending strategic goods transactions, as well as respecting 
their destination and end-use, involving, when it is necessary, the ministries, 
departments and interested organizations; evaluates and accepts, by case, international 
certificate of import and certificate of the end-user or equivalent documents or 
certificates released by competent authorities from the importer partner’s country 
with the view of releasing export licences for strategic goods; releases international 
certificate of import, certificate of the end-user or equivalent document, as well as 
certificate of verification the deliver of imported strategic goods; examines and 
approves demands for licence regarding  export, reexport or import of strategic goods; 
releases, on the base of  Committee’s decision, licences for  export, reexport, import  
of strategic goods. 
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c) control: verifys conformity and exactness of declarations of the persons who carry on 
transactions with strategic goods; disposes, in case of violation the provisions of the 
present Regulation with the help of competent organs; stoping or interdiction of 
performing operations of export, reexport, import, transit, reloading or other strategic 
goods transfer, as well as penalizing persons guilty of this violations. 
d) representation: represents the Republic of Moldova within the framework of 
activities unfolded by responsible  international organisms in the field of control the 
export, import of strategic goods; initiates, in cooperation with competent ministries 
and departments of the Republic of Moldova, actions of promoting interests of the 
Republic of Moldova in relationships with international organisms of export, 
reexport, import and transit of strategic goods control. 
e) informing and consultation: organizes, with support from ministries, departments and 
organizations from  republic and abroad, programmes of informing economic agents 
in connection with principles, objectives, norms and procedures regarding regime of 
export, reexport, import and transit of strategic goods; grants, at the demand, 
specialized consultation to economic agents and to other persons interesting in 
performing operations of export, reexport, import or other operations with strategic 
goods that are under control regime regulated by present legislation; cooperates with 
similar authorities from other states for the purpose of mutual informing and 
consultation in case of demand to release licence for export, reexport, import and 
transit of strategic goods if solid indexes exist regarding possibility of utilization of 
this in other purposes than those declared; bringing up to date and uniform application 
of regulations on this matter, inclusively of the Nomenclature; notification of 
violation of the control regime with the view of penalizing guilty persons by 
competent organs from every state. 
       Interaction between Committee, Office and the rest of the ministries in the process of  
examination of the solicitation petitions of releasing licences for performing transactions 
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From this scheme you see that in the process of control of  strategic goods transactions 
are or can be involved a number of competent departments and ministries that have 
prerogative to the respective transactions. Some ministries are directly involved in the 
control process ( for example: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Industry, Information and Security Service, Department of 
Customs ) and others – depending of subjects that are discussing ( for example: Ministry 
of Health and Department of exceptional situations in case of import/export of  dangerous 
substances, or Academy of Science when are necessary specific laboratoric examinations 
). 
 
By examining the scheme of interactions of ministries and departments and their 
functions in the control process, you can observe two important touches. In the first place 
exists a mechanism of involving different ministries and departments in the process of 
control, in the examination process of applications of licence’s solicitation for carrying 
on transactions with strategic goods. In the second place it is necessary an intensive 
informational exchange between ministries and departments, inclusively with similar 
agencies from abroad. 
 
The main problem in export control is that countries and persons that wishes to buy 
strategic goods for the purpose of arming programmes can use services of economic 
agents from a third country helping them to buy the necessary items and services. In this 
context, the leading part in crossing this is in a more close cooperation with specialized 
agencies from different states. For touching the proposed goals is strictly necessary an 
operative exchange of information for determining the end-users of the respective items 
companies suspected in illicit trading with strategic goods, the violators, the character of 
items that will be trans ported. 
 
The respective information has a confidential character, that’s why for obtaining it, it is 
necessary to sign agreements that foresee the operative exchange of information and 
mutual help in the control process at a bilateral or multilateral level between specialized 
agencies in this field, at least, at first stage, with neighbour countries, inclusively with 
countries that have a developed control system. An example will be the “ Agreement of 
cooperation in the field of crossing the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and 
promotion of military and defense relationships” signed by Government of Romania with 
Government of the USA. 
 
Now, the Republic of Moldova has no such signed agreements with any states (except 
some general agreements that foresee inclusively exchange of information between 
branch ministries, for example between the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Department of 
Customs and others, and their homologous from abroad). These agreements, by our 
opinion, have a general character and are not working really. 
 
Other possibility to ensure an efficient informational exchange with other states is in 
adhering to international agreements of nonproliferation (the Wassenaar Arrangement, 
Nuclear Suppliers Group, Zagger Committee, Australia Group, Missile Technology 
Control Regime) that foresee, compulsory, informational exchange between member- 
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states, performing bilateral consultations. At present, the Republic of Moldova is taking 
part to non-of these arrangements. 
 
In addition, the Government of the USA grants assistance in implementation of 
TRACKER systems, those foresee the establishment of a national informational system 
and connection to the informational systems of the neighbour countries and from region. 
In the future, the respective possibility will be examined, at the same time, by our 
opinion, for obtaining necessary information from abroad, utilization of the respective 
system is necessary to implement and use this system by all countries. 
 
At the end, to create an imagination of how the National strategic goods Control System 
functions, we would like to make characteristics of the examination mechanism of 
applications for licence releasing to carry on transactions with strategic goods. 
 
The economic agent who wishes to import, export or to transport in transit a strategic 
good addresses to the Ministry of Economics by handing in an application for obtaining 
licence and annexing to the application a number of documents: 
 
a) copy of the document that certifys the registration of the aplicant as an economic 
agent; 
b) copy of the licence ( if the field of activity involves licencing ); 
c) documents that certify the origin of items; 
d) documents regarding qualitative and technical characteristics of items, and by choise, 
the code of respective items in accordance with Nomenclature; 
e) contract and its copy signed with foreign company that imports or exports strategic 
goods; 
f) copy of licence, attested in astated way, that certifys the permission for foreign 
company to carry on operations of export-import with strategic goods, released by 
authorized organ of the country where the company is registered; 
g) certificate of the end-user ( at the Office demand ); 
h) international certificate of import ( at the Office demand ). 
 
The Office after receiving application and mentioned documents, is consulting with other 
ministries and departments involved in control procedure with the view of verifying 
presented documents. 
 
After previous examination of application, the documents and the conclusions with 
reference to transaction are presented to the Committee. In case when different opinions 
appear with reference to transaction the decision for releasing licence is taken by the 
majority of member’s votes. In case when members of the Committee cannot take a 
decision with reference to this problem, the decision is taken by the deputy-minister, 
Parliament or by the President of the State. 
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The causes of not releasing licences can be the next: 
 
• possibility of use of exported strategic goods for production of nuclear weapons or 
exist doubts that importer-country wishes to obtain weapons of mass destruction ( 
because of these reasons the USA do not deliver technologies to Iran ); 
• to the importer-country are imposed sanctions or embargo by international 
organizations; 
• economic agents involved in the respective transaction are doubtful; 
• false documents were presented; 
• to ensure from the national security of the state; 
• were hidden some facts from the respective transaction; 
• economic agents commited breaking of laws in the past, possible they have contacted 
terrorist groups. 
 
The maximal procedure of examination of application is 60 days in dependence with the 
difficulty of taking every case in part. 
 
A major role in establishment of the National Control System, performing a strict control 
of strategic goods transactions, crossing contraband, nonsactioned traffic, interruption of 
the illicit passing over the customs with strategic goods and crossing international 
terrorism is claimed by customs services, especially customs bodies. At the same time, 
customs bodies are authorized to carry on operative activities of investigations, criminal 
inquiry and preliminary investigation for the purpose of discovering cases and persons 
who commited custom contraventions, contraband infringements or other type of 
violations. 
 
In accordance with Regulations regarding regime of  export, reexport, import and transit 
of strategic goods control, the transport of strategic goods through the custom territory of 
the Republic of Moldova is accomplished on the base of licences released by the 
Direction of Control of dual – use goods circulation within the framework of the Ministry 
of Economics on the base of Interdepartmental Committee’s decision of control on 
export, reexport, import  and transit of strategic goods at the meetings of which 
participates and the representative of the Department of Customs leading as a member of 
this Committee. 
 
For the import, as well as for the export of strategic goods economic agents or those who 
are carrying on such transactions are obliged to present to the custom’s authorities the 
originals of export or import licences and their copies. The custom official notes on the 
original of the licence as well as on its copy the real quantity of  imported or exported 
items and the date of import or export and the number of declarated items confirmed by 
his signature and paraph. 
 
If strategic goods are imported or exported in many lots on the base of a single licence, 
the custom official verifys the total amount of goods in order not to exceed those 
specified in the licence. The originals of licences are returned, but their copies are kept by 
custom authorities as an annexe to first original copy of items declaration. 
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In case when the transit is accomplished through the territory of the Republic of Moldova 
the declarent presents to custom authorities the licence for strategic goods transit and 
declaration of transit custom procedure. Transit licence is used only once and is annexed 
to the original copy of transit declaration that is enclosed to stock. 
 
When strategic goods are allowed to enter on the custom territory, the custom official 
registers the transit licence, but when goods are leaving the territory of customs, the 
licence is annuled and all this are confirmed by signature and paraph applied by custom 
authorities from the exit point on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. 
 
In transit licences are also indicated custom posts through which the entrance/exit will be 
maken, route and time of performing transit. 
 
In case when economic agent does not dispose of respective licences, the custom 
authorities stop the import or export of strategic goods till obtaining, by agent, necessary 
documents for carrying on transactions. For the purpose of verifying correctess and 
complete statemant of imported items, custom bodies will perform inspections at the 
economic agents – importers of such items. 
 
Despite the fact that custom bodies have enough power for performing control at the 
borders of state, they are confrunting with different problems on the way of their activity. 
 
An acute problem for the Republic of Moldova is nonsolving transnistrian dispute, that 
leads to the impossibility of performing control of items tide on the whole perimeter of  
customs of the Republic of Moldova. 
 
For solving somehow this problem the Department for Custom Control restrains at the 
borders the items addressed to economic agents from transnistrian region, suspends the 
releasing  licences and respective authorizations to economic agents from this region and 
at September 1, 2001 withdrawed the custom paraphs from custom authorities from this 
region. 
 
Another problem is corruption, which considerable afects the image of custom bodies. 
It leaves much to be desired the professional training of some custom officials. 
At the same time, for finding out contraband cases, effectuation of nonsanctioned 
transactions with sensitive strategic goods ( for example: chemical substances, toxins, 
radioactive materials ) the custom services do not dispose of necessary equipment for all 





There are 3 main aspects of the problem of strategic goods export control: socio – 
political, legal and technical.             
 
To perform control is very difficult because appear problems: what to control, how to 
control and how to find the balance between necessity of transparence of the democratic 
society and national security.  
 
It is very hard to find technical solutions in export control, especially to find out cases of 
violations, because respecting rules of export control depends, in a large measure, on the 
exporter himself.  
 
The problem of export control is not an internal problem, but an international one. That’s 
why it can’t be solved at the national level. 
 
Legislation in this field must be, if not a unique one, for all the countries, at least similar. 
If in different states would have existed various regulations of export control, the buyers, 
of course, prefere to buy items  and technologies from where exists a more weaker 
control and it is possible, in a quicker way, to obtain them and have less chances to be 
sanctioned in case of violation. 
 
As long as companies will consider that licence of strategic goods export is a “ paper “ in 
addition and an obstacle in free trade, is less probable that export control will be efficient. 
 
Establishment and implementation in the Republic of Moldova of the National Control 
System is a new process. At the moment was created, in general, the legislative data basis 
necessary for performing control of strategic goods and now, is required to proceed from 
the theoretical part to that practical and, of course, exist a lot of obstacles in 
implementation and establishment of this system of legislative, financial, technical and 
social orders.  
 
In legislative field is requiring to elaborate strict amendments to the criminal code and to 
the code with regard to administrative contraventions that look upon legislative violations 
in the respective field. 
 
In technical field is feeling acute absence of educated staff to activate in this field. For 
working with nomenclature persons from the involved ministries, especially those from 
the custom services, must be acquainted with procedure of determination of items, goods, 
technologies that must be under licencing procedure, in accordance with categories from 
the Nomenclature. At the moment, persons who can work with such lists are inadequated. 
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In financial field is feeling acute absence of financial means for training and pay the field 
specialists, obtaining equipment, technics and informational technologies, automatization 
of control process, shifting for performing before- and after – licencing control, 
performing laboratoric examinations. 
 
In informational field is feeling the absence of internal as well as of external information 
relating to economic agents involved in transactions, final utilization of strategic goods, 
of other legislation of the state. Is requiring a closer cooperation between ministries and 
departments involved in control process in Moldova, as well as with specialized foreign 
agencies. It is necessary to create an informational system which will ensure 
informational exchange between national agencies, as well as with similar foreign 
agencies, especially from neighbour countries. For informing economic agents about 
changes that take place in the control process, is requiring publication of informative 
bulletins, booklets, organization of round tables, workshops and of others. An important 
moment is creation of an official web – page. But to fulfil such important measures we 
are conflicting with financial problem again. 
 
In social field every economic agent and citizen must get into the essence of the problem 
of export control which is, in essence, an overall problem, fact that was demonstrated 
especially after the attempt from September 11, 2001. 
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The Influence of Regional factors on Possible scenarios of Development 
of Moldova-Transnistria-Ukraine relations 
Dr. H.Perepelitsya, National Institute for Strategic Studies, Kyiv, Ukraine 
 
 
The stability and safety of southeastern region of Europe are determined primarily by the 
character and level of mutual relation between the countries of this region. The most 
explosive zone destabilizing the international situation in this region of Europe is 
Transdniestria.  
 
Transdniestrian Moldavian Republic emerged as a result of  the Transdniestrian conflict, 
de facto, having turned into a quasi-state located between Moldova and Ukraine. And 
despite the fact that none of the international subjects recognizes its state sovereignty and 
independence, the fact of existence and viability of Transdniestria is beyond question. 
This reality should be taken into account in the analysis and forecasting of development of 
the Ukrainian-Moldovan relations. 
 
The importance of research of these relations is determined, first of all, by the fact that 
they reflect, as a mirror, the problems and tendencies, characteristic both for the post 
Soviet space and for the new Europe whose shape is formed under the influence of the EU 
and the NATO expansion to the East. 
 
The future of these relations can be reduced to several prognosis scenarios. Each scenario 
differs from others in the character and level of the relationship, developing in the 
Moldova-Transdniestria-Ukraine triangle. 
 
The quintessence of relationships in any of these scenarios of development of events is the 
situation at borders between subjects of these relationships. The analysis of the situation at 
the borders is not only a test for the definition of the character and level of relations, but 
also the desirable result which we should aspire to achieve for the safety of all 
southeastern region of Europe.  
 
The interstate relations are formed and develop under the influence of many factors. The 
factors are the driving force of any social processes, including the processes developing 
within the system of the international relations. In this context, the prognosis scenarios are 
being built primarily with the consideration and through the research of the key factors 
forming the given scheme of relationships.  
 
According to the force, scale and character of influence on the development of 
international relations, the factors are subdivided into several kinds and types.  
 
If to look at the development of relationships within Moldova-Transdniestria-Ukraine 
triangle through the prism of the factorial analysis, then it is possible to outline the factors 
that render global influence on the entire system of international relations not only on the 
European continent, but also all over the world, and also the factors from the regional  
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level. Under the influence of these factors, two main contradictory processes – the 
globalization and regionalization processes - develop. 
 
Moreover, if the globalization factors have a mediated influence on the process of 
development of the Moldovan-Ukrainian relations, the regional factors have a direct 
influence on this process. Therefore, they represent a priority in the development of short-
term and medium-term prognosis scenarios of development of these tripartite relations 
 
The regional factors are in their turn divided in external and internal. The key role 
among them is played by the internal factors. The relationships, as known, are being built 
starting from the nature of their subjects. The internal factors in this case represent an 
expression and demonstration of this nature. Such dependence serves as an extra 
confirmation of a known axiom that the foreign policy of the state is nothing but the 
continuation of its internal policy.  
 
Such ranking of regional factors represents a necessary procedure in the elaboration of 
prognosis scenarios; however, it would be incomplete without taking into account the 
factors forming the character of relationships between their subjects. In addition, the 
character of relations, as known, is determined by the interests of subjects. The entire 
spectrum of interests of subjects is reduced to two most essential ones – the needs for 
possession of authority and material resources.  
 
Hence, determining among internal factors are political and economic ones. We will 
analyze the way these internal factors influence the development of the situation within 
the system of tripartite relations examined by us.  
 
Political factors. The main political factor in the system of these relations represents the 
type of political regime in Moldova, Ukraine and Transdniestria.  
 
The political regime in Moldova, Ukraine and Transdniestria was formed in conditions of 
disintegration of the Soviet totalitarian system. The loss of CPSU’s managing role became 
the reason for a cardinal restructuring of political power in the post-Soviet space. The 
restructuring of power lead to the delimitation of the carriers of this power of the 
communist nomenklatura in pragmatic and conservative. 
 
The "Pragmatic" nomenklatura emerged during the Gorbachev perestroika. It was inclined 
to compromises, understanding of new realities, openness to the West, market economy 
and recognition of democratic values. Ideologically it has departed from the traditional 
communistic dogmas. It was close to the ideas of social democracy. The domination of 
pragmatic nomenklatura in republics, that nowadays are new independent states, provided 
a certain union with national oriented elite groups and their separate representatives.  
 
Hence, the ideology of the ruling pragmatic nomenklatura in the former Soviet republics 
became a mix of communist ideology and social democratic values, engaged with national 
attributes. 
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The conservative part of the Soviet nomenklatura was caused by the old Soviet totalitarian 
system, therefore it does not see its the future without an authoritarian political regime. It 
is not capable of compromises, adheres to old communist ideology, old values and old 
representations about the world. Its interests are connected to the existence of a totalitarian 
or authoritarian system. Its ally may be only “ultra” which is also inclined to authoritative 
forms of political power.  
 
If now we look at the process of formation of a political regime in Moldova, 
Transdniestria and Ukraine, by these three political powers, we will get the following 
picture.  
 
The specificity of emergence of political regime in Moldova during the consolidation of 
its sovereignty is the fast process of ethno-politicization of the Moldavian society and 
imperious party-nomenklatura. Moreover, this process developed not under own 
Moldovan, national slogans, but in an atmosphere of Romanianization of the Moldovan 
society. 
 
Probably, the republican nomenklatura examined the rapprochement with Romania as the 
closest way for the exit of Moldova from the structure of the USSR, but such a fast 
process of Romanianization of the Moldovan society has resulted in the fact that in spring 
1990, as a result of democratic elections it completely lost the authority in the republic. To 
power came the representatives of the Popular Front that included both national 
democrats, and ultra-nationalists. The government of Republic Moldova was headed by 
M. Druc sympathizing nationalist moods. In these conditions, the Transdniestrian 
nomenklatura lost any chance to be represented both in the republican structures, and in 
the Moldovan society as a whole. Besides, the accepted by the supreme legislative body of 
the country, Declaration of state sovereignty of Moldova, tore it off from the Union 
Centre, without whose support the Transdniestrian nomenklatura risked to lose completely 
the authority not only on Moldova, but also in its own region. The radical position of 
representatives of the Popular Front led to the emergence of a military conflict with 
Transdniestria and loss of political authority in own republic.  
 
The national-democratic and ultra nationalist forces from Moldova were consecutively 
replaced by the pragmatic nomenklatura, in person of the President of Moldova P. 
Luchinchi - former large party official. The behavior of the new imperious nomenklatura 
of Moldova in relation with Transdniestria was based on a whole system of compromises 
providing expansion of subjects in the negotiation process regarding the settlement of the 
Transdniestrian conflict.  
 
The pragmatic nomenklatura, which came to power in Moldova as a result of democratic 
elections, has decisively given up on the national factor and orientations towards 
Romania, however, it did not share the old authoritative Soviet stereotypes, dominating in 
Transdniestria.  
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This ruling part of the Moldovan nomenklatura oriented towards the creation of bases of a 
democratic regime in Moldova, but for that, it used the state institutions for the 
accomplishment of their clan interests. Such a regime of political power in Moldova 
provided Transdniestria with a wide field for maneuvers in upholding their political and 
economic interests. In such situation, the chance of renewal of escalation of the conflict 
was excluded, but also the mighty world demanded extremely large concessions, 
unaccepted by both parties, for it threatened them with the loss of political power in their 
republics.  
 
Thus, the stay in power of Moldova of two political forces has determined two periods of 
relations of Chisinau with Transdniestria. The first period was characterized by an armed 
confrontation, when the power in Moldova was held by representatives of national-
democratic and ultra nationalist forces. The second period, which coincided with the 
ruling of pragmatic nomenklatura, was marked by the establishment of relations between 
Chisinau and Transdniestria that can be expressed in the formula "neither war, nor 
peace". 
 
With the election of communists to the power in Moldova in 2001, began the third period 
of relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol that can be called "the cold peace” with 
transition to a stage of escalation of confrontation. 
 
In spite of the fact that the governing conservative nomenklatura of Moldova, as well as 
the Transdniestrian authority, externally professes common Soviet communist ideology, 
confrontation between them will accrue.  
 
The matter is that the conservative party nomenklatura, having come to power in Moldova 
as a result of parliamentary elections, obviously, will aspire to restoration of authoritarian 
forms of governing in the country. This, in its turn, inclines the management of Moldova 
to the solution of Transdniestrian problem using force. With such a behavior, the 
compromise methods will be sent to background the second plan, and the pressure on 
Tiraspol on behalf of Chisinau will increase. On the other hand, the stability of the 
authoritarian regime in Transdniestria will play for the benefit of such a confrontational 
scenario of development of relations.  
 
The authoritarian regime in Transdniestria was created by the conservative Soviet 
nomenklatura consisting basically from the management staff.  
 
The legacy of the Soviet Union has helped the Transdniestrian nomenklatura to unite 
around itself the population of the region not according to the national attribute, but the 
“soviet” principle. 
 
The declassed and denationalized population of Transdniestria represented a community 
that was to be called “soviet people” or the so-called “Russian-speaking” population. It 
makes up 60 % of the population from the region. Separated from ethnic native land and 
national language, it lived according to the traditions of representations about the external 
threat, equality in poverty and equity in distribution of material benefits. Therefore, it is  
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no wonder, that it hostilely reacted to the ethno-politicization process of the Moldovan 
society and perceived this process as real threat to the existence of its own way of life.  
 
In such an uncertain and menacing situation, the Transdniestrian population managed to 
unite quickly around the Transdniestrian nomenklatura in the conflict with the official 
Chisinau. Moreover, the authorities of Moldova themselves in their actions only assisted 
the aggravation of the situation and amplification of the action of conflict-generating 
factors, one of them being the language factor. Having proclaimed the Moldovan 
language with Latin spelling, identical with Romanian, as official language, the official 
Chisinau actually lost the channel of communications with the Russian-speaking 
population of Transdniestria, which reacted to the adoption of this Law organizing 
political strikes, perceiving it as a threat for itself and the descendants. The prevailing 
Russian-speaking part of Transdniestrian population was excluded both from the cultural, 
and from the information environment of the Republic of Moldova. The abrupt change of 
conditions of the language environment has considerably strengthened hostile mood of 
Transdniestrian population towards official Chisinau and represented one of the reasons of 
emergence of the Transdniestrian conflict. 
 
The political authority in Transdniestria is legitimate for it is elected by the population of 
the republic as a result of elections. The authoritarian regime established by political 
leaders in Transdniestria, appeared in these extreme conditions for the republic more 
effective for it allows a better mobilization of material and other resources for the solution 
of specific tasks of state consolidation. Certainly, such a regime appeared during the 
escalation of the armed conflict and that is why in peacetime, an appropriate external 
conflict-generating environment is necessary for its consolidation. The perception of an 
external threat, the presence of the “enemy face” is the integral attribute of any 
authoritarian political regime. 
 
In Transdniestria, the authoritarian forms of government are successfully combined with 
the old Soviet stereotypes existing in the social consciousness of the population of the 
republic. The positive perception of authoritarianism by the population makes the political 
authority in Transdniestria internally stable, viable and durable. The durability of the 
authoritarian regime is determined also by the fact that it destroys any opposition towards 
the authoritarian political authority, and, hence, deprives a society from the alternative of 
choice. 
 
The authoritarian regime in Transdniestria prefers the force-based methods for the 
solution of both external and internal problems. By means of force-based methods, 
President I. Smirnov has established a regime of personal authority over the entire 
territory of the republic and has taken under the full control a sector of the Ukrainian-
Moldovan border adjoining with Transdniestria. The system of tripartite relations is also 
influenced by the political regime existing in Ukraine. 
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Ukraine, as well as the majority of the post-Soviet republics is characterized by the regime 
of transition period representing the remains of the base of the totalitarian regime with 
elements of emerging democracy. Such transitional type of political regime is the most 
acceptable one for the pragmatic nomenklatura, being in power in Ukraine and to the 
greatest extent responds to the nature of its economic interests.  
 
In the foreign policy sphere, the interests of the regime correspond to the policy of 
Ukraine oriented to the restoration of territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova with 
the maintenance of rights of broad autonomy in Transdniestria. Such an approach of 
Ukraine proved its devotion to the democratic values and compromise political methods of 
settlement of Transdniestrian conflict. Certainly, Chisinau could always count on the 
support of Ukraine in the solution of this problem. The political precondition for this 
purpose was the common nature of positions of the pragmatic nomenklatura in power, 
both in Ukraine, and in Moldova.  
 
Ukraine acted in this situation as a guarantor of safety of the two conflicting parties. Such 
position appreciably predetermined the existence of a liberal frontier regime at the border 
between Ukraine and Moldova. However, the decisive role in the existence of such a 
liberal regime at the border was played and continues to play the economic factor. 
 
The way to the market economy, in which the reformatory “pragmatic” nomenklatura 
planned to create the subjects of the market, private proprietors. As such proprietors, 
certainly, should have acted the “pragmatic” nomenklatura itself, which did not have other 
way to become proprietor, as well as appropriate the state property, having taken the 
advantage of the monopoly of the government.  
 
In this very context, the new reformatory governments of the last regime carried out 
actions for the privatization of the state property, obviously for the benefit of the 
management body and all those who held high state positions in economy and in general 
in the government system. 
 
In the republics, the mechanism of appropriation was introduced during “perestroika” 
times and represented a plenty of private joint-stock companies with limited liability, 
created within the state enterprises. Thus, behind the state enterprise was the industrial 
activity and the activity of private companies had a commercial character, connected to 
the sale of production of state enterprises. In such system, the nomenklatura received huge 
super-profits by means of such financial operations, which were carried out through figure 
firms. 
 
For the appropriation, the imperious republican elites of the state enterprises needed 
political sovereignty. Such sovereignty provided the monopoly of power in the republics, 
and later also the monopoly of appropriation of the state enterprises from within the 
territory of the republics. The process of appropriation itself occurred depending on what 
political elites held the power in the republics. 
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The “pragmatic” party nomenklatura kept the privatization process of the state enterprises 
under its own control and the number of its real participants was limited. The legislative 
base and market reforms were focused exactly on the nomenklatura privatization. Such 
conditions of accomplishment of market reforms could not be satisfactory for the 
achievement of a high-grade market economy. They have resulted in the increase of 
“shadow” economy. 
 
The conservative party nomenklatura, having stayed in power in some sovereign 
republics, was compelled to carry out market actions at very much limited local levels, in 
those economic spheres in which it was already impossible to keep the command methods. 
The process of a privatization, as such, in these republics did not occur. All the state 
property was under the private control of the head of the state and its narrow environment. 
 
The first model of economic transformations is inherent to Ukraine and Moldova, the 
second – to Transdniestria. Moldova as predominating has proclaimed the principles of 
democracy and free market. In Transdniestria, one tried to keep much of the previous 
system in the social and economic spheres. 
 
By virtue of different approaches to the solution of existing social, economic, political and 
other problems, different vision, different systems of coordinates, different systems of 
readout was generated. It allows speaking about presence of the objective problems 
caused by existing distinctions in social and economic development. 
 
The economic contradictions between Chisinau and Tiraspol arise also by virtue of 
different approaches to the change of the pattern of ownership. For the Republic Moldova, 
as well as for the majority of the countries of the CIS, the nomenklatura privatization was 
characteristic. The result of such privatization, first of all, became the increase of the share 
of “shadow” economy and “shadow” capitals in social production and consumption, 
deficiency of the state budget, growing external and internal debts of the state, export of 
shadow capitals abroad. 
 
Transdniestria, with its uncertain status for shadow economy of Moldova, plays the role of 
a certain grey offshore zone, facilitating some part of the Moldovan nomenklatura and 
shadow business to carry out the export of the capitals and goods abroad and receive in the 
same way the production from abroad. 
 
Unlike in the Republic Moldova, in Transdniestria all state ownership is under the 
personal control of the head of republic and its narrow environment. The Transdniestrian 
nomenklatura adheres to command-administrative methods of management of economy. It 
uses the market measures only in those spheres of economy where it is already impossible 
to keep the old methods. As consequence, Transdniestria has none of those negative 
consequences that are characteristic for nomenklatura privatization. 
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The economy of Ukraine, as well as other countries of the CIS, also has a mainly shadow 
character. While the countries of the CIS undergo a deep economic crisis, and the 
prevailing share of production falls in the shadow part of their economy, Transdniestria, 
with its uncertain status, becomes a need for everyone who today has close connections 
with it for moving shadow capitals and the smuggled goods to the third countries. 
 
The logic of such shadow commodity circulation is proven by the unsettlement of the 
border issues and weakness of the regime at border of Ukraine with Transdniestria. In 
such a regime are interested not only certain political forces in Ukraine, but also in other 
countries of the CIS, as Ukraine is the transit country in relation to Transdniestria. 
 
The length of the Ukrainian border with unrecognized Transdniestrian republic is 386 km. 
At the Ukrainian-Moldavian sector of border, 45 % of smuggling is discovered [1]. 
 
In conditions when Chisinau has the legal right to supervise legal export of production 
from Transdniestria, the smuggling in this republic is erected to the rank of state business. 
The recognized leader of this sphere of business is the "Sheriff” company. As many 
analytics specify, Vladimir Smirnov, the chairman of Customs Committee of 
Transdniestria, the son of President of Transdniestria Igor Smirnov, has the most direct 
relation to it. The firm operates under the covering of law enforcement bodies of 
Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic.  
 
Their actions represent carefully planned operations with all the necessary elements - 
investigation of district, supervision, recruitment of participants and distribution of roles. 
The routes of contraband caravans, as a rule are chosen the roundabout and field roads that 
have been not covered with border posts. The activity of smugglers is favored by both 
difficult economic and social situation in border areas. For the inhabitants of adjoining 
villages on both sides of the Ukrainian-Moldovan borders, the smuggling or participation 
in the criminal groupings engaged in theft of cattle, agricultural machinery gradually turns 
to the basic occupation [2]. 
 
Speaking about the situation in Transdniestria, the President of Moldova Vladimir 
Voronin has noted, that "the region has gradually turned to "a black hole" through which 
only for six months of the present year, two Transdniestrian banks have carried out 
operations of money-laundering of amounts considerably exceeding the annual gross 
domestic product of the region" [3]. 
 
From the used annually in Moldova more than 1 million tons of mineral oil, almost half is 
imported illicitly, without payment of taxes and duties [4]. 
 
The smuggling way represents only a part of export of industrial and agricultural goods 
from Transdniestria. The other part of the goods is exported quite legally under the mark 
of products of the Republic Moldova, with the use of Moldovan quotas and the Moldovan 
customs licenses. Such a export scheme was favorable to Transdniestria as it provided 
Transdniestria with the foreign policy freedom and necessary conditions for the economic 
development of the republic. Such scheme was also favorable to the ruling pragmatic  
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nomenklatura in Chisinau, allowing certain clan groupings gain from this certain shadow 
profit. 
 
With the coming to power of the conservative communist nomenklatura led by President 
of the Republic of Moldova V. Voronin, the situation in Moldova has changed. The 
authorities from Chisinau have decided to take under a rigid control the Transdniestrian 
sector of the Ukrainian-Moldovan border that has resulted in a tension of relations of 
Moldova with Transdniestria and Ukraine, as it touched the shadow interests of powerful 
political groups in these republics and other countries of the CIS. 
 
On August 31, 2001, the Government of Moldova announced the withdrawal from the 
unrecognized Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic of the Moldovan customs licenses due 
to the introduction of new licenses according to the WTO standards and creation of joint 
customs points. However, the representatives of Transdniestria have not undertaken any 
actions for participation in the activity of joint customs points though earlier such consent 
was given. The President of Transdniestrian Republic Igor Smirnov has regarded the 
actions of Chisinau as an attempt to organize an economic blockade of Transdniestria. 
Then the Moldovan customs officers on September 1, 2001 made an attempt to establish 
joint posts on the territory of Ukraine, however the Kiev authorities did not allow this. 
Chisinau insists on the creation of joint posts to interfere with the smuggling, which 
penetrates through the uncontrolled by the Moldovan authorities Transdniestrian region. 
 
The economic losses of Transdniestrian republic as a result of customs and trade blockade 
on behalf of Moldova have reached 50 million dollars. It makes a quarter of the entire 
republican budget. According to Smirnov, when Ukraine refused to place on its territory 
the Moldovan customs officers and by that making unreal the plans of customs isolation of 
Transdniestrian Republic, Chisinau stopped issuing to the Transdniestrian enterprises the 
internationally recognized certificates certifying the legality of their products. Without 
these certificates, the export of Transdniestrian goods beyond the limits of the Moldovan 
territory becomes impossible. Many enterprises from Transdniestria, including 
"Electromas" Plant in Tiraspol, Moldovan Metallurgical Plant in Rybnitsa and others, for 
this reason reduced the current production volumes with 20-30 percent. Tens of contracts 
with foreign contractors were under the threat of cancellation with a total sum of about 
100 million dollars [5].  
 
In reply to the measure undertaken by the leadership of Moldova of enforcing order at the 
Moldovan-Ukrainian border, the "Tiraspol regime blocked the railway, obstructing the 
circulation of cargoes to Moldova, including fuel and the humanitarian assistance". 
“Besides, the Transdniestrian authorities assert that the Tiraspol regime is going to block 
the supply of potable water, natural gas and the electric power to Moldova," told V. 
Voronin [6.]. 
 
Chisinau accuses Ukraine for not supporting the economic sanctions in relation to 
Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic, letting the Transdniestrian goods pass through its 
territory without the necessary customs licenses. Moreover, since January 1, 2002, 
Moldova has introduced new passports due to this fact the population of small, but proud  
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Transdniestrian republic practically cannot exit, as all foreign diplomatic representatives 
accredited in Moldova issue visa documents only to citizens of the recognized states. 
Consequently, already now many inhabitants of Transdniestria try to get the Moldovan or 
Ukrainian citizenship by any means. 
 
Such aggravation of the situation on the Transdniestrian sector of the Ukrainian-Moldovan 
border directly infringes upon the interests of national security of Ukraine.  
 
The aggravation of the situation at border and unsettlement of border problems favors the 
increase of the flux of illegal migrants, smuggling, weapons and drugs through border. 
The president of Moldova Vladimir Voronin specifies: "On our own experience we got 
convinced, that the regions controlled by separatist forces, are a constant source of 
instability and tension, a favorable environment for smuggling, illegal traffic in arms and 
drugs, money-laundering and illegal migration" [7]. It is enough to tell, that about one 
third of the withdrawn firearms in Ukraine originates at the border with the 
Transdniestrian areas.  
 
On the Ukrainian-Moldovan sector are arrested 60% of the infringers of Ukrainian state 
border. Moreover, 79 % of them violate the frontier at the entrance to Ukraine. On the 
same sector of the border, during 2001 by the Ukrainian border guards were arrested 4000 
units of ammunition that constitutes about 50 % of the ammunition arrested on the entire 
sector of the Ukrainian border. From Transdniestria through the Ukrainian-Moldovan 
border passed 83 % of the total volume of the narcotic raw material delivered to Ukraine 
and arrested by the Ukrainian border and customs services in 2001.  
 
The very interests of national security push Ukraine to search for ways of influence on 
Moldova with the purpose of demarcation of the Ukrainian-Moldovan border. In this 
context, it is possible to assume that one of motives of refusal of Kiev to support the 
economic sanctions against Transdniestria was its intention, thus, to push Chisinau to 
solve the issue of demarcation of the Ukrainian-Moldovan state frontier.  
 
However, the situation at the borders, as well as a frontier regime itself, is determined not 
only by internal factors, but also by external factors, the main one in this given region 
being the geopolitical factor. 
 
The influence of the geopolitical factor on the situation of tripartite relations of Moldova-
Transdniestria-Ukraine is primarily shown in the geopolitical orientations of these 
subjects.  
 
Moldova. The geopolitical orientation of Moldova since the proclamation of its 
independence has undergone a certain evolution. At the beginning, Moldova has headed 
towards an intensive rapprochement with Romania, inclusively counting on its military 
assistance in the conflict with Transdniestria. Then, with the coming to power of the 
pragmatic nomenklatura led by Luchinschi, it sharply abandoned this direction. Before the 
election of the communists to power in 2001, Moldova and its population has been in a 
condition of uncertainty regarding its geopolitical choice. The Moldovan society had two  
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choices: to unite with Romania or to exist further as the sovereign, independent and 
neutral state.  
 
Thus, if this choice did not disturb Moldova, - both choices were acceptable for the 
population, then for the inhabitants of Transdniestria this choice had a basic significance.  
 
Romania represents for them an absolutely alien ethnic and socio-cultural environment. 
Hence, such geopolitical uncertainty of Chisinau forced the Transdniestrians to support 
the independence of the unrecognized republic.  
 
The situation changed with arrival of the communists to power in Moldova in 2001. The 
geopolitical orientations of Moldova and Transdniestria for the first time have coincided. 
Just like Transdniestria, the ruling nomenklatura in Moldova sees the future of the country 
in the Slavic union of Byelorussia, Russia and Ukraine, and although such a union does 
not yet exist, the main geopolitical reference point for Moldova is Russia.  
 
Such pro-Russia geopolitical aspirations of the communist authority in Chisinau are 
explained not by ideological, but by quite pragmatic reasons related to the return of 
Transdniestria in structure of Moldova.  
 
Transdniestria. In the same time, in comparison with Moldova, the pro-Russian 
orientation of Transdniestria has deeper and more complex roots. Unlike Moldova, the 
Slavic rhetoric of the political regime from Transdniestria is caused by a search of 
ideology that might unite the population of this region around of its authoritarian 
authority. Neither national, nor the communist idea may represent such integrating force 
anymore. The authorities of Transdniestria are inclined to consider as such an idea a 
certain mix of the opinions expressing the Soviet totalitarian traditions and a certain racial 
generality on the basis of which the Soviet Union may be restored. As such a generality 
they are inclined to see the mythical "the Slavic Union ". 
 
Nevertheless, the common geopolitical orientation of Moldova and Transdniestria gives a 
certain hope for the settlement of the conflict between them in case when both sides will 
be subjects of one state, either the Russian Federation, or a wider Russian state formation. 
However, here there are two circumstances that essentially complicate the 
accomplishment of such a dream.  
 
Firstly, at present, the prospective of entering of Transdniestria together with Moldova in 
a certain third more common state, may hardly satisfy Chisinau. Secondly, the 
accomplishment of such plans is impossible without the inclusion in this common state of 
Ukraine, which geographically separates Moldova from Russia and Byelorussia. Hence, 
the main role in such a unifying process will be played by the geopolitical orientations of 
Ukraine. 
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Ukraine. For the development of Ukraine in the nearest future, three tendencies will be 
characteristic: the tendency expressing gravitation to the “fraternal alliance” with Russia; 
the tendency of the European integration; the tendency connected to the consolidation of 
independence, unity and integrity of Ukraine as a country and independent state. 
Depending on the prevalence or combination of these tendencies, the foreign policy of 
Ukraine will precess between allied relations with Russia, neutrality and the course of 
European integration.  
 
Depending on course chosen in Ukraine, its position in relation to the settlement of the 
Transdniestrian conflict will change also. In case of maintenance of neutrality or 
orientation to the European integration, Ukraine will contribute objectively to the prompt 
settlement of Transdniestrian conflict, preservation of territorial integrity of the Republic 
Moldova and also of consolidation of its state border.  
 
However, in the last years Ukraine more and more precisely and consistently shows the 
adherence to the policy of integration with Russia, which objectively deprives it from all 
chances to be even in the remote future integrated with the unique Europe. Such re-
integrationist way of Ukraine, which could be called "back to Russia", is accompanied by 
the reconstruction of some elements of authoritarianism. Hence, the revival of 
authoritarian power in Ukraine and the association with Russia will change the position of 
Ukraine in the system of tripartite relations “Moldova-Transdniestria-Ukraine". In such 
situation, the authoritarian regime in Transdniestria will become even closer to it, which 
will entail the rapprochement of Kiev with Tiraspol. 
 
With such a scenario of development of the situation, Ukraine will dissolve itself as a 
independent guarantor of political settlement of the conflict in Transdniestria. Its line of 
behavior in this process of political settlement will be completely subordinated to the 
interests of Moscow. This, in its turn, will make Russia the only and the most powerful 
mediator in the settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict and will allow it set its full 
control over the situation in Transdniestria and Moldova. However, will this promote the 
settlement of the conflict Transdniestrian? The answer to this question depends on what 
extent this settlement will respond to the geopolitical interests of Russia in this region. 
 
 
Geopolitical interests of Russia. The position of Russia concerning the solution of the 
Transdniestrian problem will remain inconsistent and ambiguous. Such discrepancy is 
characterized by the objective tendencies of modern development of Russia. These 
tendencies are formed under the influence of both external and internal factors. The 
dominant tendency in internal development of Russia in the nearest ten years will become 
the construction of the “centralized state”. In foreign policy aspect, this tendency will be 
shown in the fact that the Russian leadership in the solution of Transdniestrian conflict 
will emphasize the attention to the necessities of preservation of territorial integrity of the 
Republic Moldova and indestructibility of its frontiers. In this view, Russia will continue 
to play a positive role of guarantor of safety and stability in the Transdniestrian region. 
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In the same time, in the foreign policy aspect, Russia obviously in the nearest ten years 
cannot refuse the claims for restoration of the status-quo of great superpower and 
dominant influence on formation of the entire geopolitical landscape of Europe. As Russia 
does not show intention to join the process of European integration, and wants to be a self-
sufficient prevailing force in the Eastern Europe, hence, it will have uneasy relations with 
such European and Euro-Atlantic communities as the NATO and EU. In case of 
preservation of existing claims, the force and the level of confrontation of Russia with the 
West will be determined by its internal resources and opportunities. As for Russia the 
greatest resource until 2010 will remain its military resources, obviously Transdniestria 
may play a role of a military jumping-off place, which due to the military presence of 
Russia may render significant military-political influence on all Eastern Europe.  
 
However, taking into account the fact that Russia has already lost the military superiority 
over the West, sooner the weakness, than the force will push it to partnership relations 
with the West-European countries and their organizations, such as the NATO and EU, to a 
policy of bargaining and mutually acceptable compromises. Concerning the countries of 
the CIS, including Moldova, such a policy will result in Russia’s aspiration to support the 
stability in the European post-Soviet space not on the basis of coordination of interests of 
the EU countries, but on the basis of exclusive Russian domination, primarily military-
political and economic. With such a policy, Russia will not be interested in the renewal of 
an armed escalation of Transdniestrian conflict. It is obvious that with such geopolitical 
interests, the variant of a final settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict is not favorable to 
Russia for it eliminates the reasons for the prolongation of its military presence in this 
region. 
 
The policy of Ukraine, in case of preservation of its pro-Russia re-integrationist course, 
will be also subordinated to the geopolitical and strategic interests of Russia. Being guided 
by the logic of such policy, Ukraine, obviously, will leave the borders with Transdniestria 
and Moldova open and will refuse their demarcation. The air space of Ukraine should also 
be open for flights of the Russian military aircraft to Transdniestria and Moldova. 
 
The relations in the triangle: Moldova-Transdniestria-Ukraine, as well as the settlement of 
the Transdniestrian conflict, is also influenced by other external factors such as the 
interests and policy of such influential geopolitical players on the European continent as 
the USA, NATO, EU, Romania. 
 
The USA. As long as the conflicts in the Balkan are not completely settled, the United 
States will hardly show a big interest in the destiny of Transdniestria and the settlement of 
the Transdniestrian conflict. Today the Transdniestrian issue interests the USA only to 
what concerns the establishment of the control over the spread of weapons from the 
combat arsenals in Transdniestria and neutralizations of the Russian military domination 
in the region. However, some corrective amendments in such position of the USA could 
be introduced by the American antiterrorist campaign in case that the US services will find 
illegal deliveries of weapons from Transdniestria to the international terrorist 
organizations.  
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The NATO. The policy of the NATO in relation with Transdniestria in many respects will 
be motivated by the interests of the USA, and, hence, in its actions in the region the 
Alliance will be guided by the same American motives. This problem will increasingly 
interest NATO in the process of approach of the second wave of its expansion towards the 
East. With the acceptance of Romania as member of the Alliance, NATO will be 
compelled to engage in the solution of this problem, for then the issue of settlement of the 
Transdniestrian conflict will touch directly the interests of safety of the Alliance. 
 
Among other external factors of at the regional level, it is possible to outline the factor of 
influence of Romania. 
 
Romania. The influence of Romania on the process of settlement of Transdniestrian 
conflict will be determined by the domination of two tendencies in its foreign policy. First 
of them is the tendency of connection of the historical grounds, which actually means the 
unification with the Republic Moldova in one state. The domination of this tendency in 
the beginning of ’90 substantially promoted the emergence of the Transdniestrian conflict. 
However today, and obviously in the next years, Romania will keep the course of 
European integration, whose ultimate goal is the inclusion into the European Union and 
the NATO. The adaptation of Romania as a member of these communities in the next 
decades will exclude the possibility of its destructive influence on the process of 
settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict. 
 
Thus, the analysis of the above-mentioned factors allows asserting that in the next five-ten 
years the geopolitical landscape of southeastern region of Europe will undergo dynamic 
changes. Such instability and uncertainty of the international juncture in the region 
predetermines the poly-alternativeness of scenarios of development of tripartite 
relations: Moldova-Transdniestria-Ukraine, as well as the process of settlement of the 
Transdniestrian conflict. 
 
At the same time, the combination of the multitude of external and internal factors at more 
or less precise expressiveness of the factor of the Russian domination and Pro-Russian 
geopolitical orientation of all the subjects of tripartite relations, substantially narrows the 
field of their maneuver in the use of external forces and choice of strategy of development 
of the problems of tripartite relationships. 
 
These two contradictory tendencies allow to outline a discrete number of typical scenarios 
of development of relations in the triangle "Moldova-Transdniestria-Ukraine". Depending 
of the ratio of the specified external and internal factors, three most common scenarios of 
development of tripartite relations are probable: confrontation, uncertainty, integration.  
 
The confrontation scenario. The basic precondition for the development of such scenario 
is the unsettlement of the Transdniestrian conflict. This scenario appreciably reflects the 
present condition of relations between Tiraspol and Chisinau. Other thing is that this 
confrontation has not developed into an armed escalation of the conflict. However, it does 
not eliminate the question, whether the development of this scenario in such direction is  
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possible. The contemporary international practice gives an affirmative answer to this 
question. Today the same force variant of conflict resolution is shown by the Russian 
Federation in the Chechen Republic. 
 
However, the analysis of the factors and conditions with reference to Transdniestrian 
conflict confirms the unlikeness of recurrences of such scenario in the future. The internal 
factors reducing the probability of occurrence of the similar scenario are: 
 
 Absence for Transdniestria of aggressive goals in relation with Moldova. Political 
objectives, which could be solved by military way, have already been achieved by 
Transdniestria during the armed escalation of the conflict in 1992; 
 The presence in the safety zone of tripartite peace-making forces; 
 Unpopularity of military-power methods for the solution of the Transdniestrian 
problem among the most part of the population from the Republic of Moldova; 
 Mutual political obligations of the conflicting parties regarding the non-use of 
force; 
 Presence in Transdniestria of efficient combat-ready army, which surpasses the 
Armed Forces of the Republic Moldova in the potential; 
 Presence on the territory of Transdniestria of the Operative group of the Russian 
army. 
 
From all stated factors, the basic resulting factor constraining the armed escalation, is the 
adverse balance for such scenario in the ratio of potentials of armed forces of 
Transdniestria and Moldova. The national army of Moldova has a total of 8500 persons, 
209 units of armored vehicles and 205 artillery weapons. The number of staff of the 
Armed Forces of Transdniestria involves 7500 military, 67 combat armored vehicles and 
115 units of artillery. However, if to take into account the available in Transdniestrian 
warehouses weapons of the former 14-th army, it turns out that the region is one of the 
most militarized in Europe. Now in military warehouses there are 49476 units of small 
arms, 805 artillery systems, 655 units of combat machinery [8]. 
 
Such a balance excludes the opportunity of solution of the Transdniestrian problem in a 
military way. However, the unlikeness of renewal of an armed escalation of the 
Transdniestrian conflict does not exclude the confrontational relations between the two 
parties. The factor promoting the development of relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol 
with such a scenario is the presence of an authoritarian regime in Transdniestria, and also 
possible attempts to restore an authoritarian regime in Moldova. 
 
It is obvious, that the actions of these internal factors will push Chisinau to solve the 
Transdniestrian problem using non-military power methods. One of such methods is the 
economic blockade or economic sanctions against Transdniestria. 
 
However, in this case it is necessary to take into account that the actions of this character 
in relation with Transdniestria may result in the complication of relations between 
Chisinau and Kiev, which actually has already taken place in the fall of 2001. In 
conditions of confrontation of Chisinau with Tiraspol, Kiev maintains the most  
advantageous position, playing a role of mediator and guarantor of political settlement of 
the conflict. However, such position appears rather vulnerable in case of obvious 
overweight of one of the parties in this confrontation. In such situation, even the role of 
guarantor forces Kiev to support the position of weaker side. The confrontation scenario 
maintains the constant tension at the Ukrainian-Moldovan border. 
 
It is necessary to attribute to external factors the circumstance, that none of the external 
forces will be interested in the renewal of the armed escalation of the conflict neither now, 
nor in the near future. 
 
The scenario of uncertainty. The scenario of uncertainty implies the maintenance of 
peace, but it does not provide sufficient opportunities for its final fastening or in other 
words for “peace-building”. Starting from this, any failure or unsuccess in peaceful 
process of settlement, will contribute to the strengthening of viability of the scenario of 
uncertainty. Finally, this development of the situation in such direction will result in the 
“Taiwanization”  of the Transdniestria’s status.  
 
The scenario of uncertainty of relations of Chisinau and Tiraspol with Kiev to the greatest 
extent corresponds to the present domestic situation of Ukraine and its uncertain multi-
vector foreign policy. Such scenario provides a wide choice of tools for the construction 
of tripartite relations; however, the productivity of their application seems rather low. 
Such relations remind of the game with zero variant. One cannot expect a big prize in such 
a game, but there is the confidence that it is impossible to lose much.  
 
In such scenario of development of tripartite relations, the frontier regime at the 
Ukrainian-Moldovan border remains uncertain too. The problem of demarcation of the 
border is postponed for an indefinite term. The border will further remain transparent for 
smuggling, transit of drugs and weapons. Such a scenario will be further alimented by 
shadow economy of Ukraine, Moldova, Transdniestria, CIS countries and the countries 
from the southeastern region of Europe.  
 
The re-integrationist scenario. Such scenario of development of relations are based on 
the re-integration tendencies representing the aspiration of influential political forces in 
the Slavic countries of the CIS to restore the common state. This tendency represents a 
process of inverse-sovereignty of republics of the former USSR. It is caused by the 
weakness of the new independent states, and insufficiency of both internal and external 
resources for the national state consolidation in these countries. To what concerns the 
system of tripartite relations, this re-integration tendency may be presented at two levels.  
 
First level reflects the re-integrationist tendency occurring within the system of tripartite 
relations; 
 
Second level represents the reintegration of all three subjects of relations within a wider 
state unity, as the Byelorussia-Russia Union or a stronger state, as the Russian Federation.  
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The separation of the reintegration tendency into these two levels is rather relative, as the 
processes developing at these two levels are closely interconnected among themselves. It 
is worth mentioning, that the reintegration scenarios for both levels are stacked in the so-
called concept of "common state". 
 
For the first level, the accomplishment of the concept of "common state" may be carried 
out in two scenarios: confederations and federations. Thus, it is necessary to notice, that 
the reintegration tendencies do not correspond to the purposes and aspirations of Tiraspol, 
pursuing the consolidation of sovereignty of the republic. For the political leadership of 
Transdniestria, the status of the independent state is desired, therefore the accomplishment 
of the reintegration scenario as confederation is considered by Tiraspol as a logic step for 
acquiring by Transdniestria of full state sovereignty.  
 
The scenario of confederation. This scenario represents the concept of reconstruction of 
the common state of Moldova and Transdniestria on a confederative basis. However, for 
the conclusion of confederative relations with Moldova, Transdniestria lacks the necessary 
external conditions. Such relations Transdniestria may expect only in case of amplification 
of Russian domination in the region and, as result, the achievement of official 
arrangements with NATO regarding the delimitation of spheres of influence in the Eastern 
Europe. Nevertheless, so far Russia has no intentions to assert for Transdniestria the status 
of confederative relations with Chisinau. Besides, for this purpose it has neither internal, 
nor external resources. 
 
Hence, the confederative relations may act only as a certain foreign policy anchor, serving 
for Transdniestria as guarantor of safety and preservation of its independent status within 
the "common" with Moldova state, built on closer federal relations. As such external 
resource, there might be confederative relations of Transdniestria with Ukraine. At the 
moment of tensioning of relations with Chisinau, I. Smirnov already addressed to Kiev 
with the request for unification of Transdniestria with Ukraine [9]. However, this offer, 
except for separate representatives in the Ukrainian parliament, has not found support in 
Ukraine. Such unification is impossible also from the formal-legal point of view. Ukraine 
is a unitary state. This circumstance does not allow it to attach Transdniestria neither on 
federal, nor on confederative conditions.  
 
The internal and the foreign policy of Ukraine oriented towards the preservation of 
integrity of the state and observance of territorial integrity of other countries does not 
provide the bases for Transdniestria to expect for unification with Ukraine in any form. 
Understanding it, I. Smirnov obviously put forward such initiative in counterbalance to the 
pressure of Chisinau. 
 
The scenario of federation. In the accomplishment of the scenario of federal construction 
of a "common” for Moldova and Transdniestria state, Ukraine as well as Moldova, will 
aspire to end the normative-legal and infrastructural registration of their borders, and 
consolidation of the frontier regime at the Ukrainian-Moldovan sector. Hence, such script 
meets the interests of national security of Ukraine.  
98 
The scenario of a common federative state of Moldova and Transdniestria most likely will 
be favorable also to the Russian Federation. Such scenario is better connected with its 
military-political interests in this region. In case of creation of the federation, Russia 
receives the chance to change the neutrality status of the Republic of Moldova and thus 
create the necessary legal conditions for the prolongation of the military presence in 
Moldova. 
 
However, the accomplishment of the "federation" scenario is primarily obstructed by the 
internal factors, such as the presence of an authoritarian regime in Transdniestria and its 
possible restoration in Moldova, and also the factor of "shadow" economy. The negative 
action of these internal factors provides certain bases for the accomplishment of the 
scenario of common state on the second, wider level of action of reintegration processes. 
 
The common geopolitical orientations, gravitation to the authoritarian regime and 
domination of shadow economy, allow to speak about the inclusion all three subjects of 
relations in a wider context of the model of "common state", such as the scenario of state 
union and the Russian Federation. 
 
The scenario of "state union". This scenario is already embodied in the Byelorussia-
Russia Union. The Moldovan communists expressed their intentions to join it, however 
only before the moment of coming to power in Moldova. The President of Transdniestria, 
I. Smirnov, repeatedly expressed intentions to join this Union. "To settle the 
Transdniestrian problem is possible by gradual rapprochement of two independent states - 
Moldova and Transdniestria. However, we see our future in the Union of Russia and 
Byelorussia", - he said told [10]. The majority of inhabitants of Transdniestria - 63% also 
believe that this unrecognized republic should have a political-legal status within the 
structure of the union of Russia, Byelorussia and Ukraine. This is proved by the results of 
the survey carried out by the Centre of Analytical Researches "New century" among 964 
inhabitants of Transdniestria and published at the beginning of 2002 in Tiraspol. Out of 
the respondents, only 28 % consider that Transdniestria should be an independent state 
[11]. 
 
Such scenario is also rather favorable to the accomplishment of the Russian re-
integrationist geopolitical ambitions for it opens the possibility full “association of 
Transdniestria to Russia or to the Union of the Russian Federation with Byelorussia, 
together with Ukraine” [12]. Without such a company with Ukraine, the association of 
Moldova and Transdniestria to the Russia-Byelorussia Union loses any sense. Without a 
common territory of the state formation, it turns to an international organization. 
 
It is necessary to notice, that the creation of such a state union as Byelorussia-Russia is 
favored by both internal, and external factors. However, the frailty of such combination as 
the Byelorussian-Russian Union is explained, most likely, by the nature of authoritarian 
regimes. The authoritarian regime from Byelorussia tries to keep the full control over the 
economic and material resources, and also over the political institutions in the republic, a 
fact that interferes with the progress of the Russian economic and political interests in the  
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territory of Byelorussia. In the accomplishment of a similar scenario, the same result 
should be expected both in Transdniestria and in Moldova.  
 
Therefore, as an alternative for the advance of Russian interests is the scenario of 
reintegration with the Russian Federation. Such scenario may imply two variants of its 
accomplishment.  
 
The first variant of accomplishment of such scenario represents the association of 
Transdniestria to the Russian Federation on conditions of confederation. However, the 
confederative relations of Russia and Transdniestria are also unlikely, as the new forces, 
which have come to power in Russia, renounced the idea of restoration of the “former 
USSR” and in the nearest ten years will be occupied with the consolidation of 
centralization of their own state. The leadership of Russia, with all external allure of such 
relations for the achievement of the Russian geopolitical ambitions, obviously, 
understands that the Russian Federation can hardly swallow such a unstable community as 
Transdniestria, Byelorussia and Ukraine with its present confusion of its own state system. 
The most acceptable to Russia will be the scenario of protectorates.  
 
The scenario of protectorates implies the transfer under the full control of Russia of 
economic resources, infrastructures, information and spiritual sphere, external and internal 
policy of these three subjects of relations with formal preservation or recognition of 
attributes of statehood of these independent countries.  
 
Such scenario is most successfully accomplished by the leadership of Russia in relation to 
Ukraine. The basic framework of such scenario is: the creation of joint (in the long-term 
common future) credit and financial system, restoration of a common power, transport 
system and system of communication, accomplishment of a large-scale shadow 
privatization, common information space and common defense-industrial complex. 
 
In such scenario, the administrative status should be returned to the Ukrainian-Moldovan 
border.  
 
However, the accomplishment of this scenario is again obstructed by the authoritarian 
regime in Transdniestria and the unwillingness of the Moldovan communists to carry out a 
privatization contradicting to their ideological principles. Consequently, the most probable 
short-term scenario will be the script of uncertainty of development of relations in the 
Moldova-Transdniestria-Ukraine triangle. Transdniestria in such scenario will have a large 






The avoidance of such pessimistic future is possible only with the condition of 
neutralization of the negative action of the above-mentioned both internal and external 
regional factors.  
 
For this purpose, it is necessary to: 
 
1. Change the vector of geopolitical orientation by all three subjects of relations 
from Russia to Europe; 
2. Withdraw the Russian armies from Moldova and Transdniestria, export and 
destruction of the ammunition stored in this region;  
3. Market economic transformations in Moldova, Transdniestria and Ukraine and 
structural reorganization of their economy with orientation towards the inclusion in the 
global economic system; 
4. Attract foreign, primarily western investors; 
5. Internationalize the process of settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict;  
6. Finalize of contract-legal and infrastructural delimitation of the border between 
Moldova and Ukraine; 
7. Overcome the gravitation to authoritarianism in Moldova and Ukraine and 
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Settlement of the Transnistrian conflict as a way to the creation of the 
regional stability zone in Eastern Europe 
Vitaly Kulik, Director of the Research Center for civil society problems, Kyiv, Ukraine 
 
 
Transdniestria is the most conflict-generating zone on the Ukrainian border. The 
existence of a zone of instability in this region continues to provoke not only tension in 
the Ukrainian - Moldavian relations, but also negative pressure on the socioeconomic and 
conflict-generating processes in boundary areas of Ukraine.  
 
In spite of the fact that today the Transdniestrian conflict has lost practically any 
ideological, geopolitical and ethnic attributes, it has kept a high level of a pressure in 
the relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol administrations.  
 
Along with the victory of communists in parliamentary elections, the political authority 
in Moldova has acquired political uniformity externally. It has brought in essential 
corrective amendments to the processes of the Transdniestrian conflict settlement.  
 
I. Smirnov's victory in presidential elections of Transdniestria on December 9, 2001 has 
actually marked the beginning of a new stage of aggravation in the opposition between 
Tiraspol and Chisinau. On December 10, 2001 V. Voronin has confirmed, that he does 
not see any perspectives in negotiations with I. Smirnov and that the further negotiations 
are possible only with the change of Transdniestria’s leader. Actually, the negotiating 
process was suspended from Chisinau’s initiative.  
 
 
Administrative-territorial problems of the Republic of Moldova 
 
Moldova’s communist government attempts to take under control all branches of 
authority in the country and to finish the "coloring" of the Republic of Moldova’s 
authority in red. It will enable the supervision of all the administrative resources of the 
country and will speed up the establishment of control of CPRM over financial flows in 
all economic areas of the country.  
 
One of the obstacles in the way of the CPRM is the local self-government. In order to 
eliminate it, the parliament of Moldova has developed a plan for administrative-territorial 
reform; its first step should have been the accomplishment of pre-term local elections on 
April 7, 2002. Early elections should have been carried out in connection with the 
modifications in the Law on local self- government.  
 
Actually, CPRM, which represents the parliamentary majority, has tried to take complete 
authority in the country: from the parliament up to the local councils. 
 
The new law contained two mechanisms for this purpose - election of heads of local 
administration not through direct vote, but through voices of local advisers, and the return 
to the regional administrative distribution, instead of, recently introduced, district  
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distribution. Actually, on one hand, Vladimir Voronin tried to weaken local "barons" who 
have received, according to his opinion, a too big district authority and on the other hand 
to receive control over Chisinau’s financial flows, which make up approximately 70% of 
the total amount available in Moldova. Communists have attempted to displace the mayor 
of Chisinau Serafim Urecheanu for a long time. 
 
The idea on pre-term local elections was completely supported by the president of the 
Republic of Moldova. The president has even slightly outrun the events, mentioning the 
date of their occurrence before the official authorization of the parliament. 
 
However, the administrative-territorial reform was condemned by the Council of Europe. 
A number of western politicians have declared that they were against the accomplishment 
of this reform. The aggravating situation in Georgia, the amplification of the opposition’s 
reaction in Chisinau, the lack of dialogue with Transdniestria - all these have resulted in 
the fact that the government of the Republic of Moldova gave up temporarily on its plans.  
 
On February 19, 2002, the Constitutional Court of Moldova recognized the illegality of 
the decision of the Moldovan parliament regarding the accomplishment of elections of 
local authorities on April 7. Officially the question of “illegality of parliament’s decision" 
was examined on the basis of the appeal made by deputies belonging to the parliamentary 
faction of Christian Democratic Popular Party. Out of six members of the Constitutional 
Court who examined the inquiry, four members were in favor of recognizing the decision 
of the parliament as not constitutional. Two have wished to express a special idea. 
 
Nevertheless, the decision of the Constitutional Court does not mean the refusal of the 
territorial reform, which was conceived by communists, it only transfers its terms and is 
based on that the decision of the parliament interrupts the power of representatives of the 
present local administration elected through national vote for four years. 
 
“The Parliament has to study the decision of the Constitutional Court in which the bases 
for abolition of the decision on establishment of the date of local authorities elections are 
stated”, - the Head of CC of Moldova Victor Puscas has declared. The question on 
establishment of a new date for elections may be raised only after the elimination of the 
incurred irregularities regarding the Constitution. 
 
The Parliament refused to provide any comments concerning the decision of the CC. In 
the same time, the reaction of the president V. Voronin was more than quiet. 40 minutes 
(!) after the announcement of the decision by the CC, the president made a statement 
where in particular, it is marked that: “No normative act contradicting the Constitution, 
may be valid. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova is the unique body of 
constitutional jurisdiction, which guarantees the supremacy of the fundamental Law. In 
this context, as the President of Republic Moldova and as the guarantor of the 
sovereignty, national independence, unity and territorial integrity of the country, I call 
that the higher and local authorities, the government, the political parties, the political 
organizations and citizens of Moldova  operate in severe conformity with the decision of 
the Constitutional Court. I am sure, that observing the decision of the Constitutional  
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Court will confirm entirely adherence of our state to the democratic European norms and 
values." 
 
The use of forceful methods in solving political problems has caused displeasure on the 
part of the internal opposition; territorial contradictions (Georgia and Transdniestria) 
were pointed. The Government of the Republic of Moldova was facing a real threat to be 
internationally isolated. The Assistant of the US Secretary of State on Europe and 
Eurasia, Steven Piffer, who visited Moldova in February, spoke about possible 
consequences of violent actions for the Republic of Moldova. 
 
The Vice-minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Мoldova Ion Stevile has noted 
that the perspective of Moldovan-American relations would be determined by the 
development of the political situation in Chisinau. Washington has not yet developed an 
exact position regarding this matter. Actually, Piffer has stated his cautions to the 
government of Moldova concerning the possible consequences for Chisinau in case of 
application of force methods while solving a crisis situation or a territorial question. 
 
V. Voronin has taken advantage of the decision of the CC, in this way, first of all, has 
kept his “European face". Secondly, he has strengthened his authority, which essentially 
loosened as a result of the external and internal political failures, and, simultaneously, has 
precisely shown, who actually the head of Moldova is.  
 
It is necessary to mention, that according to the Constitution of the Republic of Мoldova, 
the President of Moldova is a nominal figure elected by the Parliament, while the first 
person in the state is the speaker of the Parliament - Eugenia Ostapciuc. The actual 
authority of Voronin is based on the fact that he is the leader of the Communist Party and 
has a great influence over the communist parliamentarians. The Constitution of Moldova 
does not mention anything about party government of the country. It is necessary to draw 
a precise line between Voronin - the president and Voronin - the chairperson of the 
Communist Party. 
 
However, today this line appeared dim. The actual concentration of all authority from 
the country in the hands of one person took place, which, in effect, is a silent form of 
coup d'état and an establishment of personal dictatorship. This dictatorship appears 
absolutely irresponsible as in case of failures the president easily leaves in the shadow, 
hiding behind the CC, the Government and the Parliament. 
 
 
New Chisinau approaches regarding territorial settlement 
 
The opposition of Tiraspol and Chisinau appeared to be favorable to both parties. 
However, if Transdniestria plays blockade rhetoric with the purpose to put political 
pressure upon Chisinau in the context of renewing the negotiating process (in order to 
draw the attention of world community), and its persistence may be regarded as tactical 
maneuver Moldova shows power politics in solving its own territorial problems.  
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The present character of Moldovan-Transdniestrian relations in Tiraspol is explained by 
V. Voronin's aspiration to complicate by any means the renewal of negotiations and to 
force Transdniestria to approve the Moldovan project of Transdniestrian problem 
settlement.Chisinau enforces the power politics also in the solution of Gagauz-Yeri 
matter. 
 
Last year, at the end of October Chisinau has directed to Gagauz-Yeri and Transdniestria 
the law draft regarding amendments to the Constitution of Moldova, which should adjust 
the national-territorial issue. As representatives of Comrat have declared, this project 
does not provide any expanded autonomy either to Gagauz-Yeri, or to Transdniestria.  
 
The basic requirements of the administration of Gagauz-Yeri addressed to Chisinau are 
concentrated around the question of privatization of state property. At the moment of 
passing the law regarding the special status of Gagauz-Yeri, Chisinau already had a 
significant external debt, therefore the Moldovan government tried to distribute its 
increasing volume “uniformly”. Payments regarding the external debt demanded urgent 
distribution of Moldova’s property rights on different industrial targets, and also objects 
of power and transportation, placed on the territory of Gagauz-Yeri and Transdniestria, 
for their possible privatization without coordination with the management of these 
territorial units.  
 
According to its “special status", Gagauz-Yeri has the right to engage directly in 
economic affairs with other states and regions, however in practice Chisinau constantly 
creates obstacles, particularly in questions of property privatization.  
 
Thus, the question of territorial autonomy and special status of Gagauz-Yeri has an 
economic and administrative basis. The national coloring of the given conflict arises 
already as consequence and does not represent a key. Leaders of Gagauz-Yeri artificially 
paint the conflict in national colors. Chisinau also politicizes the conflict. While Comrat 
is ready for negotiations and compromises (within reasonable limits), Chisinau 
persistently stakes on power methods for solving the problems. Therefore, Tiraspol and 
Comrat coordinate their efforts in the organization of an “opposition” to Chisinau, which 
more and more shows its inability to translate a problem of territorial settlement into a 
course of dialogue and compromises. The Moldovan authority is not ready for the 
federalization of the country, which de facto already exists. Therefore, the "special 
statuses" and consolidation of "autonomies" in the frameworks offered by Chisinau do 
not answer to the interests of the heads Gagauz-Yeri and Transdniestria. 
 
It should have pushed V. Voronin's administration to search for other forms of 
negotiations instead of continuing to press on Comrat and Tiraspol. However, "V. 
Mishin's commission", which prepared the draft of changes in the Constitution of 
Moldova, sent to the leaders of Gagauz-Yeri and Transdniestria the next document in 
which their positions were not taken into consideration.  
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“Chisinau knowingly simulates the negotiating process, making loud declarations 
regarding the development of new approaches, offers, concepts etc. The consumer of 
these declarations is Moscow, OSCE and the world community. V. Voronin's 
administration tries to show its readiness for dialogue and at the same time does not see 
those with whom it should negotiate1”. 
 
At the end of November 2001 Chisinau declared that it intends to realize the project of 
"Mishin’s commission", concerning Moldova’s territorial-administrative facilities. That 
would strike naturally on the interests of Gagauz-Yeri.  
 
At the beginning of December, the pro-governmental mass media of the Republic of 
Мoldova, including in the pages of the official newspaper "Sovereign Moldova" the 
relations between Chisinau authority and Comrat were artificially put into discussion2. 
 
On December 11, 2001 the National League of Mayors’ Associations, the Federation of 
local and regional authority and the Association Gagauz-Yeri mayors adopted the 
Application "concerning the new threats to local and regional self-management in the 
Republic of Moldova ". The document mentions that “the restoration of the territorial - 
administrative facility which has exhausted itself, on the basis of small districts with 
limited economic and social opportunities, will make impossible the development of 
regional centers with powerful industry and social infrastructure "." We vainly hoped that 
the top management of the Republic of Moldova, having listened to a voice of reason, 
would not begin to destroy the basis of the territorial and local autonomy stipulated by 
the European charters on local and regional autonomy. During the last weeks, 
unfortunately, we realized that our protests were not heard and that pretended deafness of 
dignitaries of the highest rank hides itself behind egoistic party and personal interests… 
This is why "people of Moldova should say a firm "no" to the policy promoted by 
Chisinau”.  
 
In this context, on behalf of the National league of Mayors’ Associations of Moldova, of 
the Federation of local and regional authority, on behalf of the mayors of  Gagauz-Yeri:  
 
1. We resolutely protest against the intentions and attempts of destruction of the 
present system of local administration;  
2. We condemn the projects, which prepare the "division into districts" of 
territories and the organization of local elections to which we shall resist with all lawful 
ways;  
                                                          
1 Babilunga N.V. «Paradoxes of the Moldovan negotiating process»// Citation from the Bulletin of the 
Research Center for civil society problems, - №2, 2002, Page.7  
2 In the article of V. Abramciuc from “Sovereign Moldova" (8.11.2001p.) "The Gagauz matter: how to 
normalize it?" meaning "the normalization of Moldovan-Gagauz relations". In this context, the 
contradictions between the leadership of the Autonomous Unit Gagauz-Yeri and the Republic of Moldova 
acquire an international aspect. Besides this, in the interview given to the state television, the vice-speaker 
of the parliament V.Mishin declared that “the road from Comrat to Chisinau leads through Tiraspol”, 




3. We are full of determination to draw the attention of the international 
community to the restoration of state administration which is prepared, based on total 
centralization, on full disrespect of the system of autonomy of territorial communities of 
citizens of the Republic of Moldova;  
4. We leave behind ourselves the right to call all representatives of local 
administrations elected by people, society, diplomatic representatives that operate today 
in the republic, to solidarity against these antidemocratic projects ".  
 
The elaboration of the project decision of Gagauz-Yeri National Assembly on the 
political situation in Moldova and further mutual relations between Chisinau and Comrat 
was completed in December 2001. The document was prepared according to the 
implementation of the decision of the eighth congress of Gagauz deputies (advisers) of all 
levels, which was held on November 18 in Comrat. In the project, it is particularly 
marked that the management of TAU Gagauz-Yeri states its disagreement regarding the 
recommendations offered by " Mishin’s commission " regarding the constitutional 
changes concerning some status positions of TAU Gagauz-Yeri, and also reserves the 
right to organize referendums in a number of settlements in the south of the Republic of 
Moldova regarding entry in the autonomy’s structure and its denomination.  
 
Understanding, that Chisinau tries to make pressures on Comrat with the purpose to 
liquidate the bases of Gagauz-Yeri autonomy, the leaders of Gagauz-Yeri have actually 
started to prepare for the realization of a referendum concerning the status of autonomy in 
Moldova’s structure and the principles of its relations with the central authority of the 
Republic of Moldova. The law project regarding the modifications and amendments to 
the Constitution of the RМ concerning the status of Gagauz-Yeri, developed in Comrat 
was brought for wide public discussion. 
 
Appearance of these documents in Chisinau was considered as the actual beginning of 
preparation for a referendum on the form of self-determination of Gagauz people. The 
first attempt to acquaint a maximal number of inhabitants of Gagauz-Yeri with the 
contents of some clauses of the law project was carried out by the political newspaper 
"Gagauz Halki" ("Gagauz people") which was issued for three years on the Tiraspol 
polygraph base and distributed by ten-thousand copies within the TAU. The project 
stipulates the introduction of such concepts as "Gagauz citizen" and "Gagauz Republic". 
It also foresees that Gagauz-Yeri has the right to "independently solve its administrative-
territorial matters", and has an "exclusive right" – to separate from the Republic of 
Moldova based on a general referendum. 
 
Obviously, such activity of Gagauz management caused counteraction from the part of 
official Chisinau. 
 
Moldova’s central mass media carried a campaign against Gagauz-Yeri management 
during January - February 2002. Official Chisinau accused the leaders of Gagauz-Yeri of 
separatism, of cooperation with Transdniestria and of criminal offenses. V. Voronin's 
administration initiated a movement for resignation of the head (Bashkan) of Gagauz-
Yeri Dmitry Croitor, this movement was headed by pro-Chisinau deputies from the  
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National Assembly of Gagauz-Yeri as well as by some heads of Gagauz cities, members 
of the CPRM. 
 
A group of pro-Voronin deputies of Gagauz-Yeri National Assembly led by I.Kristioglo 
and I. Topal declared in February 2002 in Gagauz-Yeri, upon direct support from official 
Chisinau about the preparations for realization of a referendum concerning the 
resignation of the head of local executive authority Dmitry Croitor according to the 
reveals made by the Moldovan Court of Accounts regarding financial infractions depicted 
in his activity.  
 
The Bashkan itself and the leaders of the National Assembly have declared this decision 
as not legitimate and contradicting a number of laws of the independent - territorial 
district (Gagauz-Yeri).  
 
Nevertheless, the president of Moldova Vladimir Voronin, and the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs called the Gagauz population to take part in the referendum in order to state 
democratically their attitude towards Gagauz management.  
 
Besides this, representatives of management of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the 
deputy minister of internal affairs Kulicitski) and of the Moldovan Service of Information 
and Security arrived in Comrat. They tried to displace the commander of Gagauz police. 
According to IA Olvia-press, a battalion of internal armies of special destination "Fulger" 
from Moldova was put in the condition of full alertness for incoming the Autonomy5.  
 
In the same time, the municipal police of Gagauz-Yeri (controlled by the Bashkan) was 
transferred to the amplified mode of service performance. The volunteers who arrived to 
the house of executive committee formed national teams, which were lead by workers of 
law enforcement bodies of Gagauz-Yeri.  
 
On February 24 the chief of legal protocol management NA of Gagauz-Yeri Ivan 
Burgudji, declared the referendum illegal and the activity of the Central elective 
commission as illegitimate, he withdrew from the last the documentation and the seals. 
From February 23-24, unknown persons stole the ballot box from the Electoral 
committee. Thus, the referendum appeared disturbed.  
 
Forces of Gagauz municipal police blocked the groups of operative forces of the 
Republican Ministry of Internal Affairs and sealed the rooms of the Security and 
Information Service of Moldova. Fortified posts of State Auto Inspection, of municipal 
police, carabineers and national teams were dislocated on all entrances in Gagauz-Yeri.  
 
                                                          
5 Press-release of the IA “Olvia-press// Citation from the Bulletin published by the Research Center on 
Civil Society Problems, - №2, 2002, page.7  
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As the chairperson of the National Assembly of Gagauz-Yeri Michael Kendigelean has 
declared, it is necessary to return the matter regarding legitimacy of the activity of 
executive authority into legality. Presently the Gagauz-Yeri management entirely 
supervises the situation in the Autonomy. 
 
In the context of the aggravating Gagauz-Yeri crisis, the ambassadors of France and 
Turkey, the head of the diplomatic corps of USA and Germany (Pamela Smith and 
Michael Zikirik), representatives of OSCE mission in Moldova, the Congress of local and 
regional authority of the Council of Europe visited the Autonomy.  
 
The situation of Gagauz-Yeri has interested as well "the Venetian commission" of the 
Council of Europe. However, formally, the arrival of its delegation headed by the general 
secretary Janni Buccicho had a scheduled character and was carried out upon invitation 
of the Moldovan Parliament, its real reason was determined by the latest events in the 
Autonomy. The commission arrived in Moldova in order to estimate the project of 
amendments in the Constitution of the Republic, according to which Gagauz-Yeri will 
receive the constitutional right for existence (until now the ТAU Gagauz-Yeri existed as 
an unconstitutional unit). 
 
A struggle developed around access to the commission: Chisinau tried to limit delegates’ 
communication only to the Gagauz deputies loyal to Chisinau. However, management of 
Gagauz-Yeri National Assembly and the Bashkan had negotiations with representatives 
of the Venetian commission.  
 
Such international activity supporting the present management of Gagauz-Yeri has 
resulted in that the president of the RМ “backed into the shadow” again. However, the 
leaders of the RM carry out a regrouping of forces both in Gagauz-Yeri, and in Chisinau 






Aggravation of the conflict between Chisinau and Tiraspol 
 
The aspiration of present Moldovan authority to achieve qualitative shifts in settlement of 
the Transdniestrian conflict comes first of all from the desire of the Communist Party of 
Republic Moldova (CPRM) to receive significant political dividends as the party “of 
unifiers of the country”, and also to change significantly the structure of the Moldavian 




Besides this, the success of the economic efforts of official Chisinau depends on the 
results of relations settlement with Tiraspol. So, the realization of the most promising 
economic projects for Moldova in the sphere of transport communications (transport 
corridors to Europe using the Danube - zone of Reni - Galati - Giurgiulesti) and power 
engineering (reconstruction of the left-bank Moldavian district power station, integration 
of the RM in the unique Ukrainian - Russian power system, export of electric power to 
the Balkan countries) will be possible only after settlement of the Transdniestrian crisis. 
 
However, the specificity of modern relations between Chisinau authority and 
Transdniestrian administration in the political, as well as in the economic sphere 
practically excludes the probability to achieve in the near future any significant positive 
results in the process of Transdniestrian crisis settlement. 
 
In particular, the essential reduction of the amount of export-import transactions of the 
Transdniestrian enterprises caused by the introduction of new customs regulations on the 
Ukrainian border, performed by Chisinau on September 1, 2001, as well as the 
application of new customs seals, determines for a half-year a negative atmosphere of 
further contacts between the representatives of these parties3. 
 
Tiraspol management might avoid partly the negative consequences of such actions of 
Chisinau, trying, at least, to simulate readiness for the establishment of more constructive 
relations with the Moldovan government. Nevertheless, I. Smirnov during the last months 
obviously aspired to keep pressure in the relations with V. Voronin, keeping thus a 
“security distance” from Chisinau leaders.  
 
                                                          
3 According to the official data from the Commission on coordination of activity of the state administrative 
bodies of Transdniestria (established after introduction of seals), total economic losses incurred by 




Maintaining an image of a country leader, who found himself in a situation of economic 
blockade, is favorable to I. Smirnov. Tiraspol uses the pause in the negotiations with 
Chisinau. Such tactics operated by I. Smirnov actually caused absence of progress in the 
Moldavian-Transdniestrian dialogue, resulting in which Tiraspol continues to accuse 
Chisinau of violation of the arrangements achieved earlier.  
 
From its part, the Moldovan government does not try to veil the “anti-Transdniestrian” 
orientation of customs innovations, continuing to specify, that “Transdniestria is a 
residence to numerous mafia clans”, whose basic profit sources are export operations, 
smuggling of fuel, tobacco, weapons, drugs and “trafficked persons” 4.  
 
It is obvious that presently the economic sanctions are directed first of all against the 
leader of the Transdniestrian region. In the same time, Chisinau leadership does not hide 
its interest in establishing control over the big industrial targets of Transdniestria. In 
particular, the Moldovan prime minister V. Tarlev foresees the following development of 
events: “... first of all replacement of customs seals, then common customs with Ukraine 
on the perimeter of Transdniestrian border segment, after that - registration of 
Transdniestrian enterprises in Chisinau and as a result payments in the budget of the 
Republic of Moldova by economic agents of the left-bank of Dniester...” Nevertheless, 
“the customs blockade” of the left-bank areas of Moldova hardly appears effective as 
means of fighting against smuggling, as the shadow business does not use customs seals. 
 
On the eve of presidential elections in Transdiestria, the Moldovan president declared 
that he would attempt to change the Transdiestrian leader, who “is exhausted as a 
politician”. “The experience of previous meetings with Smirnov showed that there are no 
results of negotiations with him or with his entourage”, - declared V. Voronin. Official 
Chisinau declared the elections of December 9, 2001 as illegal and called the 
international society to avoid contacts with the regime of I. Smirnov and no to send any 
observers to the elections. 
 
In the same time I. Smirnov, the leader of Transdiestria declared, that “in case of re-
election, he will negotiate with the president of the Republic of Moldova, with Voronin, 
or whoever else”. The leader of Transdiestria intends to obtain during these negotiations 
“the creation of a common state, in which two independent subjects with equal rights – 
Moldova and Transdiestria will enter”. 
 
After the elections in Transdiestria the negotiating process between Tiraspol and 
Chisinau practically stopped. The president V. Voronin admitted the fact of lack of 
understanding with the Transdniestrian leadership. The declarations of intermediary-
countries Russia and Ukraine have not activated the negotiating process. 
                                                          
4 In 2001 Transdniestria exported goods for the amount of over 230 million USD  
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“The Russian factor” in the Transdniestrian conflict settlement 
 
Russia has a special influence in the development of the Transdniestrian situation and 
over solving the existent problems. Kremlin’s policy regarding Moldova in general and 
within the framework of the Transdniestrian settlement is based on the fact that 
Transdniestria represents a “key” to Moldova. Without the restoration of Moldova’s state 
integrity upon coming to the power of communists the Russian Federation will not be 
able to use the full potential of the increasing pro-Russian feelings on the banks of the 
Dniester river, because status quo to the Transdniestrian matter will mean emergence of 
“double standards” in Moscow’s actions towards Moldova. This, at its turn, will disturb 
the confidence of the present Moldovan leadership towards Russia. 
 
Moreover, the successful settlement of the conflict, from Kremlin’s point of view, 
determines the status of the Russian troops on the Moldovan territory, as well as the 
degree of Russia’s approaching the instability zone in the Balkans and its level of 
influence on the development of the situation in this area5. 
 
The uniting of the economic systems of the Republic of Moldova and of Transdniestria 
will have certain positive outcomes for the Russian Federation, especially through: 
 
- establishment of necessary conditions for export of electrical power to the Balkans 
after reconstruction of the Moldovan district power station with Russia’s participation; 
- reduction of prices on the Russian foodstuffs market due to the output of Moldovan 
agricultural production on the Russian market; 
- maintenance of appropriate functioning of the transportation corridors through the 
Republic of Moldova, which may additionally lower the costs of Russian transportations 
in case of expansion of opportunities of the Danube ports of Reni and Galati. 
 
Besides the existence of various approaches in the Russian political sphere regarding the 
Transdniestrian conflict settlement, Kremlin will probably consider the following first of 
all: 
 
• The status of Transdniestria may not be lower than the status of a subject of a 
federation, which will allow the region to have a certain influence over the 
policy of the country; 
• There exists a self-sufficient administration on the left bank of the river, which 
will attempt to preserve its status. The basic impediment to the normalization 
of relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol is actually the present leadership of 
Transdniestria. 
                                                          
5 Moldova’s dependency on the Russian gas is easily perceptible. Over a half of the energetic resources are 
imported to Moldova from the Russian Federation. Out of 1.2 milliard USD of foreign debt, about a half is 
the debt of Moldova to “Gasprom”. Moreover, this is about two times more than the amount of yearly 
national budgetary income. 
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Tiraspol represented until recently the advanced post of the Russian Federation in the 
region, however along with coming to power of V. Voronin in the Republic of Moldova 
the situation changed radically. The positions of Transdniestria were undermined, the 
political weight of I. Smirnov and his influence in Moscow appeared on a lower level 
than that of the president of the Republic of Moldova V. Voronin. Moreover, the 
positions of V. Voronin augmented as a result of signing the agreement between the 
Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova on November 19, 2001. 
 
The amplification of V. Voronin’s positions in Kremlin are confirmed by the declaration 
of the first vice-minister on foreign affairs V. Trubnikov, who declared to “Interfax”, that 
Russia does not consider the elections in Transdniestria as legitimate, “from the point of 
view of international law they do not have any lawful foundation”. The Transdniestrian 
Republic, according to Russia, is a “self-declared territory”. 
 
However, there was no official declaration made by the Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs regarding this matter. According to the deputy of State Duma of the Russian 
Federation V. Alksnis, based on the decision taken by State Duma of the RF on 
November 27, 2001, signed by the vice-speaker L. Slizka, the Russian parliament 
officially sent its observers to the Transdniestrian elections.  
  
Thus, the declaration of V. Trubnikov may represent the official position of the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which “corresponds to the norms of international law”, but 
does not correspond to Kremlin’s feelings. However, experts consider that the only fact 
of appearance of such declaration proves the attempt of consolidation of Chisinau, and 
Moscow’s effort to play up to Voronin. 
 
I. Smirnov won the presidential elections, getting 80% of the votes from a total of 65% of 
Transdniestria electors, who showed up on December 9, 2001 to vote. The majority of 
analysts forecasted I. Smirnov’s persuasive victory. No other alternative candidate had 
sufficient support from the population of Transdniestria. 
 
However, on the December meeting of OSCE in Bucharest the US State Secretary C. 
Powell mentioned that Russia achieved success in a number of regional security matters. 
Especially, he pointed out the progress in Moldova, with which Moscow came to an 
agreement regarding the matters of withdrawal of military equipment. At its turn, 
Washington is ready to offer Russia 14 million USD for these undertakings. 
 
This type of event development will determine Tiraspol’s opposition, which does not 
agree to care the role of the passive observer and will strive to re-acquire the role of an 
equal-rights participant in the negotiating process.  The dissatisfaction of a part of 
Transdniestrian leadership by Moscow’s position regarding the possibilities of conflict 
settlement will determine the withdrawal of Transdniestrian political forces from the pro-
Russian orientation to the activization of relationships with other partners, first of all with 
Ukraine. 
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It is possible that this, particularly, caused the precipitate political declarations made by 
Chisinau regarding the Ukrainian customs policy on the Ukrainian-Transdniestrian 
border soon after signing the Moldovan-Russian Major Agreement. Moldova answered 
the note of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated on November 29, 2001 only 
on December 5, fact which witnesses the complicated agreement processes within the 
Moldovan authority. Moreover the Moldovan note, along with the declaration that 
“Moldova appreciates the role of Ukraine in the process of settlement of the 
Transdniestrian conflict”, carries the regret, that the Ukrainian party “continues to allow 
transportation of goods through the state border without any effective customs 
documentation” and demands “to immediately cease this practice”. 
 
Under such scenario of events development it is impossible to exclude, that such behavior 
of the Moldovan leadership might have been the manifestation of Kremlin’s 
dissatisfaction towards Ukraine’s policy in this region, rather than own manifestation. 
 
 
Weakening of the “Romanian factor” in the Transdniestrian settlement 
 
Lately the relationships between Moldova and Romania are characterized by certain 
coldness. The Romanian prime-minister A. Nastase while carrying out the forum on the 
Central-European Initiative has disagreed to translations in the “Moldovan language”. He 
declared that there is only one language - “the Romanian language”. The Romanian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent an official note to the official Chisinau regarding the 
refusal of Moldovan state bodies to register the Bessarabian Metropolitan Church of the 
Romanian Orthodox Church. The idea of protection of the Romanian citizens, dwelling in 
Moldova becomes increasingly pressing in the Romanian parliamentarian circles.  
 
At the end of the last year the senator of the National-Liberal Romanian Party A. Radu 
proposed to the Romanian senate to hold a meeting with the participation of the president 
and of the minister of foreign affairs in order to determine the basic directions of 
Romania’s policy regarding Moldova. Correspondingly, to the senator’s declaration, the 
catalysis of Bucharest activity should be the rapprochement of the new Moldovan 
leadership to the Russian Federation.  
 
It is not clear yet how Bucharest’s fears can emerge regarding the fate of the pro-
Romanian driven citizens of Moldova. The politicians of the right wing insist upon the 
active participation of the Romanian administration in all negotiations regarding the 
Republic of Moldova, even to the allocation of minimal credits by the international 
financial organizations. 
 
In the same time, one might observe a certain synchronizing of unfriendly actions 
regarding Ukraine in Romania and Moldova with submission of accusations and appeals 
to the European community. Such synchronization of actions, possibly, testifies not only 
the existence of certain agreements between Chisinau and Bucharest, but also the 
existence of common interests, even situational, based on which Moldova and Romania 
might form a coalition against Ukraine.  
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The role played by Ukraine in the process of settlement of the Transdniestrian 
conflict 
 
The particularities of the situation in the Transdniestrian region require appropriate 
attention from Kiev. Along with military-political factors, the problem carries as well the 
humanitarian and economic component.  
 
The population of Transdniestria counts 600 thousand, from which 28% are Ukrainian 
(40% are Moldovan and 25 % are Russian). In the conditions of propagation of modern 
administrative-legal norms of the center over Transdniestria, there might appear problems 
with ensuring of informational and cultural-human necessities for the Ukrainians and 
Russians.  
 
Besides this, compared to Transdniestria, the process of state construction is significantly 
slowed down in Moldova, related to the change of state administration. 
 
As a matter of fact, after chronic political crisis the communists have to prove at least 
their ability to govern effectively in the framework of the existent political system. For 
comparison the indices of social-economic development of both banks of the Dniester 
River demonstrate not in favor of Moldova (starting with the year 1996, GDP per capita 
in Moldova was 1.5-2 times lower than in Transdniestria). Transdniestria takes the lead 
over the Republic of Moldova in the formation of its own, including political identity7. 
As a result, the idea of uniting Transdniestria to Ukraine becomes increasingly popular 
among Transdniestrian Ukrainians, probably as a result of an increasing political 
influence of the Union of Ukrainians of Transdniestria. 
 
From the pragmatic point of view, further inhibition of transportation flows, as well as 
non-observance by Transdniestrian partners of contractual obligations towards the 
Ukrainian partners, will lead to significant under-collection of profits from work with 
Transdniestrian economic agents by Ukraine.  
 
The amount of foreign trade turnover between Ukraine and Moldova (including 
Transdniestria) in the year 2000 increased compared to the year 1999 by 43.4% and 
represented 211.6 million USD (including exports – 176.3 million USD, and imports – 
53.3 million USD). During the last 9 months the amount of foreign trade turnover 
between these countries increased by 56.7% compared to the respective period of the last 
year and amounted to 231.4 million USD, including export of Ukrainian goods to 
Moldova – 190.6 million USD, import – 40.8 million USD. Moldova places second after 
Russia regarding exports of Ukrainian goods.  
                                                          
7 According to the data coming from social questioning (which was performed in November 2001 by 
“IMA-Consulting”, Russian Federation, Moscow), a part of the inhabitants of Transdniestria, who consider 
themselves first of all citizens of Transdniestria, make up 34.9% (13.9% consider themselves inhabitants 
“of their locality”), while only 4.4% of the respondents consider themselves citizens of the Republic of 
Moldova, as they are practically for the international community. 
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The amount of foreign trade turnover of Transdniestria with Ukraine for the first half of 
the last year amounted to 34.1 million USD, to Ukraine were exported goods evaluated at 
4.1 million USD and goods imported from Ukraine were evaluated at 30 million USD. 
 
About 30 Transdniestrian enterprises maintain economic contacts with over 55 big 
Ukrainian enterprises. The biggest part of import-export operations is carried out by the 
Moldovan Metallurgic Plant (MMP) in the town of Rybnitsa, which during the last year 
purchased raw materials amounted to over 25 million USD from Ukraine. 
 
Every month the MMP acquires from Ukraine 50 to 60 tons of scrap metal. The Rybnitsa 
complex monthly sends 75 thousand tons of scrap metal through the Ukrainian ports.  
 
It is not rational for Ukraine to carry out an economic blockade versus Transdniestria 
(transfer into Moldova’s treasury of payments resulting from customs operations by 
Transdniestrian enterprises will finally result in weakening the economic “independency” 
of Transdniestria) because of: 
 
• Increasing instability in Transdniestria will negatively influence the economy 
of Ukraine; will lead to an increasing instability at the Moldovan-Ukrainian 
border, first of all in the northern districts of Transdniestria, where indigenous 
Ukrainian population dwells; will generate flows of refugees and forced 
immigrants from Transdniestria to Ukraine; 
• Weakening the relations with Transdniestria may negatively influence the 
international image of Ukraine, it will “allow” the other countries to speculate 
on the Ukrainian topic, to press over Ukrainians’ rights. 
 
Ukraine, in the role of an intermediary-country looses the initiative in the process of 
normalization of the regional situation, especially considering that V. Voronin, often uses 
more radical and straightforward methods of entertaining the “dialogue” with the 
Tiraspol administration. 
 
Absence of the Ukrainian party from the meeting regarding settlement of the 
Transdniestrian conflict, which took place on April 20 of the current year in Vienna, was 
appreciated unanimously by the western analysts as Kiev’s elimination from the 
negotiating process. It was not taken into consideration that the topic of Vienna 
consultations was not the political settlement of the conflict but the matter of withdrawal 
of armed forces and military equipment belonging to the Russian Federation from 
Transdniestria, - this was not considered as basis for carrying out of negotiations without 
the Ukrainian party. 
 
The exchange of notes of protest between Ukraine and Moldova, regarding “the tolerant 
attitude” of Kiev regarding “Transdniestrian smuggling” and evasion from establishment 
of common customs, shows Chisinau’s tendency to eliminate Ukraine from the 
negotiating process in Transdniestria by all means. First of all, in 1996, as a result of the 
negotiations between Tiraspol and Chisinau, Transdniestria received the right to perform  
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independent customs control8. Secondly, Ukraine possesses the practice when presence of 
customs seals on the goods crossing the Ukrainian customs border, is not compulsory. 
This is not solely a Ukrainian practice, in this way Ukraine works with many other 
countries. 
 
Taking into consideration the specific character of the situation, which arose as a result of 
customs securing, introduced on September 1, 2001 by the Republic of Moldova; 
however, Ukraine is obliged to allow cargos not showing signs of smuggling or any other 
criminal origin. This does not conflict with the norms of international law. Moldova did 
not yet offer an answer to Ukraine regarding the documents of international law, which 
official Kiev violated, according to Chisinau’s opinion. 
 
Regarding the matter of establishment of common customs, Moldova and Ukraine have 
elaborated different approaches regarding the technology of establishment of these 
common admission points. The Ukrainian side considers that the reason for the creation 
of common checkpoints is ease of crossing the border for people and merchandise, this is 
exactly how common checkpoints function in all the countries of the world, who agree 
upon such action. The Ukrainian approach is exactly like this.  
 
However, Moldova intentionally politicizes the customs matter trying to press over 
official Kiev in order to eliminate it from the negotiating process concerning 
Transdniestria.  
 
The complexity and dynamism of the situation determines Ukraine to elaborate the 
strategy of Ukrainian-Moldovan political relationships taking the format of Kiev-
Tiraspol-Chisinau. The components of this strategy may become the following: 
 
 1. Observance of the “five-side” format for carrying out of negotiations. This position 
was supported during the meeting of representatives of Ukraine, of the Russian 
Federation and of OSCE on November 22, 2001 in Prague.  
 2. Effectiveness when working with the Ukrainian Diaspora in Moldova. It is 
necessary to carry out an active cultural and informational policy in the region aiming to 
increase influence over compatriots, dwelling on Moldovan territory (including 
Transdniestria) and Romania. Especially to elaborate rationally a complex of measures of  
state (material and informational) support to the Ukrainian schools, lyceums, Sunday 
schools, cathedras of Ukrainian language and literature. To offer assistance to the 
Ukrainian language publications and bureaus of local TV and radio companies. In the 
same time, Ukraine needs to contribute to the development of initiatives of the 
Moldovan, Romanian and Gagauz Ukrainians. Kiev has to stimulate its work regarding 
assuring the rights of the national minorities to cultural and society development. 
                                                          
8 Memorandum on the principles of cooperation between the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria from 
1997, signed by Ukraine and Russia. In May of the year 2001 Chisinau and Tiraspol confirmed the 
previous agreement, including the matter regarding the necessity to organize a common Moldovan-




3. Creation of the informational center of the Ukrainian community in Moldova (with 
a branch in Tiraspol), which should have a double connection – to propagate information 
on Ukraine, and to offer materials regarding the Ukrainians living in the region. It is 
necessary to contribute to the creation of similar centers for the Moldovan, Romanian and 
Gagauz communities. 
4. Observing the formula of “multi-level diplomacy” with Chisinau, Tiraspol and 
Comrat. Especially the initiatives of the local Ukrainian administrations, which are 
located on the border with Transdniestria and Moldova, should receive comprehensive 
support, directed to deepening the economic cooperation. To establish the activity of the 
functioning consultation offices of the local heads of the frontier districts of Ukraine, 
Moldova (including Transdniestria and Gagauz-Yeri).  
5. Utilization of the special role of the “euro-regions” (“Lower Danube” and other) in 
which Ukraine, Romania and Moldova take part. Within this framework the frontier 
cooperation may be extended, and cooperation in the cultural and social spheres might be 
deepened etc. The Euro regions contribute to more transparent international relationships 
in every participant-country of the “euro-region” (regular monitoring, meetings at the 
level of public organizations). 
6. Influence of weakening the Transdniestrian blockade and settlement of the conflict 
situation in Gagauz-Yeri. Ukraine loses important profits from introduction by Moldova 
in September of the last year of the new customs regulation and implementation of the 
practically economic blockade to Transdniestria. Kiev has already proven the firmness 
regarding organization of the common Ukrainian-Moldovan customs. Further 
negotiations with Moldova on this matter are possible only upon V. Voronin’s readiness 
to hold a dialogue, but not to transfer his internal problems over the Ukrainian-Moldovan 
mutual relations.  
7. Wide discussion regarding the future status of Transdniestria and Gagauz Yeri 
considering that more than 100 thousand Ukrainians live in Transdniestria, while an 
important Moldovan, Romanian and Gagauz Diaspora exists in Ukraine. Such discussion 
will allow to reveal groups of politicians, non governmental organizations, 
representatives of mass media in Moldova (in Transdniestria and Gagauz Yeri), in the 
Russian Federation, in Romania and in countries of the European Union which might act 
as Ukraine’s  partners in the settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict, in the creation of 
the regional stability system. In the same time, the discussion will allow the formation of 
a certain community idea within Ukraine itself. 
 
Such discussion might take place on different levels, along with attracting leading experts 
from Ukraine, Russia, Romania, Europe and Moldova.  
 
The first level of discussion – is the organization at the state level of conferences and of 
seminars with the participation of experts, businesspersons, politicians and public 
officials. 
 
The second level of discussion – discussing the situation in the region by the 
representatives of political parties, of public organizations of Ukraine, Russian Federation, 
Moldova (with the participation of representatives of Transdniestria and Gagauz-Yeri),  
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Romania and elaboration of recommendations; seminars on border cooperation; thematic 
conferences (ecology, social problems etc.) 
 
The public organizations, having an influence over the community’s opinion and the state 
authority bodies might act as initiators within the framework of organizing the second 
level of discussion.  
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The Indirect Impact of Increasing Border Security 
G.Chiorean, Programme Co-ordinator, IPP, Bucarest, Romania 
 
 
Deep changes that took place in the Republic of Moldova and Romania during the last 
dozen of years, especially those related to the shift to market economy, included 
important administrative reforms aimed – in part – at facilitating free trade and 
population flow through borders that once used to be under very strict control. 
 
The geo-political condition of this region was deeply influenced during these years by 
major changes – the former Socialist countries focused on political, economic and social 
changes, new states emerged pursuant to the collapse of the former Federative Republic 
of Yugoslavia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moldova being one of them. 
National development plans, strategies, doctrines re-focused their strategic objectives and 
the relations with international organizations and institutions were reconsidered, 
according to the new context. Traditional trade directions changed, new borders appeared 
and new customs units were established. 
 
Some of the bodies with customs authority and responsibilities are relatively new, others 
have to adapt their operations to fully new procedures, based on or inspired from – by 
and large – models used in the European Union. Many current partners of the national 
agencies operating at our borders claim, though, that their performance is poor: border 
traffic is hampered by long queuing periods and one has to “slalom” through all agencies, 
which, by the way, increases international shipping services costs and makes trade 
impossible to foresee, customs dues collection is not always optimal, corruption and 
smuggling are popular with customs staff yet. 
 
All these flaws condition trade hampering and have macroeconomic effects similar to 
those caused by protectionist policies, they discourage initiatives meant to increase 
competitiveness and discourage direct investments. 
 
Difficulties at border crossing are related to: 
 
• infrastructure and equipment 
• legislation 
• organization and management 
• informatization level 
• staff training and motivation (especially related to wages) 
• inter-institutional cooperation 
 
Though there are programs funded either from local sources or from international ones 
that have attempted during all these years to find solutions to some of the issues listed 
above, their practical impact is limited, especially due to the lack of coordination among 
such projects and the lack of a clear global border reform strategy, as all activities were 
focused on some border authority, while an integrating approach is needed, given the  
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need for cooperation between national agencies and between national agencies and their 
counterparts in other countries. 
 
This narrow approach is gradually replaced by programs that take into account more 
general aspects of border activities, including trans-border cooperation, aiming at better 
cooperation and introducing compatible efficient up-to-date work practices. 
 
Given this background, as the expected date of Romania’s acceding the European Union 
gets closer, the natural question to be asked is what the impact of integration will be like 
and, further on, what impact will have Romania’s acceding upon the relationships 
between Romania and the Republic of Moldova. Repeated political assertions were aired 
regarding the future of the two countries given the expanding of the European Union; 
however, it is necessary to approach this topic in a realist study that would include both 
advantages and negative costs of integration. 
 
The decision that has brought an important change in the Eastern European region was 
taken at the Reunion of the Justice and Home Affairs Council of the European Union  on 
December 7, 2001, when it was decided to abolish visas for the Romanian citizens who 
wanted to travel to the Schengen zone, starting on January 1, 2002. It made Romania 
undertake new responsibilities and duties to ensure the internal security of the member 
states. Those who benefit from visas abolishment also have increased responsibilities, 
they must comply with the conditions agreed upon with the European Union. This 
decision of the European Union has great political significance and will as well have a 
major impact from the economic and social viewpoints. Due to the expanding of the 
European Union the external frontier of the Schengen zone will move eastwards and 
more restrictions for the free circulation of people from Central and Eastern Europe will 
be imposed. As the Eastern border of Romania becomes a Schengen frontier with 
Ukraine (649.4 km long – 273.8 km by land, 31.7 km – by sea, and 343.9 km – on 
Danube) and the Republic of Moldova (681.3 km long), in order to comply with EU 
requirements special attention should be paid to maintain regional integration as well, so 
that Romania’s integration into EU does not imply its marginalization and the break of 
social and economic connections with neighboring countries. Increased frontier security 
should not mean adopting measures that hamper the free circulation of people, but rather 
focus on preventing crimes and ensure compliance with legal provisions.  
 
The aim of maintaining the balance between candidate countries and third parties is 
currently one of the toughest challenges that might have a significant impact, especially 
from the economic viewpoint. Thus, it should be mentioned that recently the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of EU member states voted in favor of the proposals to establish new 
relations with Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, bearing in mind that these three countries 
will have common borders with UE members once Romania and Poland are admitted to 
EU. This initiative was approved because, in the opinion of EU member states, pursuant 
to EU expanding the European Community will face new issues at its Eastern border. In 
order to curb such issues related to transfrontier crime, trafficking, and illegal 
immigration, one of the solutions proposed by the UK was to give Moldova, Ukraine, and 
Belarus the “special neighbor status”, to be reviewed and defined by the European  
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Commission during the Danish Presidency, starting from July 2002. By providing the 
“special neighbor status” it is desired that the three states benefit from the liberalization 
of trade with the EU and cooperation related to justice, home affairs, security, and 
defense, with a view to apply economic and political reforms. 
 
However, it is certain that, in order to harmonize the negative list of Romania with that of 
the European Union, Romania has introduced mandatory visas for the citizens of Russia 
and Ukraine since the beginning of 2002, pursuant to the bilateral agreements that had 
been negotiated previously. As for the citizens of the Republic of Moldova, the 
requirement for mandatory visas will be in place from the moment when Romania joins 
the European Union. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the preferential 
relationship with the Republic of Moldova has determined Romania to provide a special 
regime, registered officially in the position document of the negotiation chapter #24 on 
justice and home affairs, and thus the citizens of the Republic of Moldova need no visa to 
enter Romania until it joins the EU, and one may cross the border between Moldova and 
Romania just by presenting the Moldovan passport.  
 
Double Moldo-Romanian citizenship is an issue that should be discussed separately, as 
the legislation of Romania and that of the Republic of Moldova disagree on this matter. 
In Romania legislation allows double citizenship, the Romanian state may give Moldovan 
citizens Romanian citizenship at request. The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova 
that came into force from August 27, 1994, however, sets forth in article #18 that “Except 
in those cases where international accords adhered to by the Republic of Moldova have 
different provisions, no citizen of the Republic of Moldova may be simultaneously a 
citizen of another country”. Besides, Law 5/1991 restricts the right to double citizenship. 
It conditions a number of issues both from the procedural viewpoint – e.g. the customs 
regime for the citizens of Moldova who are also citizens o Romania at the internal 
borders of the EU, and from the political viewpoint, i.e. the relations between Romania 
and the Republic of Moldova; the regulation of this issue is a major factor in the 
cooperation of the authorities in both countries. However, it should be pointed out that 
the people who have double – Romanian and Moldovan – citizenship may travel in the 
Schengen zone under the same conditions as Romanian citizens, as long as they comply 
with legislation. 
 
When it comes to transfrontier cooperation, another important factor is the collaboration 
within Euroregions. The increased globalization of world economy is a fundamental 
feature of the beginning of this millennium and it means that the trend to reduce and 
eliminate barriers between national economies and the intensification of relationships 
between countries under various forms is a significant characteristic of this process. In 
order to strengthen cooperation between Romania, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine 
were established the Euroregions “Upper Prut” (September 22, 2000) and “Lower 
Danube” (August 14, 1998). The activities of the Euroregions so far have focused on 
establishing a joint framework to develop a calendar of tripartite meetings for information 
and documentation regarding issues of common interest, including high level meetings, 
on consulting and coordinating matters related to environment protection, small trade 
facilitation in adjacent zones, including by arranging new international customs units, on  
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initiating joint appeals to international economic and financial organizations to ensure the 
funding of projects of common interest, agreed upon by means of tripartite cooperation, 
on collaborating and developing a plan of measures to fight organized crime, terrorism, 
illegal trafficking of weapons and forbidden substances, illegal migration, and illegal 
border crossing.  
 
Euroregions were established as zones for joint project initiatives that would meet 
regional needs and objectives that can be achieved with the contribution of more than one 
country, they have the role of encouraging cooperation between different social levels in 
different countries. Euroregions mirror the level of cooperation of countries at the 
national level, they initiate a wide range of projects that are developed in a way that 
would emphasize the advantages of each participating country, as well as to make 
participants aware of the values, advantages, and liabilities while implementing joint 
projects. Frontiers that separate the three countries that participate in the regions 
mentioned above are not a real barrier in promoting joint actions, and the securization of 
the Romanian frontier does not aim at blocking the flow of goods, people, ideas or 
collaboration initiatives, but rather at facilitating any type of exchanges under the 
conditions of full safety and transparency. 
 
One of the major factors in fighting transfrontier crime is the signing by Romania and the 
Republic of Moldova of the Agreement of the Re-Admission of Foreigners. In order to 
apply the provisions of the Agreement both countries must accept the foreigners, 
including stateless persons, who, when coming directly from their national territories, 
cross the frontier illegally or are illegal residents of the country that is a party to the 
Agreement. Concerned authorities, both in Romania and the Republic of Moldova, have 
repeatedly alerted the Governments of their countries that, under current conditions, 
disagreements had arisen repeatedly between Moldovan and Romanian authorities, due to 
the insufficient regulation of this issue. Currently, the Agreement has been ratified by the 
Parliaments of both countries. The provisions of the Agreement are important for 
securing the people flow between the two countries, and the application of its provisions 
should start without further delay.  
 
Given the increased illegal migration rate, the European Commission has expressed its 
concern and proposed recently a number of measures on integrated frontier management 
in order to strengthen the external frontiers and the idea that the freedom of circulation 
does not mean decreased safety for the citizens of member countries. "External borders of 
the European Union are sometimes viewed, reasonably or not, as the weak link, affecting 
the internal security of the Union, especially when it comes to the EC space where 
internal frontiers have been abolished. Besides, by the results of all opinion polls 
regarding EU expanding, the population has repeatedly drawn our attention toward the 
need to maintain or even to increase the internal security level within the Union”, stated 
in a press release in early May 2002 António Vitorino, the Commissioner for Justice and 
Home Affairs.110 
                                                          
110 Press-release: Towards Integrated Management of the External Borders of the Member States 
of the European Union, DN: IP/02/661, Bruxelles, May 7, 2002 (unofficial translation from 
Romanian) 
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On the long term, the new vision proposed to increase frontier control will impact 
directly the Eastern frontier of Romania with Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, i.e. 
stricter control, mandatory procedures, re-shaping the framework, as well as procedures 
for small frontier trafficking, increased attention being paid to operational consultancy 
and cooperation mechanisms, risk evaluation and staff training. Current restrictions, as 
well as potential new requirements on frontier security must be understood as a natural 
need aimed at increasing security within the Union. However, the indirect impact should 
not be overseen, especially regarding the goods and people flows. Thus, it is to be noted 
that a specific outcome of establishing the new border regime at the Romanian frontier 
will be the slight decrease of the legal people and goods flow from the Republic of 
Moldova. 
 
Romania was visited last year by about 5 million foreigners, i.e. the inflow decreased by 
6.2% compared to 2000. This evolution can be explained by the decreased number of 
foreigners coming from the Republic of Moldova – because the requirement on passport-
based entry to Turkey, Greece, and Switzerland was introduced since July 2001. From the 
viewpoint of the total number of foreigners entering Romania, the largest shares have 
Hungary (22.9%), the Republic of Moldova (20.9%), Bulgaria (7.9%), Germany (6.6%), 
and Ukraine (6.6%). Most foreigners entered Romania using vehicles (3.62 million), 
airplanes (705,200), trains (476,300), and ships (135,100).111 
 
As for illegal migration, during the first months of 2002, 9.179 foreigners were not 
allowed to enter Romania, given improper travel papers – expired visas or passports, 
passports without entry visas, the unavailability of the mandatory minimal funds, false or 
counterfeit passports or visas, etc. Most foreigners in this category came from the 
Republic of Moldova – 5,074, Hungary – 1,935, and Ukraine – 794. Compared to the 
same period during the previous year, the number of foreigners who have been denied 
entry to Romania has increased by 31%. 
 
499 people leaving the country did not have proper documents, had false or counterfeit 
passports or visas, or were guides. Most foreigners who did not meet requirements for 
leaving Romania were citizens of the Republic of Moldova – 131, Turkey – 75, and 
Ukraine – 33. Compared to the same period of the previous year, the number of 
foreigners who have been refused to leave Romania increased vy about 23%.112 
 
As for economic issues, during the first quarter of 2002, Romania’s foreign trade was 
mostly focused on the European Union countries. Compared to the first quarter of 2001, 
export to the European Union increased by 3.4% and amounted to 71% of total export. 
Import increased as well compared to the same period of the previous year, by 1.3%, 
most import (57.5%) comes from the EU member states. It should be mentioned that 
import from countries undergoing transition decreased by 3.5% and amounts now to 
22.3% of total Romania’s import. The key partners importing to Romania during the first 
quarter of 2002 were Italy – 21%, Germany – 14.4%, Russia – 7.3%. As for Romania’s 
neighbors, Hungary exported to Romania 3.4%, Ukraine – 2.5%. Import from the  
                                                          
111 Source: Ministry of Tourism 
112 Source: Main Frontier Police Inspectorate  
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Republic of Moldova is insignificant, Moldova is not included in the list of 25 top 
importers to Romania; however, no major changes in Moldova’s export to Romania 
occurred, compared to the same period of the previous year.113  
 
This study covers some aspects that would be affected indirectly by the securization of 
the Romanian frontier; however, they should be taken into account both by the authorities 
of Romania, Moldova, and Ukraine and by European officials, in order to decrease the 
indirect impact of the Schengen customs regime upon common people in these countries, 
without affecting the internal securization of the European Union. Thus, a number of 
conclusions and recommendations should be made: 
 
Romania has decided not to require visas for the citizens of the Republic of Moldova 
until it is integrated into EU. This measure does not mean full freedom at the border or 
the abolishing of the requirements of customs control. For Romanian authorities, in their 
efforts to meet criteria for the integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures, this decision 
means the undertaking of outstanding liabilities, and local and central administration 
authorities should be well aware of that. However, the issuing of Schengen visas for 
Moldovan citizens – the so called visa-for-visa procedure, is an issue that impacts 
indirectly the situation at the Romanian border. Hence, a solution might be the facilitation 
of issuing Schengen visas for the citizens of the countries where there are no embassies 
or consulates of EU member countries, by establishing EU working offices for this matter 
or by introducing the possibility to get visa application forms by mail or email. 
 
The issue of increasing the security of the frontier between Romania and the Republic of 
Moldova does not only limit to the frontier line between these two countries. As long as 
no securization measures are undertaken, such threats as illegal transfrontier migration, 
weapons and drugs trafficking, organized crime will persist or even increase. It is urgent 
and critical to settle the issues related to the Eastern border of the Republic of Moldova, 
where it meets the border of Ukraine.  
 
The region to which belong Romania, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine faces a 
number of alarming issues, some of them may become a threat to the stability of the 
region. Undoubtedly, the solving of these issues cannot be the liability of one country, as 
long as human trafficking, vehicles, drugs, and weapons trafficking, to name the most 
dangerous ones, cross the borders of a country. Given insufficient communication 
between concerned authorities in every country, to implement in a sustainable manner the 
Schengen provisions and regulate the flow of goods and people an ongoing regular 
communication framework is a must for the concerned authorities involved in frontier 
matters. The objective of goods and people flow securization cannot be achieved if 
national authorities involved in frontier matters do not cooperate, do not exchange 
relevant information on a regular basis, and do not share the same vision on the border 
securization strategy with a view to increasing regional security. From this viewpoint, 
cooperation starts from specific pragmatic measures. It is needed that all institutions of 
the country contribute information and use a joint database with relevant data (especially 
data included in informational systems) that are updated all the time. From another  
                                                          
113 Source: Main Customs Directorate 
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viewpoint, institutional cooperation should aim at using control criteria applied to goods, 
people and vehicles crossing the border that are shared by all authorities, bearing in mind 
risk profiles defined by each authority (on different matters, e.g. illegal migration). The 
results of controls carried out at customs units by one authority should be available to all 
authorities involved in frontier matters, as well as the action plan for preventing such 
problems in future. 
 
As for the Euroregions to which Romania is a party (including Upper Prut and Lower 
Danube), they might be a proper framework for supporting regional cooperation by 
developing transfrontier programs. 
 
Given that both Romania and the Republic of Moldova face economic difficulties, in 
order to equip properly customs control units, so that they meet efficiency and budgetary 
efficacy requirements, joint customs control solutions might be feasible. To be specific, 
previous practices, e.g. mobile customs control teams that would service several customs 
units should be evaluated to see whether they will be suitable in future for the border 
between the two countries (and not only them). There are precedents of international 
support provided for needed acquisitions for implementing such solutions. 
 
Frontier securization relates to changing mentality, it should be viewed as a means to 
ensure free safe access of reliable people to other countries. The efforts to develop good 
relationships between concerned customs authorities that would follow modern principles 
of such activities and ensure the securization of the Romanian border, the facilitation of 
border crossing, and the strengthening of border control should be channeled towards a 
number of major directions: 
 
• agree upon operating procedures, or work jointly; 
• improve border cooperation between all national authorities and counterparts from the 
two countries; 
• improve information exchange between relevant services in both countries, within a 
systematic well-defined framework. 
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Smuggling as cross-border crime  
Col. V.Galca, head of division, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ph.D fellow 
 
 
Smuggling is one of the most serious infringements in the field of customs juridical 
relations, since its perpetration attempts to affect or in fact violates social values of a 
paramount importance for the public order and the legitimate interests of the citizens of 
the Republic of Moldova, as well as of foreigners and stateless persons that are under the 
jurisdiction of the Republic of Moldova. Smuggling brings to the following major 
consequences: 
 
1. Smuggling prejudices economic interests of a state, because relevant taxes and 
customs duties are not charged for these goods. 
2. Smuggling breaks up monopoly on foreign trade (in the fields where it still exists).        
3. A threat is posed on public security (in cases of smuggling of weapons, drugs, etc.).  
4. Through smuggling cumulated with fiscal evasion shadow economy is being 
maintained and expanded. 
5. Incrimination of smuggling is also necessary due to the state’s obligation not to 
infringe the rights and interests of its citizens (especially those in the customs field). 
6. Also we can add to the list of the reasons the fact that there is a number of 
international conventions and treaties, which ban international flows of certain substances 
(such as drugs, explosives, etc.). 
 
According to Articles 67 and 70 of the Penal Code (PC) of the Republic of Moldova, as 
well as to Article 46 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova the material object of 
smuggling must be confiscated. Yet, as practice shows, sometimes, smuggled goods are 
not confiscated. These problems are partially due to a rather complex procedure of 
application of Article 75 of the PC, namely to those norms that directly prescribe the 
confiscation of goods. Thus, both the new procedure and the one formulated in Law of 
10.IX.98, specify the confiscation of goods, objects and other valuables that are an 
object of smuggling, while paragraphs II – IV specify the confiscation of property. In this 
regard, a more specific cross-border crime is a contraband of electric power, which is a 
movable commodity and represents an economic value.  
 
An aspect that complicates difficult activities of counteraction and documentation of 
cross-border crimes is the factor of the breakaway Transnistrian region where the 
legitimate law enforcement and control bodies of the Republic of Moldova cannot fulfill 
their duties. Its geographical location at the border with the Ukraine, as well as foreign 
support of the anti-constitutional regime substantially facilitated a growing number of 
cases of smuggling committed by the business operators from this territory, as well as the 
use of this region by other economic agents. 
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In this regard, the competent bodies have revealed a series of schemes of smuggling. 
Some of the most simple are the following:  
 
I. A business operator that has no fiscal relationship with the budgetary system of the 
Republic of Moldova smuggles goods due to the fact that the border between the 
Transnistrian region and the Ukraine is absolutely transparent. Subsequently, these goods 
are divided in smaller lots and sold in the Transnistrian region or on the whole territory of 
the country without paying appropriate taxes and duties. 
II. A business operator that has tax relations with the budgetary system of the Republic of 
Moldova, and also has warehouses or juridical address in the Transnistrian region imports 
material goods. These goods are being received and afferent duties, which are smaller 
than those stipulated by the Law on the Budget of the Republic of Moldova are being 
paid. Subsequently, goods are sold to other business operators, often to phantom 
companies. 
III. A business operator imports raw materials (goods that in most cases are excisable) 
for being processed. Later on these raw materials are exported to foreign companies 
(phantoms), but material goods remain in the country and are sold in the Republic of 
Moldova according to the schemes mentioned above.  
 
In these cases the budget revenues of the Republic of Moldova are affected by the 
evasion from paying excise-duties, custom duties, value added taxes, income taxes of 
enterprises and individuals, the same refers to the Social Fund contributions. The money 
flowing from the cross-border crimes are being used for the maintenance of shadow 
economy, which, according to some surveys, is estimated at 40 – 60% of the share of the 
real economy.  
 
The geographical location of the country and the international treaties signed by the 
Republic of Moldova are used to their utmost by the delinquents operating in the 
Transnistrian region (and not only) while committing cross-border crimes. To prove this 
we are going to examine a felonious scheme. 
 
On the one hand, between the Republic of Moldova and Romania there are agreements 
that provide, among other things, for the import of goods without paying custom duties 
(“0” quota). On the other hand, between the Republic of Moldova and the CIS countries 
there have been concluded agreements, which provide for a “0” quota on the import of 
goods from these countries. 
 
By using this situation, a business operator from the Republic of Moldova imports 
furniture of Romanian origin that is in demand on the Moldovan and the CIS countries 
markets at a “0” quota. Meanwhile, there are being issued, by means of corrupting 
employees of the relevant institutions, documents that confirm the Moldovan origin of 
the furniture, which later on is exported to the CIS countries, thus being exempted twice 
from paying customs duties.  
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It is difficult to counteract the phenomenon of cross-border criminal activity when there 
is evidence of organized crime and particularly corruption and protectionism. In this 
regard, it is worrisome that the employees of the Customs Department who are expected 
to exercise correctly and fully their professional functions, and to contribute to the 
counteraction of these serious crimes, are paid a salary of about 400 lei (30 USD), while 
the minimum consumption basket is about 1200 lei.  
 
For the Republic of Moldova, the impact of smuggling as a phenomenon, is especially 
serious, taking into account the size of the country’s budget in comparison with budgets 
of other countries, in particular of the neighboring Romania and the Ukraine. It is 
important to mention the internationalization of smuggling expressed in the organization 
and carrying out of criminal groups activities not only within the country, but also 
beyond its borders.  
 
Thus, Moldova is part of the “southern-eastern group” – a group of states, which export 
poppy straw, Moldova being even one of the biggest suppliers in this regard. The share of 
this kind of smuggling in the overall smuggling volume increases. Among the reasons of 
this phenomenon, according to some sociological polls done in the CIS countries, are the 
following: 
 
- economic and political instability specific for the current situation; 
- insufficient material and technical endowment of appropriate institutions; 
- discrepancy between the legislation and the activities of the law enforcement bodies in 
this field. 
 
For the unification of the relevant provisions there can be mentioned several international 
convention and treaties in the field, such as: 
 
1) Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961. 
2) UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
of 19.12.1988. 
3) UN Resolution No. S – 17/2 adopted on the basis of the Special Committee Report at 
the eighteenth session.  
4) Kiev Agreement of 21.X.1998 on cooperation between the ministries of interior affairs 
in combating traffic in narcotic drugs. 
 
Based on these conventions the legislation of many states includes provisions that restrict 
trafficking of narcotic drugs and other substances of this group. Thus, the Penal Code of 
the Republic of Moldova, Article 75, paragraph II prohibits illegal trafficking of narcotic 
drugs, psychotropic, toxic, radioactive, poisoning, explosive substances, substances with 
strong effect and harmful wastes. 
 
With a view to combating smuggling and to reveal and prevent cases of corruption of 
customs and fiscal control authorities, police bodies take constant measures directed 
towards the intensification of control bodies activities at the customs offices and the joint 
fiscal offices in order. For instance, during the year 2000 the interior ministry units  
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disclosed 192 cases of smuggling (+ 58,9% comparing to the same period of 1999), 
losses being estimated at about 16 million lei (the current exchange rate is 1 USD = 13,5 
lei). Due to these actions, there have been compensated material prejudices in the amount 
of almost 11 million lei and confiscated goods worth of 3,41 million lei.  
 
Among the goods confiscated by the economic-financial police we should mention: 
 
- industrial goods – 8,3 million lei; 
- coffee – 2 million lei; 
- sugar – 1,2 million lei; 
- timber – 371 thousand lei; 
- diesel oil – 370 thousand lei; 
- petrol – 265 thousand lei; 
- alcohol – 176 thousand lei; 
- cigarettes – 175 thousand lei; 
- furniture – 175 thousand lei; 
- leather products – 173 thousand lei. 
 
Out of those 192 criminal cases, about 140 were brought before the court and the rest are 
either in the process of a preliminary examination, suspended or closed.  
 
In the same period of time the economic-financial police issued 112 administrative 
reports on the basis of Article 161, paragraph 2 (violation of the rules of purchasing, 
storage, commercialization or sales of material valuables), Article 193 (violation of 
customs rules), Article 152, paragraph 10 (transportation, storage or commercialization of 
goods without excise-duty stamps) of the Code on administrative infringements. On the 
basis of these administrative reports there have been paid fines in the amount of 245 
thousand lei and confiscated goods worth of 4 million lei. As a result of these 
administrative reports, there have been confiscated mainly excise goods: 
 
- petrol – 158,5 thousand liters, worth of 771 thousand lei; 
- diesel oil – 144,1 liters, worth of 552 thousand lei; 
- alcohol – 44403 liters, worth of 1 664 thousand lei. 
- Tobacco products - worth of 799,3 thousand lei. 
 
Fighting illicit trafficking of goods is a major problem in the process of consolidation of 
the fiscal discipline in the state and is the responsibility of the law enforcement and 
control bodies. Recently, there has appeared an alarming tendency among the law 
enforcement bodies of closing cases sued on the basis of Article 75 of the PC 
(Smuggling). The main reason of such decisions is the interpretation of the provision “… 
or associated with the failure to declare or false declaration in the customs papers or 
other documents required for passing the border…”. This fact needs the elaboration by 
the Customs Department of an instruction or regulation that would specify the procedure 
and order of declaring goods at the customs offices. 
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Activities of police bodies in the field of counteracting and preventing cases of 
smuggling and illicit trafficking of goods are not the most efficient ones due to the 
following reasons: 
 
1. Gaps that exist in the regulation of the procedure of paying income taxes and afferent 
taxes at the import of goods and services by business operators at the border customs 
offices. The current procedure, according to which the Customs Department issues a 
“Transport docket” for bringing of goods into the customs territory with the fulfillment 
of customs procedures within 72 hours indirectly stimulates smuggling. 
 
2. In accessing the Customs Department database in the process of documentation and 
accumulation of evidence in cases of smuggling and capture in flagrant delict of 
delinquents police bodies meet difficulties for different reasons, inclusively because the 
requested information is a commercial secret of business operators.  
 
3. Employees of the ministry of home affairs, in the process of documentation and 
investigation, of preliminary inquires, etc. meet difficulties in accessing the border offices 
where the employees of the Customs Department and the Border Guard Department 
fulfill their activities, sometimes of illegal nature. This is a flagrant violation of the 
provisions of the Law on police and of the Law on inquiry and investigation activities.  
 
Regarding the transportation across the country’s border of alcoholic products it is 
believed that for a more efficient fight against corruption, protection of the local market 
and reduction of smuggling there should be taken the following measures: 
 
- prohibition of import on the territory of the Republic of Moldova of ethyl alcohol by 
business operators without an advance payment of excise-duties and afferent taxes (the 
calculation of income taxes will be done on the basis of the documents of origin and 
invoices for goods before the introduction of alcohol into the country); 
- business operators that import ethyl alcohol for pharmaceutical purposes and for 
manufacturing perfumery items, exempted, according to Title III of the Fiscal Code, from 
paying indirect income taxes, have to pay excise-duties and afferent taxes before the 
introduction of alcohol into the country. The reimbursement of excise-duties and taxes 
will come from the State Budget after the local business operators confirm the production 
of the final merchandise. 
- at the export of alcoholic products a resident business operator will be asked to present 
to the Customs Department of the Republic of Moldova copies of customs declarations  
of the importing country that prove the conformity of the assortment, the cost and the 
volume of delivery with the real one, thus excluding cases of adding false data into the 
accompanying documents and this way of the evasion from paying income taxes. Fiscal 
institutions will require documents that acknowledge the receipt and fiscal evidence of 
the exported goods by the resident business operator of the importing country.  
- There should be undertaken measures with a view to establishing similar taxes for the 
import of oil-products and of other excise-duty goods applied in the whole country, 
inclusively in the transnistrian region, where the compulsory sums for the imported goods 
are lower (about 50% per 1 tone of petrol), the fact that stimulates illicit trafficking of  
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- these products through this region. Recently, the Parliament adopted the Law Nr. 461-
XV “On the oil-products market” and the Government adopted the Decision Nr. 1027 of 
02.10.2001 “On some measures of implementation of the Law on the oil-products 
market”. In this regard the ministry of home affairs elaborated a number of measures 
called to regulate the process of import, set up prices at retail sales adequate to the import 
prices of the oil-products, to combat smuggling and illicit trafficking of such products, 
fight against fiscal evasion and evasion from paying compulsory duties.  
 
The aforementioned modifications will make the local business operators to declare 
goods (products) and to pay all income taxes, duties and other payments at the border 
customs offices, the fact that will positively contribute to the full collection of these 
duties into the State Budget. At the same time, it will give the possibility to check goods, 
to discover and prevent illicit trafficking and smuggling. 
 
Another aspect of transborder crime is the illicit trafficking of human beings. The 
seriousness of this criminal activity lies in the fact that criminals accumulate huge 
amounts of money, violate states’ borders, contribute to the extension of the prostitution 
network, increase the number of persons that are not protected by the state and are used 
by criminal structures. The trafficked persons often hold forged identification documents, 
pretending to be citizens of other countries. For instance, the employees of the economic-
financial police have put an end to the illegal activity of the top management of one firm, 
which via Odessa (the Ukraine) and Chisinau airports intended, by corrupting appropriate 
persons, to illicitly traffic groups of 5 – 7 citizens of the Republic of Moldova to Portugal 





The criminal situation, inclusively in the field of combating cross-border crimes linked 
with corruption and protectionism are consequences of the following factors: 
 
- failures to implement reforms and mistakes made in this process, which in their turn 
favored criminalization of the economy, accumulation of the shadow capital and the 
appearance of the organized crime and of a rapid social differentiation; 
- inadequate legal basis for legal, control and supervision activities, personnel 
fluctuation, unsettled problems related to legal, technical, material and financial 
assistance; 
- transparency of the state’s border, the fact that generated a free entrance and 
movement of criminal elements in the country, the involvement of Moldova into the 
sphere of influence of international drug dealers, traffickers of weapons, munitions, 
explosive materials, counterfeit money and the securities; 
- activities of transnational and national communities using the territory, potential, 
resources and the citizens of Moldova in criminal interests;  
- corruption of public servants of the law enforcement and control bodies, increase of 
abuses and violations of law; 
133 
- juridical nihilism of the population, imprinting into the masses’ conscience of a 
stereotype of an illicit behavior, lack of confidence of the population in the ability of the 
law enforcement institutions to protect the interests of a person, of the society and the 
state; 
 
In order to more efficiently fight against corruption we suggested: 
 
- criminological expertise of every law, decree, decision of the Government in order to 
reveal conditions that can generate corruption and financial frauds; 
- adoption of a law on confiscation of goods obtained by criminal ways; 
- improvement of the legislation in the field of financial activities and of the modality of 
registering and activity of business operators; 
- increasing responsibility for forgery of documents and public acts; 
- presentation of declarations for transactions estimated at more than 10 thousand lei for 
juridical persons and at more than 5 thousand lei for individuals; 
- elaboration and implementation of a common network of databases of the Fiscal 
Police, Customs Department, Chamber for Trade and Industry, Chamber for Licensing, 
Informational Technologies Department; 
- creation of a database on persons and organizations that have been identified by law 
enforcement bodies as practicing illegal activities; 
- coordination of efforts of the Moldovan law enforcement institutions with the 
international ones in the field of fighting against transborder crime; 
- modification of the penal legislation and penal procedure legislation that would 
specify the reimbursement of money and material valuables from those public servants 
that take bribes.   
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The Operation of the Romania Border Police at the Eastern Border 
Major V.Niculescu, Romanian Border Police 
 
The fundamental option of Romania’s foreign policy to integrate into the European and 
Euro-Atlantic structure is for the Ministry of Home Affairs (the Main Frontier Police 
Inspectorate) the main direction of foreign relations, the fundamental component of the 
policy of building an appropriate image in the country and abroad.  
 
Given this vision, the main strategic objective is to intensify the reform and modernize 
the Ministry of Home Affairs and its elements, this process being conditioned not only by 
this objective – European and Euro-Atlantic integration – but also by the need to fight 
successfully international crime and the ensuring of secure frontiers has an important role 
to play in this process.  
 
The security of the national frontier, especially its Northern and Eastern segments, 
increased control supervision and improved management are the sine-qua-non conditions 
of success in fighting efficiently trans-frontier crime.  
 
The need to secure Romania’s State frontiers is conditioned by the development of trans-
frontier crime, both as variety and complexity, the general direction being from the East 
to the West, by the internationalization of organized crime, as well as by the availability 
of conditions that encourage such phenomena – ongoing economic crisis, social, ethnical 
and religious conflicts, increased rate of terrorist activities in neighbouring countries, and 
general globalization.  
 
Thus, the complexity and variety of crimes, the criminal pressure at the frontier and the 
need to fight crimes efficiently and to ensure measures to secure the State frontier at the 
same time make all State structures and bodies that have responsibilities related to State 
frontiers get involved actively in the process, in order to ensure integrated frontier 
management that complies with EU practices.  
 
The reorganization of the Romanian Frontier Police has reached an advanced stage, its 
structure was changed during the first stage in 2000, aiming at reducing the number of 
subordination levels. 
 
During 2001 was implemented the second stage of the reorganization program, its 
objective was to ensure optimal management at each frontier segment.  
 
Besides, new legislation on the organization and operation of the Frontier Police and on 
the State frontier regime was adopted.  
 
In addition, pursuant to the legislative reform and the change in the operational 
conditions, central and local bodies were adapted to meet requirements conditioned by 
recent changes. Efforts to increase the professional level of frontier services will continue 
by gradually replacing the military by qualified frontier police, at the same time the  
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informative aspect of their actions will increase, as well as the number of mobile units for 
prompt frontier interventions that are well trained and equipped for such missions.  
 
Special attention is paid and will be paid to the cooperation between empowered 
institutions, as well as cooperation with similar entities in neighbouring countries, other 
EU members and candidate countries. 
 
The main objective of the Romanian Frontier Police is the security of the Eastern and 
Northern frontiers; as these frontiers will become EU frontiers once Romania joins EU, 
the main goals are: efficient frontier control, frontier security and safety, compliance with 
the provisions of treaties, agreements, conventions concluded with neighbouring 
countries, as well as other countries, the use of acquis communitaire to ensure conditions 
needed to integrate into Europe. 
 
If Romania joins EU, while the intentions of Yugoslavia regarding joining EU are not 




The Frontier between Moldova and Romania 
 
The frontier is 681.3 km long and stretches from Cuzlau (Botosani County) to Gura 
Prutului (Galati County). 
 
The frontier has seven points for frontier crossing (5 highway customs and 2 railway 
customs). 
 
One Directorate and four County Inspectorates of the Romanian Frontier Police service 
this segment of the frontier. 
 
The land in this area is a plateau, and the banks of River Prut have a meadow relief. The 
course of the Prut River is sinuous, there are a lot of windings that make surveillance 





• Organized illegal migration from Asia and Africa through Romania to Western 
European countries; 
• Human trafficking for prostitution and illegal employment through criminal 
networks from Moldova that include citizens of other CIS countries; 
• Smuggling with the support or the consent of the frontier services of the 
neighbouring countries; 
• Organized smuggling of consumer goods, especially tobacco, spirits, coffee, food, 
weapons, ammunition, other forbidden goods; 
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• Frontier crimes, including drug, weapon, radioactive substances, patrimonial 
goods smuggling, given the high demand for such goods in the Western, Central, and 
Eastern European countries; 
• Smuggling cars stolen by specialized organized crime; 
• The entry to Romania of members of illegal groups from the CIS and the change 
of status of the criminal actions of such groups at frontier crossing and on the main 
transportation routes (robberies, burglaries, frauds, murders); 
• Attempts to enter Romania with counterfeit passports or travel papers, especially 
by the citizens of Moldova, once the requirement regarding the entry to Romania by 
passport only was introduced; 
• The unavailability of a bilateral legal framework at the Moldova-Romania frontier 
and the delay of negotiations regarding the development and implementation of 
normative acts regulating such issues. 
 
The frontier with Moldova is the one through which individuals bring into the country 
agricultural goods, food, cigarettes and coffee by their own or rented cars, that also 
transported across the frontier several people who are the ones who, as a rule, market the 
goods, without intermediaries. The same is true for railway transport connecting Moldova 
and Romania. 
 
The review of current operations shows a decrease of the number of attempts to enter 
Europe illegally by people from Asia and Africa through the Eastern frontiers, as 
international migration networks prefer safer routes: Turkey – Bulgaria – Romania – 
Hungary or Russia – Ukraine – Poland – Germany.  
 
However, trafficking is a major issue. Available data show that a large number of people, 
especially young ladies from Moldova who have entered Romania illegally were 
trafficked through the frontier with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to work as prostitutes in 
Turkey, Greece, and Italy. 
 
Groups of 3-11 young women of ages ranging from 16 to 33 operated in areas close to 
the frontier crossing units Moravita – Vatin, Naidas – Kaludjelovo, Ylatitsa – Kusici, 
Socol – Vracev Gaj, Varadia – Socitsa. 
 
Such women were trafficked from Chisinau, they entered Romania legally through 
Sculeni, Albisa or Oancea customs, were transited through Romania and entered illegally 
Yugoslavia. 
 
Data were obtained that show that one of the most popular ways to organize illegal 
migration from Moldova to the West is to use travel agencies to get visas that would 
allow people to enter Western Europe as tourists, while the real intention was to violate 
the legislation on visa regimes. 
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It became possible due to the provisions of Romanian legislation that allowed for the 
transit through its frontiers by presenting an ID or passport, without any nominal record 
keeping, which made it difficult to identify Moldovan citizens involved in criminal 
activities. 
 
During 2001, 463 people involved in human trafficking were identified: 116 pimps, 269 
trafficked women, and 78 guides. People that were supposed to leave Romania illegally 
and practice prostitution in other countries came from Moldova (51.6%), Romania (36%), 
and Ukraine (12.2%). 
 
These countries are both source countries and transit countries for groups of women 
trafficked for sexual exploitation in former Yugoslavia, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, the 
Netherlands, other EU members. Two situations are most common: 
 
• Women leave the country well aware of the services they will be delivering. They 
negotiate service conditions, including financial terms; 
• Girls/women sign contracts that seem genuine and state that they would be 
employed as baby-sitters, nurses, companions of elderly people, dancers, waitresses, etc.  
 
From the legal point of view, the women in the first category are considered prostitutes, 
while the second – victims, irrespective of the country of destination. From the humane 
point of view, both categories are victims. 
 
Romanian authorities have undertaken major efforts lately to establish an appropriate 
legal framework and necessary prevention measures in order to reduce the share of such 
phenomena. However, it is a long way to go and many joint actions at the regional and 
national level are needed in order to implement them in a well-coordinated manner, and 
obtain real control over the situation. Thus, international cooperation at the decisional and 
operational levels becomes critical. 
 
As for re-admission agreements, the work on initiating, signing and updating them is 
ongoing. The Agreement on Re-Admission was signed by Romania and the Republic 
of Moldova at Bucharest on July 27, 2001, it was ratified by both parties and will come 
into force in early July of the year 2002. In order to implement the Agreement, the 
authorities of both countries must allow the entry of foreign citizens, including stateless 
persons, who have crossed illegally the frontier coming directly from their country or are 
illegal residents of the other party to the Agreement. 
 
The availability and ratification of the Bilateral Inter-Governmental Agreement on Re-
Admission is critical for securing the human flow between the two countries, and the 
compliance with its provisions should not be delayed.  
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Conclusions and recommendations 
 
The extension of the European Union towards East, being a positive process itself, shall 
be both beneficiary and baneful to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, two former 
soviet states neighboring with the new members of Schengen space (an later on of the 
EU). The implementation of Schengen border should result for these states, on a side, in 
raising of new problems and aggravating the existent ones and on the other side in 
generating positive trends in many problematic domains. 
 
1. Positive aspects of the new Schengen border for Republic of Moldova, Ukraine 
and Romania 
 
• The implementation of Schengen, making inevitable toughening of the frontier regime 
with Romania, could result in decreasing of smuggling and border criminal activities on 
both Moldovan-Romanian and Ukrainian-Romanian borders, as well as in reducing the 
flow of illegal transit migrants. But the real situation will depend, finally, on the 
evolutions in the process of Transnistrian conflict settlement. 
• The enlarged EU (with the new members from Central and Eastern Europe) could 
influence the increasing of the exports from Moldova (more than 50% estimated) and 
Ukraine to the Schengen area. The importance of Schengen area for Moldova’s trade 
relations will significantly grow and in total terms being comparable with that of CIS 
countries. 
• The EU internal changes, as well as the political changes in countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe made possible the international cross-border cooperation, for example 
through Euroregions.  
• The gradual approach of the Republic of Moldova towards the European Union will 
consolidate the state and will accelerate the reorientation of Moldovan society towards a 
normal development, based on the practical implementation of the values of European 
civilization. 
• If the process of Schengen implementation will be accomplished in close cooperation 
with Romania and other countries from the region, in frame of Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe cooperation, as well as other regional structures, Moldova can benefit 
from that, being included in the international cooperation on border management. 
 
2. Negative aspects of the new Schengen border for Republic of Moldova, Romania 
and Ukraine 
 
• The implementation of the Schengen border between Republic of Moldova and 
Romania could determine the reorientation of the flows of migrants, drugs and arms to 
Ukraine, enhanced by the transparence of the Transnistrian sector of the Moldovan-
Ukrainian border, what will disturb the social stability and national security of Ukraine. 
The Moldovan labor migrants could also increase the migration toward Russia and 
Ukraine.  
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• Strengthening the control of Moldovan-Romanian, Romanian-Ukrainian and Poland-
Ukrainian borders, will result, for many people, in growing of the temptation of free 
circulation throughout Europe, and there will be more attempts to cross illegally the 
eastern Schengen border; 
• The adoption of restrictive immigration and visa regime by the candidate states in EU 
for their neighbour countries will cause to the population of the last ones a lot of 
problems: starting with visiting their relatives to the destabilization of the society. 
• The Schengen border will worsen the economic wellbeing of the people and regions in 
the proximity to the border. As a result of introducing the visa regime a considerable part 
of Moldovan active population, as well as a part of the Ukrainian population, will lost 
most of the possibilities to earn the income necessary to meet the challenges of the 
increasing costs of living. 
• The deficit of Moldova’s trade balance with Schengen States is expected to increase. 
In the situation when Schengen countries mostly import to Moldovan market, Moldova 
will become even more dependent on its eastern traditional exports markets, leaving less 
room for diversification, and subsequently making it more vulnerable to the fluctuations 
on those markets.  
• The strict enforcement of the provisions of the Schengen agreement regarding the 
border regime will certainly facilitate (affect) the increase of existent disparities between 
the two parts of Europe, primarily in the social-economic and psychological aspects 
(feelings of frustration). The plenary conformation of Romania to the provisions of 
Schengen agreement will cause the restoration of a frontier similar to the one that existed 
prior to the declaration of independence of the Republic of Moldova.  
• The exclusion from the new Europe could have a profound effect on political 
identities, on foreign and security policies, and on the progress of democratic and 
economic reforms of these countries 
• There is a possibility, that European enlargement will encourage the formation of a 
closer security relationship among the excluded states, and a strengthening of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States or the new organization that will replace 
(substitute) it. 
• Without comprehensive solutions that would address the related problems, these could 
create additional challenges to the security and stability of Republic of Moldova, Ukraine 
and Romania – which, in their turn, will generate risks for the broader European security.  
Recommendations 
 
The key-problem consists in elaboration of common measures of the EU, its future 
members and new neighbors in order to minimize the negative effects of Schengen.  
 
 
In this regard, is necessary to undertake the following measures: 
 
• Demarcation of the border with Ukraine and strengthening the control of the 
Moldovan central authorities’ over the territory under the Central Government 
authorities.  
• Strength the administrative capacity, material endowment of the state authorities, 
increase of the personnel, its institution pursuant the European standards.  
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• Create national databases comprising information on all entering persons. Exchange of 
information on migration between Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and CEE and the EU 
states could serve as an initial step towards development of such co-operation and 
creation of a single computerised database 
• Regulate the “ghost-tourist agencies” activity. This should also interest the west-
European states, because their embassies are issuing visas having contacts with these 
agencies. 
• Support financially, including through sponsoring, the continuing of the campaign for 
prevention of the white slave traffic, trying to use also the sponsors’  
• Sweeping change of the legislation regarding the aliens. 
• Signing the bilateral Treaties of readmission of foreign citizens with states attractive 
for the Moldovan and Ukrainian immigrants. 
• Provide a close collaboration between the neighboring states (for example by ssetting 
up common border crossing checkpoints) in combating the illegal migration and the 
outgoing infringements, excluding different policy techniques promoted in these 
countries and the lack of trust between these states’ authorities.  
• Improving professionalism within the customs services, in particular by combating 
corruption, streamlining activities and developing effectiveness through improving 
procedures and organization of joint cross-border actions. 
 
 
The states from the Schengen region should undertake the following measures: 
 
• Provide assistance in the Moldova’s efforts in demarcation of the border with Ukraine. 
• More efficient international support of the Moldavian initiative in setting up of the 
Moldovan-Ukrainian border, on the Transnistrian sector, joint checkpoints. 
• Support the efforts undertaken by the Moldavian authorities for solving the 
Transnistrian conflict.  
• Introduce at the Schengen border checkpoints of a considerable number of consular 
workers capable to manage the increasing volume of visa applications. 
• Provide a tight co-ordination and collaboration between the consular services of the 
countries that adhered recently to the Schengen space and European Union, as well as the 
involvement of some important financial resources for the assurance of a high efficiency 
of the activity of the new consular offices.  
• Provide the holding of the consultations of adequate governmental officials and joint 
working groups of experts from Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and adequate accession 
states and the EU, which will work out proposals for introduction of streamlined visa 
issuing procedures. 
• Increase the co-operation with relevant EU agencies responsible for the 
implementation of the Schengen acquis and transfer of experience through twinning 
programs. Technical provisions for improving the efficacy of such a migration policy 
shall include modernisation of the border infrastructure, installation of adequate computer 
technology and personnel training. 
• Implement new methods of granting visa (using mailing services, Internet etc). 
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• Increase the investments in the modernization of the technical infrastructure of the 
checkpoints at the border for a rapid crossing without creating difficulties of formal and 
psychological nature. 
• Provide financial assistance for the campaign for prevention of the white slave traffic. 
• Provide logistic assistance of the administrative structures of Moldova, Ukraine and 
Romania dealing with migration. Training of the personnel in conformity to the European 
standards. 
• Support of the NGOs dealing with migration phenomenon. The latter are more 
efficient even with limited funds. 
• To fix an extension of the categories of people with the legal right to be issued 
multiple Schengen visas for one year and with the right to travel freely during 6 months 
• Reduce the cost of Schengen visas. 
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